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ABSTRACT 
This research falls into two parts. The first part begins with some 
observations on the methods employed in the writing of intellectual 
history. These observations are essentially critical and lead on to 
a detailed discussion of some proposed alternatives. The first 
chapter does not claim to have solved difficult theoretical and 
methodological problems but rather to have made possible greater 
clarity and awareness of what the problems are o 
In the light of these considerations an examination is then made of 
the relationship between Darwinian Biology and the major social 
doctxine claiming inspiration from it, namely~ Eugenics. With 
reference to this connection the central argument maintained is that 
there were systematic links between Darwinism and Eugenics o An 
attempt is made to analyse those links firstly by examination of 
certain theoretical features of Darwinism itself and secondly by an 
examination of the misreadings of Darwinism practised by Eugenics o 
This analysis is complemented by a detailed investigation of the 
structure of Eugenic thought as it appeared in Britain before the 
First World Waro 
The second part then extends this general picture by means of a 
number of case studies of Eugenic thinking and action on specific 
issues. The issues studied are those at the centre of controversy. 
during the period namely pauperism, alcoholism and mental deficiency. 
The priority in these case studies is the further development of the 
account of Eugenic thought but in each case there is an attempt, 
firstly to assess the impact of the Eugenic idea on public opinion and 
secondly, especially in the case of mental deficiency, to assess what 
legislative impact, if any, the Eugenic idea may have had. 
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Part I - THE THEORETICAL STRUCTURE OF EUGENICS 
In the first part of this research I have tried to accomplish three 
different objectives and in this introduction some of their purposes 
and limitations are explained. The first chapter, perhaps unusually 
in a study of the history of ideas, devotes considerable space to 
some discussion of how to approach this kind of historical writing and 
more specifically to an analysis of the work of two particular 
contemporary writers in this field. Hopefully this exercise has been 
more than just sterile exegesis. I have tried to bring out the 
presuppositions of much conventional history writing, primarily with a 
fairly detailed look at Lovejoy. This has been done through the 
analysis of other perspectives to show what possible criticisms can be 
made of those presuppositions. 
There is a very thin line here dividing internal and external forms of 
criticism. The difficulty, it seems to me, has been well put by 
J.R. Searle: "if internal he (the critic) must learn enough about the 
subject to see where its regular practitioners are going wrong, to 
correct their mistakes, and in that sense to do it better than they do 
i tit - "If, on the other hand, he tries to make purely external attacks 
- the practitioners of the subject are doing such and such, but they 
should be doing so and so - there is a danger that his criticisms may 
simply amount to a preference for doing something else altogether" (1). 
I have tried to get round this difficulty towards the end of Chapter 
One by an example from the history of botany which shows the 
weaknesses of some of the conventional approaches. 
The presentation of alternative perspectives has forced the closer 
consideration of some of the major questions in writing the history of 
ideas. The value of the exercise is not in any easy methodological 
'pay_off' but in the view that sustained analysis of particular styles 
of history writing makes for clarity of thought when one approaches 
one's own material. What can be said by way of conclusion to this 
point is that the results of this chapter were to give the rest of the 
research, to use the conventional jargon, a strongly internalist 
flavour (2). 
(5) 
The second chapter begins the actual analysis of Eugenics by trying to 
establish with some precision its connection with Darwinism. It 
illustrates one of the great difficulties in writing intellectual 
history, namely, boundary problems. Some attempt is made to resolve 
these by analysing certain aspects of Darwin's writings without 
deviating too much into properly philosophical or biological 
territory. The problem that I am trying to deal with here is that 
while at one level the links between Darwinism and the social 
doctrines 'borrowing' from it have always been obvious the precise 
connections have seemed (at least to me) irritatingly vague (3). In 
this chapter I tried to show how those connections might be possible. 
Finally in Chapters Three and Four the attempt is made to present as 
accurate a picture as possible of the Eugenic doctrine as it emerged 
in Britain befo~~ the First World War. There were methodological 
difficulties here, of course, which are discussed in the appendix to 
Chapter Three. The material is divided firstly into an analysis of 
the major concepts deployed by the Eugenists in their account of the 
biological effects of modern society and secondly an analysis (in 
Chapter Four) of the structure of their proposed solutions. It seemed 
useful at that point to add a brief account of some of the 
contemporary reactions to the Eugenic doctrine. 
FOOTNOTES 
(1) Times Literary Supplement 21 Nov 1975 
(2) The distinction is, of course, a familiar one. For an interesting 
discussion in the biological field see Garland Allen - Genetics, 
Eugenics and Society: Internalists and Externalists in Contemporary 
History of Science (Social Studies of Science 6(1976)105-22) 
(3) For different angles see K.E. Bock - Darwin and Social Theory 
(Philosophy of Science 22(1956)123-134); R.J. Halliday - Social 
Darwinism (Victorian Studies XIV(197l)389-405); J.A. Rogers -
Darwinism and Social Darwinism (Journal of the History of Ideas XXXIII 
(1972)256-280) 
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Chapter I - WRITING THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 
"Tout le monde admet que ltesprit dtune ~poque marque toutes les 
activit{s de lthomrne. Le difficult{ ne consiste pas tant ~ faire des 
rapprochements, qur~ les justifier. Un esprit s~rieux r~pugnera 
toujours ~ passer dtune th~me politique ~ une forme architecturale, 
d'une pratique religieuse \ une doctrine scientifique. Cette voltige 
intellectuelle range de d~consid:rer l'histoire des id~es au pr~s de 
bons esprits, ou n~gligeant les contingences, les donn~es materielles 
, , 
et techniques, les traditions propres a chaque science et a chaque 
art. Pourtant les rapprochements s'imposent". (J. Roger - Les 
~ , 
Sciences de la Vie dans la pensee francais du XVIII siecle). 
Traditionally the academic study of the history of ideas has dealt 
with a number of problems that can usefully be separated into the 
internality of texts and relations between texts. A number of major 
problems have recurred: problems of interpretation and meaning; 
problems of the forms of language,; problems of the division of texts 
into different spheres and genres. The fact that these spheres and 
genres are not watertight itself engenders a whole series of problems 
concerned with the relations between texts: questions of relations 
between philosophy and the sciences; between sciences and ideologies; 
indeed questions about the nature of interpretation itself. 
More recently another range of issues has come to be seen as central, 
namely the relations between texts and social organisation (in the 
widest sense). This has led to studies of both a macro-type 
(relations between texts and types of society for instance) and a 
micro-type (relations between texts and an author for instance) (1). 
Often, perhaps even usually, these two aspects are seen as 
complementary. So, to take a famous example, the 'rise of science' 
has often been seen as the product of people concerned with practical 
or technical problems (navigation, ballistics etc.,) which problems 
were themselves produced by new social practices or organisation. 
These are crude descriptions but not so as to be unrecognisable. 
It seems reasonable to say that the dominant position in this field of 
study is what might be called a history of ideas/sociology of 
(7) 
knowledge couple. The complementary relation between these two 
approaches is one of continuisrn/reductionism. That is to say that the 
history of ideas (beyond the merely mechanical recapitulation of what 
has been said in the past) deploys concepts usch as 'tradition', 
'spirit of the age' (2) 'influence; and various developmental 
principles whose combined effect is to display continuities and 
connections and erase apparently superficial dafferences. This can be 
seen both in its programmatic statements and in empirical work. For 
Lovejoy, the history of ideas, "is concerned only with a certain group 
of factors in history, and with these only insofar as they can be seen 
at work in what are commonly considered separate divisions of the 
intellectual world; and it is especially interested in the processes 
by which influences pass over from one province to another" (3). 
Lovejoy shows the effect of such ideas in the following quotation (one 
of many that could be cited): " ••• while in an age in which many men 
of science were also theologians, this change in the religious and 
ethical application of the conception (the Platonic conception) 
tended, of itself, to promote a kindred change in scientific ideas" (4). 
The presuppositions behind these statements blend easily with the 
various kinds of sociologism and psychologism. That i$ to say that 
the sociology of knowledge deploys concepts whose tendency (even if 
denied) is to reduce forms of discourse to effects of social practices. 
Thus, for Gasman, Marx and Darwin were "representative authors of the 
age" while according to Pickens many upper-middle class Americans 
"merely projected their class prejudices as objective laws of 
civilisation and nature" (5). The sociology of knowledge is replete 
with these kinds of assertions which may have a psychological 
reference thrown in. Thus for Zilsel - "The individualism of the new 
society is a presupposition of scientific thinking. The scientist, 
too, relies, in the last resort, only on his own eyes and his own 
brain and is supposed to make himself independent of belief in 
authorities" (6). 
In recent work in the field of intellectual history considerable 
dissatisfaction has been expressed at both the limitations of and 
unconvincing results of these approaches. This dissatisfaction has 
been uneven (different in the history of the sciences from say the 
(8) 
history of political theory) but has had a common element in the 
search for more adequate concepts or possibly even a general doctrine. 
Two theorists who have made a considerable impact with contributions 
in this field are L. Althusser and M. Foucault. What follows is not 
primarily an exegetical exercise but an attempt to establish both the 
fact and the effects of distinctively different theoretical approaches, 
and to see what lessons may be learned from their writings. 
"The reader should realise that I am doing all that I can to give the 
concepts I use a strict meaning, and that if he wants to understand 
these concepts he will have to pay attention to this rigour, and, in 
so far as it is not imaginary, he will have to adopt it himself". 
L. ALTHUSSER (7). 
The first of the authors to be considered is a marxist philosopher not 
unassociated with the structuralist current in France~(8). In his 
book For Marx Iproblematic t is one of two concepts introduced as 
essential to his work - "the indispensable theoretical minimum" (9). 
Given this indispensibility it seems appropriate to ask the following 
questions. Why are the old concepts unsatisfactory? In what way(s) 
are the new concepts different and better? How do the new concepts 
work? It is convenient to begin with Althusser's review of the 
Recherches Internationales studies of the Young Marx (10). The 
theoretical problem here concerns certain readings of Marx's early 
writings which "depend(s) more on free association of ideas or a 
simple comparison of terms than on a historical critique" (11). The 
results of such readings are not insignificant; they may be "the 
preconditions of a real understanding of the texts" (12); they may 
"open up interesting perspectives" (13). However these readings are 
based on a certain theoretical position - "the comparison, opposition 
and approximation of elements that culminates in a theory of sources -
or, what comes to the same thing, "in a theory of anticipation" (14). 
This theory has three suppositions: firstly an analytic one - a 
theoretical system is reducible to its elements which makes possible 
(a) thinking "any element of this sytem on its own" (15) (b) comparing 
the element of one system with another similar element of another 
system; secondly a teleological one - this "institutes these elements 
as elements in order to proceed to their measurement according to its 
(9) 
own norms as if to their truth" (16). These two suppositions depend 
on a third which regards "the history of ideas as its own element, 
maintains that nothing happens there which is not a product of the 
history of ideas itself and that the world of ideology is its own 
principle of inte11igibi1ity"(17). 
When this theory is applied Marx's thought is reduced to its elements, 
materialist and idealist, and these elements are weighted against 
each other to "determine the meaning of the text under examination" (18). 
Thus in general: the positions ascribed involve reducing a text and 
therefore missing the level of meaning and unity; they are 
teleological, which seems to mean here that these readings do not 
explain how these different elements are combined together; they are 
of little use since all the authors in Recherches Internationales 
studies use them and yet all disagree as to when Marx became a 
materialist. 
It is the first point which is crucial to Althusser1s critique. 
Given the decomposition into elements, "who can really decide what 
meaning they constitute once they are assemble together in the 
effective living unity of a text" (19). Althusser pursues the 
ultimate logic of the analytico-te1eologica1 theory (as he calls it); 
he asks what would be thought of someone who espoused, say, the 
philosophy of the 1844 manuscripts: would we regard it as idealist or 
materialist? marxist or non-marxist? Or should we regard its 
meaning as in abeyance, waiting on a stage it has not yet reached? (20). 
Again he emphasises that in the teleological treatment the question of 
the totality cannot be raised before the final synthesis. The 
ultimate logic of this method appears to be that it cannot recognise 
anything other than itself. The critical thrust is now switched. 
Previously this method could only rub materialist and idealist 
elements together rather like a tribesman rubs sticks, with less result 
in the former case. Now it posits a relation, one of form and content 
or content and conceptual expression with materialism and idealism 
playing the obvious roles. In addition the idealist form is often 
characterised as a question of terminology. There are other variants 
of this position, e.g., where the polarity is consciousness and 
tendency. In this variant the tendency must be the motor of Marx l s 
(10) 
development and must involve for example the objective content of the 
1843 manuscripts from the viewpoint of developed Marxism. 
For Althusser this procedure is Hegelian because it merely provides a 
retrospective abstraction of the result (i.e., developed Marxism) 
which is precisely what is to be explained. Thus the positive 
implications of the criticisms of the analytico-teleological method 
would seem to be that (a) the existence of the 'effective living 
unity' of the text must be demonstrated since up to now it has merely 
been asserted; (b) this must be done without recourse to the 
ultimately Heglian, analytico-teleological method, the essential 
concepts of which are (i) elements (the possibility of decomposition; 
the possibility of thinking them in isolation); (ii) the concept of 
tendency; (iii) the concepts of form and content and their variants. 
Althusser proposes three I1Marxist principles of a theory of 
ideological development" (21) namely (1) every ideology must be 
regarded as a real whole, internally unified by its problematic, so 
that it is impossible to extract one element without altering its 
meaning; (2) the meaning of the ideology depends on its relations to 
the existing ideological field and on the social problems and social 
structure which sustain the ideology and are reflected in it; (3) the 
developmental principle of a particular ideology is to be found 
outside it - this at two levels, "its author as a concrete individual 
and the actual history reflected in this individual development 
according to the complex ties between the individual and this 
history" (22). The notion of ideology is the prerequisite to all the 
proposed new principles, e.g., the problem of the effective unity of 
a text becomes the problem of the unity of ideology though the 
question of unity remains. With this shift to ideology is opened up 
a distinct set of determinations with two levels, namely ideology in 
relation to the ideological field and ideology in relation to the 
social structure which sustains it and is reflected in ib. 
Thus far and at the level of formal definitions Althusser has given us 
a rigorous answer to the questions originally posed. The new 
concepts are different because (a) they effectively characterise the 
unity of an ideology, (b) they open the realm of ideology to 
(11) 
determinations outside its domain. Althusser takes up first the 
relation of ideology to the ideological field - "everything is in 
play between the rigour of a single thought and the thematic system of 
an ideological field" (23). For Althusser the ideological field 1S 
not available in any texts as such so that for example it is not the 
library Hegel that is of interest but rather the Hegel of the neo-
Hegelian movement, "a Hegel already made to contradict himself, 
invoked against himself, in despite of himself" (24). Marx learned 
to think within this objective environment which was not of his own 
making. Neither can the presence of an author, and so by extension 
the ideological field, in another' author's works be read off from a 
filiation of explicit references. 
The problem then is to think the unity of the ideological field but 
Althusser proposes to do this by way of posing the question of the 
internal unity of Marx's thought in relation to Feuerbach. This is 
the problem the Recherches Internationales commentators cannot grasp, 
namely what "constitutes the basic unity of a text, the internal 
essence of an ideological thought, that is, its problematic". Here 
Althusser extends his definition of problematic as "the concept that 
gives the best grasp on the facts without falling into the Hegelian 
ambiguities of "totality" (25). In more detail, (1) totality tends to 
think the empty unity of the described whole whereas (2) problematic 
thinks a determinate unitary structure which makes possible (a) the 
thinking of the unification of the elements of the thought (b) 
discovery in the unity of a determinate content and therefore the 
meaning of the elements (c) the positing of the relation of the 
ideology to the problems left or posed to every thinker by the 
historical period in which he lives" (26). 
In an important footnote at this point Althusser recasts problematic 
in terms of a metaphor congruent with his own philosophical practice 
of interrogation. The concept of problematic, "brings out ••• the 
system of questions commanding the answers given by the ideology" 
i.e., one asks the question of the ideology's own questions. This is 
the internal level. But there is a level of external determinations, 
i.e., the problematic is itself an answer, not, at this level, to its 
own internal questions "but to the objective problems posed for the 
(12) 
ideology by its time". This sets the space for a crucial Althusserian 
i) 
thesis, namely the deformation of ideology. Since the problematic is 
an answer itself to objective problems of the time it is the latter 
which constitutes the essence of the problematic. The methodological 
injunction is, "a comparison of the problems posed by the ideologue 
(his problematic) with the real problems posed for the ideologue by 
his time, makes possible a demonstration of the truly ideological 
element of the ideology, that is what characterises ideology as such, 
its deformation" (27). 
Returning to the development of tile main them Althusser takes as his 
example the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. The splitting 
of this text into Feuerbachian and non-Feuerbachian elements clearly 
will not do. It is not that new objects (politics, classes) are 
introduced - what is important is the modality of reflection on these 
objects. Problematic is 'now situated at the level of the actual 
relation of reflection to its objects so that it is not limited to any 
particular set of objects but is "the concrete determinate structure 
of a thought and of all the thoughts possible within this thought" (28). 
Thus the correct question here would be - does Marx think the State, 
private property etc., on the basis of Feuerbachian suppositions or 
not? 
To take stock at this point; Althusser regards, surely correctly, two 
elements as essential to his break with the old methods, viz: (a) the 
question of unity (b) the relation, to put it crudely, between the 
realm of ideas and the realm of other practices. His intervention in 
these questions is represented by two key terms, namely problematic 
and deformation. These problems in their general form,are not new. 
Althusser·s comment that academic orthodoxy "r:egards the history of 
ideas as its own element, maintains that nothing happens there which 
is not a product of the history of ideas itself" (29) seems rather 
one-sided. Academic orthodoxy and Althusser himself, tend to divide 
up the world, at least initially, into 'ideas' and 'non-ideas
'
• Both, 
again, believe there is some connection between these two spheres and 
therefore become involved in problems which are essentially problems 
of correspondence, e.g., how far can we say that certain ideas are in 
some way bound up with certain states of society, that for example 
(13) 
German theory (philosophy) in the early nineteenth century had some 
special relationship with German 'backwardness' or to take another 
example, that Darwinism was in some way related to 'bourgeois Society'. 
As far as the first question is concerned namely the problem of the 
characterisation of ideas Althusser claims to have solved this by 
means of the concept of problematic. Three definitions of problematic 
have been presented, namely, an internal essence or effective unity 
model, a question and answers model, and a modality of reflection 
model. The objects characterised included 'ideology', rideological 
field', 'text', 'individualts thought'. It may be added that three of 
Althusser's English commentators offer additional models, all 
different. B. Brewster, Althusserts English translator, states in his 
glossary to For Marx that a problematic can only be discovered on the 
model of the Freudian analysts's reading of his patientts utterances" 
(30). P.Q. Hirst, in a book claiming inspiration from Althusser 
argues that problematic is to discourse as langue is to parole in 
Saussure's linguistics (31). Lastly, A. Hussain argues that, "The 
problematic is to discursive practice what forces and relations of 
production are to the production of goods" (economic practice) (32). 
All the currently fashionable analogies would seem to be exhausted at 
this point. This is a somewhat confusing situation (perhaps even a 
"symptomatic' one) and requires fresh examination of a more critical 
nature of Althusser's text (33). 
It must be said that in the last analysis Althusserts discourse here 
moves in a circle of equivalent definitions which are all based on the 
mysterious 'unity'. Take, for example, the idea of ideological field, 
Althusser makes some important methodological gestures in this area 
but his real claim is to "go further than the unintentional presence 
of the thoughts of a living author to the presence of his potential 
thoughts" (34). And just as the individual's thought is characterised 
by a unity, so is the ideological field of potential thoughts - yet we 
are no nearer to knowing how we may construct this unity, other than 
that it may be made up of more than one problematic. When Althusser 
takes up an example to explain this unity (Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right) for all his impressive definitions, all he tells 
us is that the text must be examined for Feuerbachian suppositions, 
(14) 
coupled to the general idea that these presuppositions are in some way 
primary over the range of (empirical) objects that a theory discusses. 
But again this is hardly a great innovation. Certainly the use of 
terms such as 'potential' and 'all the thoughts possible within the 
thought' implies perhaps of 'grammar· of thought which would 
~generatet all the thoughts within it and the use of 'unconscious' 
and 'dragged up from the depths' perhaps authorises the Freudian 
analogy. But these are analogies of the most tenuous kind, and it 
would not be unfair to say, little more than glosses on Marx's 
off-the-cuff comments on these matters (35). 
There is more to be said on the second major area, i.e., the 
correspondence between ideas and other practices ,(36). The essence is 
contained in what was referred to above as the question and answer 
model. For Althusser ideologies must be examined at two levels. 
Internally one asks the question of their questions, or rather what 
the questions are that produce the answers that the ideology offers. 
Externally however, the ideology as a whole is an answer to certain 
objective problems. Thus, "a comparison of the problems posed by the 
ideologue (his problematic) with the real problems posed for the 
ideologue by his time makes possible a demonstration of the truly 
ideological element of ideology, that is, what characterises ideology 
as such, its deformation" (37). A slightly glib summary might be to 
say that at the internal level ideology gives real answers to false 
problems. Externally it gives false answers to real problems. 
In relation to ideas the level of 'non-ideas' is allocated two roles: 
(i) directly as a result of the break with the 'eclectic' method it is 
the level of the developmental principle of the ideology: (ii) it is 
the essence of a problematic. Althusser puts this rather crudely in 
places but the essential idea is contained in the statement that the 
truth of ideology is in the facts themselves. A propos Marx this 
question of the facts and deformation of the facts governs Althusser's 
whole account not only of the German theeretical context but also how 
it was that Marx broke away from it. But it must be said that this is 
in the form of imputed correspondences between (i)social structure 
(social problems), (ii) a certain class/stratum experience, (iii) a 
certain type of theory, i.e., post-Hegelian philosophy. For Althusser 
(15) 
early nineteenth century Germany was characterised by an inability to 
realise its bourgeois revolution and this deeply marked German 
ideology. Germany could not, as it were, 'take part' in history. 
This inability was thought by intellectuals in forms "characteristic 
of their social circle: the petty-bourgeoisie of functionaries, 
teachers, writers, etc.," (38). Their thought was a "counterpart to 
Germany's historical underdevelopment" (39). 
What is never clear in these explanations is why it is that a certain 
class, the petty-bourgeoisie, should produce a certain theoretical 
form, idealist philosophy. What were these 'characteristic forms' -
they were "hopeful, nostalgic, idealised" (40). Did not non-German 
petty-bourgeois circles also think in these forms? Did not other 
social circles also think in these forms? Nevertheless it was as a 
result of this that German idealist philosophy developed. The 
question remains as to why the petty-bourgeoisie should not produce a 
political or a sociologistic or even an astrological account of their 
countryV s 'problems'. The space is then set for Marx to be the one 
who does (literally) go to real problems - "But when he got there 
(Paris), he made the fundamental discovery that France and England 
did not correspond to their myth, the discovery of the class struggle 
of flesh and blood capitalism, and of the organised proletariat" (41). 
Clearly this (rather) positivist version can be jettisoned (42) but 
this is irrelevant. If the real problems, rather than being 'really 
there' are designated by historical materialsim (presumably the only 
alternative open to a marxist) then we do not have a comparison 
between a theory (German idealism) and a 'reality' (German 
'backwardness)) but between one theory and another; in which case the 
means of establishing 'deformation' disappear unless some other 
criteria are set up. 
"What one is seeing then, is the emergence of a whole field of 
questions, some of which are already familiar, by which this new form 
of history is trying to develop its own theory ••• " M. FOUCAULT (43). 
M. Foucault, less of a marxist and perhaps less dogmatic than 
Althusser, has devoted greater effort to producing new ways of writing 
the history of ideas. His criticism of the conventional approaches is 
J .,..;. --
( 16) 
sharp and fundamental. "But archaeological description is precisely 
such an abandonment of the history of ideas, a systematic rejection of 
its postulates and procedures, an attempt to practice a quite 
different history of what men have said" (44). The Archaeology of 
Knowledge is a militant book whose opening battle cry is a call for 
the destruction of the old methods - "We must question these ready-
made syntheses, those groupings that we normally accept before any 
examination, those links whose validi'ty is recogniesed from the outset; 
we must oust those forms and obscure forces by which we usually link 
the discourse of one man with that of another; they must be driven out 
from the darkness in which they reign" (45). 
Foucault's criticisms are of two kinds. The first appear to form part 
of what is conventionally known as structuralism though Foucault 
himself denies this (46). Much solemn and it would appear fruitless 
effort has gone into defining this term. The general drift is surely 
clear. If there is need of a formula it is well put by G. Deleuze, 
while discussing Foucault himself - "Une destruction fro ide et 
~ d 0 of d~ I °d~ d' 0 0 d' 0 0 concertee u sUJet, un Vl egout pour es 1 ees orlglne, orlg1ne 
~ t'" perdu, d·origien retrouvee, un demantelement des pseudo-syntheses 
unifiantes de la conscience, une d(nonciation de toutes les 
.". , 
mystifications de l'histoire operees au nom du progres, de la 
conscience et du devenir de la raison ••• (47). Structuralism, this 
quotation_surely allows us to add, is a cultural mood: it comprises a 
fascination with language in itself as it were, rather than as a means 
of expression, the extension of this notion to the arts (and thus the 
affinity with modernism), attacks on traditional views of reason and 
ethics and so on. In Foucault's own phrase, "Structuralism is not a 
new method; it is the awakened and troubled consciousness of modern 
thought" (48). 
The second group of Foucault's criticisms, what might be called the 
technical criticisms, would seem to be worth pursuing. Foucault 
emphasises that the conventional history of ideas makes much of the 
mapping of antecedents, i.e., the discussion of 'anticipations', 
'forerunners', 'foreshadowings' and so on, and he points out, 
irrefutably, that to pursue this exercise some notion of identity and 
difference must be employed. The main thrust of his criticism is that 
(17) 
this notion (or notions) is much more problematic than conventional 
history of ideas allows. Indeed it is argued that the apparent 
resemblance between f9rmulations may be an "effect of the discursive 
field in which it is mapped" (49). Consequently the reliance placed 
by the history of ideas on the similarity of words and themes is 
likely to be fundamentally misleading. It appears to me that this is 
the basis for all his attacks on the notions used in the history of 
ideas - all of them corne back to this principle of identity (50). 
The second half of the technical criticism refers to what may be 
called the relation between a work and its author. Here further 
allusion to general structuralist themes is unavoidable. One can 
only confess (a confession of inadequacy, no doubt) that the 
structuralist imagination seems to be populated with books that write 
themselves, pictures that paint themselves and so on. It is in this 
sense that Foucault shares the general exultation - "However, since 
the beginning of this century, psycho-analytical, linguistic and then 
ethnological research has dispossessed the subject of the laws of its 
desire, the forms of its speech, the rules of its action, and the 
systems of its mythical discourses" (51). The danger in interpreting 
this is being unfair - what it appears to mean is that there are 
certain aspects of human behaviour or activity whose rules are not 
understood by human beings engaged in those activities or behaviours 
though they are able to operate the rules - the favourite example is, 
of course, language (52). The status of this general cultural theme 
is slightly to one side of the question of its implications in the 
history of ideas. What is being attacked is "the desire to make the 
human consciousness the originating subject of all learning and all 
practice" (53), and this statement forms the springboard for Foucault's 
own work. 
In order to discuss these themes in relation to concrete material I 
have used as a central focus chapter five of Foucault's third book 
The Order of Things (Classifying). This chapter may be said to work 
at two levels - firstly there is a characterisation of eighteenth 
century natural history as part of a 'classical' episteme having 
certain features in common with other discourses; and secondly there 
are the consequences of his discussion for the traditional problems of 
(18) 
characterising natural history. It is this latter aspect I want to 
focus on. 
The general facts are familiar. One of the major debates of 
eighteenth and nineteenth century biology had been that between fixism 
and evolutionism, this issue not being finally resolved until Darwin. 
It seems to be generally agreed that 'precursors' of evolutionary 
thought included Maupertuis and Buffon (54) though Lamarck remains the 
obvious candidate (55). The question that has been asked (or rather 
it is rarely asked but 'answered' in the affirmative) is, as Foucault 
puts it, "could one not, for example, constitute as a unity everything 
that has constituted the evolutionist theme from Buffon to Darwin" (56). 
The question is rhetorical for Foucault is firmly convinced that this 
is not a fruitful strategy since, "the same thematic is articulated on 
the basis of two sets of concepts, types of analysis, two perfectly 
different fields of objects: in its most general formulation the 
evolutionist idea is perhaps the same in the work of Benoit de 
Maillet, Bordeu or Diderot and in that of Darwin; but, in fact, what 
makes it possible and coherent is not at all the same thing in either 
case. In the eighteenth century, the evolutionist idea is defined on 
the basis of a kinship of species forming a continuum laid down at the 
outset (interrupted only by natural catastrophes) or gradually built 
up by the passing of time. In the nineteenth century the evolutionist 
theme concerns not so much the constitution of a continous table of 
species as the description of discontinuous groups and the analysis of 
the modes of interaction between an organism whose elements are 
interdependent and an environment that provides its real conditions of 
life" (57). 
This will be pursued by taking up some themes already raised in 
relation to the history of ideas, specifically by a comparison of 
Foucault and Lovejoy. I think it would be generally agreed that there 
is some warrant for this. Both authors deal with theories called 
evolutionist. At first glance their respective positions are clear. 
"In roughly the third quarter of the century theories which may, in 
the broad sense, be called evolutionistic multiplied", says Lovejoy 
(58), giving Diderot and Maupertuis as examples while for Foucault, 
"There is not and cannot be the suspicion of an evolutionism or a 
--------------------~~-----
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transformism in Classical thought" (59). 
Certain aspects of eighteenth century biology appear in Lovejoy's 
classic study as effects of much older ideas (60). Precisely such an 
effect was the difference of position on species. Lovejoy's starting 
point is modes of thought about classes of objects (irrespective of 
their nature). The first of these modes involves the postulation of 
sharp, clear-cut differentiation whereas the second sees such divisions 
as a merely heuristic device having no real counterpart in Nature. 
The link between the first of these modes and post-Renaissance biology 
is made on the authority of Daudin and what is essentially the 
speculation that Cesalpino began his work De Plantis having read 
Aristotle's logical and scientific writings. The effect of the 
second mode is found via Locke's nominalism (Locke himself being 
quoted to the effect that biological species were merely verbal). But 
the principle of continuity implied this rejection of species "even 
more potently because it had a still greater body of tradition behind 
it" (61). 
Buffon attacked the systematists "repeating the customary phraseology 
about the continuity of the chain" (62). These age-old principles are 
thus seen to have exerted considerable effects. "Thus the general 
habit of thinking in terms of species ••• was beginning to break down 
in the eighteenth century. In an age in which, more than in any 
preceding period, the principle of continuity was reckoned among the 
first and fundamental truths, it could not have been otherwise" (63). 
Lovejoy uses this material to illustrate one of his constant 
preoccupations, namely the discovery of new possibilities in old ideas. 
Even where the principle of continuity did not encourage biologists to 
reject the notion of species (64) it did encourage them to search for 
'missing links' that would fill the gaps of the complete chain that it 
indicated on a priori grounds - "The metaphysical assumption thus 
furnished a program for scientific research" (65). This argument 
enables Lovejoy to locate both the obsession with missing links 
(e.g., Trembley's Hydra) and microscopy. In the latter case because 
it was argued in the eighteenth century that biological microscopy 
confirmed the principle of plenitude. 
~~v~~~~======----------~----- _____________________________________________________ ___ 
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Foucault's approach to these problems is somewhat different. He begins 
by briefly indicating his objections to previous accounts, stressing 
(the point made above), Itabove all the application of categories that 
are strictly anachronistic in relation to this knowledge" (66). In 
Foucalut's account the change to eighteenth century natural history 
from previous 'biology' was a function of an 'epistemic' change. 
Natural history became the 'nomination of the visible' (67) not in the 
empiricist sense of suddenly looking at things empirically but the 
construction of a new kind of visibility (68). So that for Foucault, 
"it was the same complex of negative conditions that limited the realm 
of experience and made the use of optical instruments possible" (69), 
i.e., the significance of microscopy is determined by the construction 
of the new domain rather than as an incidental confirmation of age-old 
philosophical notions a la Lovejoy. A similar comment applies to 
Foucault's treatment of missing link-ism, but both this and 
evolutionism require the sketching of Foucault's whole discussion. 
Foucault is concerned to separate two ways of doing natural history 
which, though familiar in appearance, were not, in fact, rooted in a 
"conflict between the great intuitions of Nature" but rather lay "in 
the necessity which at this point rendered the choice between two ways 
of constituting natural history as a language both possible and 
indispensable" (70). For Foucault eighteenth century natural history 
was governed by a relation between structure and character. The first 
of these was constructed by applying to any organism or distinguishable 
parts thereof the four values of form, quantity, proportion and 
situation. This stage still left everything designated in its 
concrete individuality. But for the process of knowledge to be 
complete character had also to be identified, that is, it was 
necessary to "situate these natural entities within the system of 
identities and differences that unites them to and distinguishes them 
from all the others" (71). There were two modes of solving this 
problem of structure and character, either the system(s) (the major 
representative being Linnaeus) or the method and both these modes 
offered ways of limiting the number of comparisons that had to be made 
between natual entities. Briefly, the solution proposed by the 
system was to select a structure arbitrarily for purposes of 
comparison (in Linnaeus' case the organs of fructification) whereas 
(21) 
that proposed by the method was to make exhaustive comparisons but 
only within empirically constituted groups in which the number of 
resemblances was manifestly high. 
However there was an outstanding problem and it is here, in Foucault's 
presentation, that the question of continuity makes its appearance. 
For the whole operation to work it was essential that there was not 
just an endless series of individual descriptions of representations. 
"In order that the simplest character can become apparent, it is 
essential that at least one eiement in the structure examined first 
should be repeated in another" (72). There had to be continuity in 
Nature and this requirement took a different form in the systems and 
the method. It is here that, as with Lovejoy, Buffon and Bonnet make 
their appearance but as it were in response to completely different 
stage directions and reading a different script. "In the methods, on 
the other hand, since resemblances - in their massive and clearly 
evident form - are posited to start with, the continuity of nature 
will be ••• a positive requirement: all Nature forms one great fabric 
in which beings resemble one another from one to the next; so that any 
dividing line that indicates not the minute differences of the 
individual, but broader categories, is always unreal" (73), and 
Buffon and Bonnet are cited to this effect. Thus, "In the 
eighteenth century, the continuity of nature is a requirement of all 
natural history ••• Only continuity can guarantee that nature repeats 
itself and that structure can, in consequence, become character" (74). 
I think it has been shown that these two authors set up quite 
different explanatory contexts which generate quite different 
theoretical 'spaces' for the question of species. The effects of this 
on their treatment of evolutionism can be seen in the way they deal 
with particular authors. Lovejoy is concerned only with forms of 
evolutionism that involve what he calls the temporalising of the 
principles of continuity and plenitude. In this context he turns his 
attention exclusively to J.B. Robinet and C. Bonnet. Robinet may be 
taken as a convenient example as he is discussed by both Foucault and 
Lovejoy. 
For Lovejoy Robinetts merit lies precisely in his "philosophical 
c 
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acumen as well as originality in penetrating to new implications, or 
possible new interpretation of old assumptions. His merit lay in the 
characteristic which Grimm found to be his principal defect; he has in 
a high degree the esprit de systeme, and insisted on carrying out what 
he conceived, sometimes rightly, to be their full consequences 
premises which his predecessors had left undeveloped" (75). From the 
principle of plenitude and a notion of perfectibility Robinet appears 
to arrive at an idea of the tgerms· of things which contained "within 
themselves an internal principle of development which drives them 
through a vast series of metamorphoses ••• "(76). From this Robinet 
appears to derive the notion that Nature must always be in a 
transitory form which Lovejoy calls the "apparently evolutionistic 
transformation of the principle of plenitude" (77). This is not to 
say that the law of continuity was neglected. With Robinet it was 
stretched to the point that "the only way to save the principle, 
therefore, is by supposing all things to have some degree of measure 
of any quality which is possessed by anything" (78), on the grounds 
that any qualitative distinctions would involve a break in the chain. 
Lovejoy takes us through some more derivations of these principles to 
arrive at Robinet's final notion of the ·prototype~, that is, that all 
living things are built up of ultimate units of the same general shape 
and homogeneous in their properties. 
Foucaultts approach is again different. Having established the 
discursive requirement within the structure of natural history he is 
concerned with the juxtaposition of this and perception of time. The 
fixism/evolutionism polarity is a false reading of the real situation. 
In natural history time was the dimension of catastrophe, accident and 
the whole range of physical changes of which the earth was capable 
which, as it were, irrupted into the chain and table of beings. There 
was on the one hand a variety of models of spatial configurations of 
taxonomic continuity; there was on the other hand a series of 
disturbing events of a geological and climactic nature. "The eras of 
Nature do not prescribe the internal time of beings and their 
continuity; they dictate the intemperate interruptions that have 
constantly dispersed them, mingled them, separated them, and interwoven 
them. There is not and cannot be even the suspicion of an 
evolutionism or a transformism in Classical thought; for time is never 
(23) 
conceived as a principle of development for living beings in their 
organisation; it is perceived only as the possible bearer of 
revolution in the external space in which they live" (79). 
Having arrived at this startling conclusion Foucault proceeds to deal 
with apparently evolutionist thought as an effect of the necessity to 
conceive the unity of the taxonomic table with the series of 
successive events, Robinet lies at the end of one route of conceiving 
this unity. The role of time may be seen as causing the variables of 
the table to assume all possible values successively - "exterior 
elements intervene only insofar as they occasion the emergence of a 
character. And that emergence, though it may be chronologically 
determined by such and such a global event, is rendered a priori 
possible by the general table of variables that define all the 
possible forms of the living world" (80). This being the case, "a 
principle of modification must be defined within the living being, 
enabling it to take on a new character when a natural revolution 
occurs" (81). At this point another choice Qpens up which Foucault 
regards as having two solutions (either Maupertuis' or Robinet's). 
Robinetts solution is to attribute a project or nature stretching from 
a prototype to a terminal species. Thus Foucault attempts to explain 
rigorously Robinet'ls obsession with similarities to human forms in the 
mineral, animal and vegetable worlds. What for Lovejoy is an over-
zealous and ~unhappy' excess (82) is for Foucault the effect of a 
position that "the signs of continuity throughout such a history can 
no longer be of any order other than resemblance" (83). 
The account presented so far shows how it is possible that a rejection 
of the methods and doctrines of the history of ideas may lead to 
quite different accounts of familiar questions and problems. Is it 
possible to move beyond this to some positive methodological 
guidelines? In its most general form Foucault's programme could not 
be said to suffer from an excess of modesty. "In other words the 
archaeological description of discourses is deployed in the dimensions 
of a general history: it seeks to discover that whole domain of 
institutions, economic processes and social relations on which a 
discourse formation can be articulated: it tries to show how the 
autonomy of discourse and its specificity nevertheless do not fit the 
(24) 
status of pure ideality and total historical independence: what it 
wishes to uncover is the particular level in which history can give 
place to definite types of discourse, which have their own type of 
historicity and which are related to a whole set of historicities" (84). 
The rejection of the unities of the historv~[deas constitutes a 
7\ 
release - a whole domain of statements is set free on the basis of 
which a new type of study can be pursued, enabling the historian 
finally, "to restore to the statement the specificity of its 
occurrence" (85); secondly the isolation of the ·statement/event' 
makes possible the grasping of relations other than those between the 
statement and its author (intentions, expressions, etc.,); thirdly it 
leaves the way open to describing other kinds of unities, "by means of 
a group of controlled decisions" (86). 
These points may seem vague but can be quite vividly illustrated by 
reference to material which I think shows quite convincingly to the 
non-specialist certain advantages of Foucault's approach. This 
material concerns an event in the history of biology to which 
Foucault attaches great significance, namely the disappearance of 
animal semantics. The essential point is as follows; "Until the time 
of Aldrovandi, history was the inextricable and completely unitary 
fabric of all that was visible of things" ••• Then, by about the 
middle of the seventeenth century "the whole of animal semantics has 
disappeared, like a dead and useless limb" (87). This event is 
crucial to Foucaultts periodisation of the classical phase of natural 
history beginning with Ray. What do other accounts tell us of this 
event and its significance? 
It goes without saying that the accounts offered by contemporary 
botanists almost reek of positivism. "The classification of plants 
was not seriously attempted until about the sixteenth century. Up to 
this period botanical knowledge has scarcely advanced since the time 
of the classical writers such as Theophrastus (372-287 B.C.)and 
Discorides (first century A.D.). Moreover it has become involved in 
a mass of superstition. The invention of printing made possible the 
publication of herbals. At first these merely reproduced the 
inadequate descriptions of plants of the early writers, and the 
accumulated folk-lore associated with them. But the Revival of 
----======::=:== ,..-- -- .. ----------------------------
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learning stimulated thought and the spirit of enquiry. Men began to 
dissentangle fact from fiction" (88). But even historical 
specialists present fundamentally similar accounts. 
The older writers allude darkly (as though it were hardly decent) to 
'curious' or ·strange' observations. A. Davy de Viroille seems to 
find it not at all worthy of investigation that John Bauhin's 
Historia Universalis Plantarum, "was, in fact, a vast compilation of 
everything that had been written on plants since Antiquity" (89). 
The view that most historians seem to share is best expressed in the 
forthright language of the nineteenth century (the author is talking 
about the situation in roughly 1500): " ••• for botanical literature 
had sunk so low, that not only were the figures embellished with 
fabulous additions, as in the 'Hortus Sanitatis', and sometimes drawn 
purely from fancy, but the meagre descriptions of quite common plants 
were not taken from Nature, but borrowed from earlier authorities and 
eked out with superstitious fictions. The powers of independent 
judgement were oppressed and stunted in the Middle Ages, till at last 
the very activity of the senses, resting as it does to a great extent 
on unconscious operations of the understanding, became weak and 
sickly; natural objects presented themselves to the eye even of those 
who made them their study in grotesquely distorted forms; every 
sensuous impression was corrupted and deformed by the influence of a 
superstitious fancy" (90). 
The basis of these positions must be that the change from animal 
semantics to classification in the 'classical period' was an effect of 
some ·spirit· or of new information or data. Both older authors (91) 
and more recent writers (92) use these arguments. The various 
categories of influence remain extremely problematic (93). Foucault 
has brilliantly described the positions taken up by these authors -
"The "biology' (and learning in general of the period appears to them 
as structurally weak; a common ground where fidelity to the Ancients, 
a taste for the supernatural, and an already awakened awareness of 
that sovereign rationality in which we recognise ourselves, confronted 
one another in equal freedom" (94). If we follow Foucault and reject 
the teleologies of reason and the psychologism we have to deal with 
the real situation in which "the great tripartition, apparently so 
__ ~ __ ~Jr~a·.·~~·~~ ____ --________ __ 
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simple and so immediate, into observation, Document and Fable, did not 
exist" (95). 
Whatever its rights and wrongs Foucault's rejection of these 
assumptions enables him to propose far more interesting avenues of 
explanation, c.f., the following on Aldrovandi - "And indeed, for 
Aldrovandi and his contemporaries, it was all legenda - things to be 
read. But the reason for this was not that they preferred the 
authority of men to the precision of the unprejudiced eye, but that 
nature, in itself, is an unbroken time of words and signs, of accounts 
and characters, of discourse and forms 
••• To know an animal or a 
plant or any terrestial thing whatever, it to gather together the 
whole dense layer of signs with which it or they may have been 
covered • • • Aldrovandi was neither a better nor worse observer than 
Buffon; he was neither more credulous than he, nor less attached to 
the faithfulness of the observing eye or to the rationality of things. 
His observation was simply not linked to things in accordance with the 
same system or by the same arrangement of the episteme" (96)0 
While this explanation remains sketchy and intuitive it does seem to 
offer a more appealing line of explanation than the assumption of 
collective psychosis if not stupidity made by other authors. The 
following features may be noted. Firstly there is the centrality 
which Foucault gives to animal semantics compared to other authors' 
neglect: secondly there is the determination not to apply possibly 
inappropriate categories; thirdly there is the rejection of any 
account cast in the form of the growth of reason; and finally there is 
the refusal to resort to psychological speculation in order to explain 
discursive change. No instant, definitive conclusions are possible 
from this analysis. It is clear that the criticgl stances of these 
authors are more impressive than their positive achievements. Although 
Foucault's work elicits admiration (97) much of it remains limited in 
empirical reference and extraordinarily vague (98). Althusser'is 
rigorous but tends towards dogmatism. Nevertheless these authors in 
their attempts to break away from the conventional methods have not 
only revealed many of the distortions induced by the unthinking 
acceptance of time - honoured categories but have given some 
indications, of other possibilities. It can do no harm to be 
'influenced v by their work. 
(27) 
Chapter I - FOOTNOTES 
1. Often the relation between history of ideas and sociology is 
conceived along the lines of the title of W. Stark's book - The 
Sociology of Knowledge: An essay in aid of a deeper understanding 
of the history of ideas (Routledge Kegan Paul 1958) 
2. For some interesting remarks on this in the context of the arts see 
M. Peckham - Manis Rage for Chaos (N.Y.:~ocken Books 1967) 
3. A.O. Lovejoy - The Great Chain of Being (Harper Torchbook ad. 1960) 
p.16 
4. op.cit. p.25l 
5. D. Gasman - The Scientific Origins of National Socialism (Macdonald 
1971) D.K. Pickens - Eugenics and the Progressives (Nashville: 
Vanderbilt U.P. 1968) 
6. Zilsel - Sociological Roots of Science (American Journal of 
Sociology 47 (1942) 544-562) p.546 
7. L. Althusser - For Marx (Allen Lane 1969) p.164. His emphasis. 
8. At various points in his books Althusser praises Foucault for 
instance. There is a long review of Foucault by one of Althusser's 
~ leading disciples, D. Lecourt, in La Pensee No. 152 (August 1970) 
pp.69-87 Cf. also Althusser
'
s presentation of P. Macherey - La 
Philosophie de la Science de G. Canguilhem (La Pens~e No. 113 
(1964) 50-74) For a useful if somewhat breathless survey see 
J.M. Broekman - Structuralism: Moscow - Prague - Paris (Dordrecht: 
D. Reidel 1974) 
9. FM pp.32-3 
10. FM p.5l 
11. FM p.55 
(28) 
12. ibid. 
13. FM p. 56 
14. ibid. 
15. ibid. 
16. FM p.57 
17. ibid. 
18. ibid. 
19. FM p.59 
20. FM p.60 
21. FM p.62 
22. FM p.63 
23. FM p.64 
24. FM p.65 
25. FM pp.66-7 
26. FM p.67 
27. ibid. 
28. FM p.68 
29. FM p.57 
300 FM p.254 
(29) 
31. P.Q. Hirst - Durkheim, Bernard and epistemology (Routledge Kegan 
Paul 1975) pp.10 and 179-80 
32. A. Hussain in Theoretical Practice 5 (Spring 1972) p.19 
33. Our concern here is principally with the eight important pages, 
63-70 
34. FM p.66 
35. See quote from Marx FM p.49 and references to him p.69 
36. It is argued that it is precisely one of A1thusser t s achievements 
to have overcome this polarity. See, for example, P.Q. Hirst's 
Problems and Advances in the theory of ideology (Cambridge 
University Communist Party 1976) 
37. FM p.67 
38. FM p.75 
39. ibid. 
40. ibid. 
41. FM p.81 
42. Cf., A1thusser's self-critical remarks FM p.187. For an 
interesting attempt to apply this idea to nineteenth century Vlews 
of poverty see G. Stedman Jones - Outcast London (Oxford 
University Press 1971) and comments in K. Williams - Problematic 
History (Economy and Society 1(1972) 457-481) 
43. M. Foucault - The Archaeology of Knowledge (Tavistock Press 1972) 
p.5 
44. M. Foucault - op.cit. p.138 
45. op.cit. p.22 
(30) 
46. See the introduction to M. Foucault - The Order of Things (N.Y.: 
Vintage Books 1973) and Foucault - Monstrosities in Criticism 
(Diacritics fall 1971) 
47. G. Deleuze - Un Nouvel Archiviste (Critique 26 (1970) 195-209)p.204 
48. Foucault - Order of Things p.208 
49. Archaeology p.143 
50. This point is clearly made in Foucaultts reply to questions from 
the Cercle d"Epistemologie translated in Theoretical Practice 3/4 
(1971) See p.113 
51. op.cit. p.112. It is strongly implied (same page) that this 
'dispossession- is an abomination (like the dialectic, no doubt) 
to the bourgeoisie. But no evidence is offered on this score. 
52. This might seem extraordinarily revolutionary if it had ever been 
thought or assumed that the 'subject' had a knowledge of his 
involuntary muscle movements or his cerebral localisation or many 
other aspects of the ·subject'. Did psychiatrists before Freud or 
linguists before Saussure think the 'subject' ·possessed' the laws 
of the mind or language? However, these differences seem to me 
irresoluble. Fouc~t summarises these general themes in a 
brilliant conclusion to his Archaeology of Knowledge. It takes 
the form, appropriately enough, of a dialogue. 
53. Theoretical Practice 3/4 p.112 
54. Cf., J.W. Burrow - "Diderot, Buffon and Maupertuis in the 
eighteenth century had held evolutionary views ••• 11 p.27 of his 
introduction to the Penguin edition of Darwin's Origin of Species 
(Harmondsworth 1968) 
55. Cf., Jean Rostand - "This theory (fixism) had been called in 
question by Buffon about 1740, when he proffered his reflections 
on the deterioration of species as a result of extraneous 
\ - / (31) 
circumstances; and certain philosophers, including Maupertuis and 
Diderot, had gone so far as to present rather ill-defined systems 
of transformism ••• A real scientific transformism made its 
appearance for the first time in 1809, with the publication by 
Jean Lamarck (1774-1829) of his Philosophie Zoologique ••• " p.187 
of The Development of Biology in G.S. Metraux and F. Crouzet (eds.) 
The nineteenth century world (Mentor 1963) Cf., also J. Rostand 
pp.5ll-5l8 in R. Taton (ed.) The Beginnings of Modern Science 
vol. II (Thames and Hudson 1964) 
56. Archaeology p.35 
57. op.cit. p.36 
58. Lovejoy op.cit. p.268 
59. Foucault - The Order of Things p.150. In this context 'classical 
thought- means the period before Cuvier. 
60. So, for example, though Diderot and Maupertuis are mentioned they 
are not treated in any detail on the grounds that "these two 
expressions of transformism were independent of the group of ideas 
which concerns us here". Lovejoy op.cit. pp.268-9 
61. op.cit. p.229 
62. op.cit. p.230 
63. op.cit. p.23l 
64. Not the least of the mysteries of Lovejoy1s account is the 
apparently utterly arbitrary nature of the effects postulated. 
65. op.cit. pp.23l-2 
66. Order of Things p.127 
67. opocito p.132 
• .I 
(32) 
68. Foucault·s argument is heavily condensed here. 
69. Order of Things p.133 
70. Order pp.139-40 
71. Order p.138 
72. Order p.145 
73. Order p.146 
74. Order p.147 
75. Lovejoy p.270. For another account of Robinet see J. Roger - Les 
Sciences de la Vie dans la XVIII Siecle (Paris: A. Colin 1963) 
pp.642-65l. Roger is rather sceptical of Robinet's evolutionism. 
I find Lovejoy's exposition here even more trying than usual since 
on his own account Robinet's originality, if such it be, appears 
to be derived from "Turgot's and Rousseau's notion of 
perfectibility ••• applied ••• to all living things". pp.272-3 
76. Lovejoy p.274 
77. Lovejoy p.275 
78. Lovejoy p.276 
79. Foucault p.150 
80. Foucault p.153 
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84. Archaeology pp.164-S 
8S. op.cit. p.28 
86. op.cit. p.29. The rest of the archaeology then elaborates in a 
kind of recapitulatory exercise in which Foucault uses material 
from his other books to show how historians begin to grasp this 
new domain of statement/events. 
87. Foucault - The Order of Things p.1SO 
88. J.M. Lowson - Textbook of Botany (University Tutorial Press Ltd 
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- Systematics of Flowering Plants (Methuen 19S2). "Then 
gradually botanists began to turn from the exhausted manuscripts, 
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growing, to think afresh and for themselves, and to draw what they 
found". p.4 
89. A. Davy de Viraille - Botany in R. Taton - History of Science 
vol. I. part I. ch. S. One is forcibly reminded of Foucaultts 
phrase "the stark impossibility of thinking that". Order of 
Things p.1S 
90. J. von Sachs - History of Botany lS30-l860 (Clarendon Press 1890) 
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and classification". p.90 
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Europe Fontana 1971) (N.Y.: Harper and Row 1971) p.43 
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98. Briefly for example - Foucault, though erudite, is very 
economical in his studies. One wonders whether eighteenth 
century Botany wasn't a little more complicated than Linnaeus Vi. 
the French. For vagueness Cf., the following, "The fundamental 
codes of a culture ••• establish for every man, from the very 
first, the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and 
within which he will be at home". Order of Things p.20 
(36) 
Chapter II - THE THEORETICAL ROOTS OF EUGENICS: FORMS OF DARWINISM 
"Certainly populations differ markedly in, for instance, mortality 
rates, but in what sense can one say that a population with a high 
mortality rate is less well adapted to its environmental conditions 
than one with a low mortality rate is to its". J.A. Harrison and 
A.J. Boyce. 
"These doctrines were turned to account by very different schools of 
social philosophy. Pessimistic and optimistic, aristocratic and 
democratic, individualistic and socialistic systems were to war with 
each other for years by casting scraps of Darwinism at each other". 
~ C. BougIe. 
The two quotations heading this chapter, and their implications, 
embody for me some of the critical issues that need to be considered 
in any examination of the theoretical context in which the eugenic 
idea emerged in Britain. Given that the context of this research 
limits the many possibilities that could be pursued this chapter will 
focus attention on the connections between Darwinism as a biological 
discourse and the social doctrines claiming inspiration from it. 
Briefly, in what follows, it will be suggested that the links between 
Darwinism and eugenics, at least, are not simply a matter of an 
accident of borrowing but are built round certain fundamental problems 
in both discourses. Darwinism contains certain difficulties and 
ambiguities that made it open to certain readings and Eugenics, not 
entirely -innocent! in the matter, performed the misreadings 
appropriate to its needs. The previous chapter has suggested that the 
analysis of the links between different theoretical structures presents 
great difficulties and has tended too frequently in the past to lead 
to the juxtaposition of elements on the grounds of their similarity. 
It is popular conventional wisdom that Darwin borrowed a basically 
economic model for his notion of the Struggle for Existence and that 
this formula found its way back into a variety of biologistic social 
doctrines (1). This might be illustrated diagrrummatically as follows: 
Malthus ------------1 Darwinism __________ ~Social Darwinism 
Political economy Eugenics 
(37) 
There clearly were resemblances between Darwinism and certain 
nineteenth century social doctrines and while it is no function of the 
present study to furnish a taxonomy of approaches to this phenomenon 
it is clear that they have tended to treat these similarities as a 
straightforward borrowing, requiring little more than exegesis, or to 
regard the borrowing as a falsehood and to confront the falsehood with 
the truth and thus dissipate it. There is no doubt much to be said 
for these approaches but perhaps it may be possible to follow a third 
which is more concerned with the nature of the links between different 
types of discourses. Some work by P.Q. Hirst (2) has the virtue of 
focussing on what kinds of questions might be asked (and indirectly 
the notion of ~readingt). Hirst clarifies borrowings as of two kinds 
namely, metaphorical and analogical. About these he then asks the 
following questions: what is the source of the metaphor/analogy e.g. 
original scientific texts, popular notions etc,; what theoretical 
function does the borrowed element have in the structure that 
borrowed it?; what is it in the discourse that necessitates such 
borrowing? These questions then lead on to further interesting 
possibilities. The first question implies questions as to the level 
of knowledge of the borrower and the nature of the domain of the 
borrowing. The second and third questions imply further questions 
about the theoretical level and degree of generality at which (in this 
case) the metaphors and analogies operate in the discourse e.g. 
illustration, similar problem, wholesale transference etc. 
There seems little possibility of directly ~applyingt this schema to 
eugenics for a number of fairly obvious reasons. The demarcations 
are not so clearcut as in Hirst's material and clearly some 
categories would be difficult to apply for example the level of 
knowledge of the borrower. It may indeed be better to describe 
eugenics as an 'extension' of Darwinism rather than a borrowing from 
it. Nevertheless Hirst's points have the great advantage of firstly, 
directing attention to certain essential questions about the 
mechanics of such theoretical transitions and secondly, emphasising 
the necessity to make careful distinctions within theoretical systems. 
Before approaching the question of borrowing or extension then, it is 
necessary to examine in more detail that which is to be borrowed. 
(38) 
In order to proceed however the ground must be cleared a little. The 
historian or sociologist concerned with the history of ideas is likely 
to find himself on difficult terrain here, a terrain not only well 
surveyed but already occupied by well-organised and prestigious forces. 
There are philosophers, especially those interested in biological 
problems and practising biologists, especially_those interested in the 
more general implications and historical background of their work and, 
almost all of whom, if one might use the expression, are card-carrying 
Darwinists. My strategy here will not be to criticise these approaches, 
which would be inappropriate (if not impertinent) but hopefully to 
clear a little space on this rich terrain of Darwinism in which it may 
be possible to say something useful in connection with eugenics. 
There has been a considerable debate amongst philosophers which is 
helpful from the point of view of clarification (3). Much the most 
active and prolific of these philosophers defending Darwinism has been 
M. Ruse (4) and a quotation from him will provide an example of the 
point to be made here. Ruse is desperately worried that there might 
be, "a crippling tautology at the heart of Darwinian theory" (5). 
Behind that little phrase lie all the heroic assumptions of the 
philosophical approach. If there is a tautology Darwinism will fail 
to meet the grounds laid down for scientificity by philosophers and 
will thus be crippled. The concern with which this prospect is 
viewed by Darwinians is understandable. However suppose this 
assumption is dispensed with. Suppose that it is assumed that one 
discourse (philosophy) cannot establish the conditions of 
scientificity for other discourses (the sciences) or any other 
conditions of any other discourses for that matter. It may then be 
possible to relax on the matter of the tautology. It may be that 
there is a tautology at the heart of Darwinism and that it is possible 
to ask interesting questions about it, such as why is it there, what 
effects does it have ~n biological practices, or on the relations 
between Darwinism and other discourses. 
It is not possible to develop in detail here the argument that the 
philosophical assumption should be dropped. What is at issue is what 
might be called philosophy's legislative illusion i.e. that is can 
establish conditions for other discourses outside their practice. 
(39) 
While it is no doubt an oversimplification the central project of 
Western philosophy has been the theory of knowledge and in recent 
times this has increasingly been focussed on the question of the 
status of science. Certainly it can be said without fear of 
contradiction that this is the way philosophy has been read by many 
outside its domain. Science and the 'scientific method' are widely 
accepted as the roy~l roads to true knowledge. These strategies seem 
to involve as a necessary effect on essentialism whereby philosophy 
itself becomes a kind of master discourse. In other words one can 
always ask the question: if only philosophy can establish the grounds 
of scientificity, or the conditions of truth what validates 
philosophy's claim? The answer surely must be circular. However all 
that one can say here is that this position has come under increasing 
fire from a number of points of view (6) enough to make it at least 
plausible to pursue other modes of investigation. 
These all too brief observations on philosophy have already raised, by 
implication at least, an issue which will be considered further, 
namely the question of tautologousness or otherwise in Darwin's theory. 
Having sidestepped philosophy it is necessary to make some 
observations about biologists' views with reference to this same issue. 
The intention is the same, not to criticise modern biologists, but 
simply to indicate a space not fully occupied by them. 
While the philosophers may resort to their time honoured principles of 
established grounds of validity or ever more complex logical 
reconstructions of what Darwin really said or meant, the scientists 
are likely to resort to the complex versions of contemporary Darwinian 
genetics of which they are the acknowledged masters. An authority of 
Mayr's stature bluntly states the position, "Unfortunately, Darwin 
sometimes also used Spencer's slogan, "survival of the fittest", and 
has therefore been accused of tautological (circular) reasoning: "What 
will survive? The fittest. What are the fittest? Those that survive". 
To say that this is the essence of natural selection is nonsense! 
This is not at all Darwin's reasoning. For him, the probability of 
reproductive success of an individual is determined by its genetic 
constitution. At a given time in a given environment each genotype 
has a different fitness, that is, a different probability of 
(40) 
reproductive success. The word fitness simply designates that fact 
that a superior genotype has a greater probability of leaving offspring 
than an inferior one. Natural selection, simply, is the differential 
perpetuation of genotypes" (7). Unfortunately this appears to 
restate the difficulty in modern jargon, an interpretation which gains 
some support from the following formulation which appears slightly 
later in the same text: "It happens not infrequently in nature that, 
for one reason or another, a superior individual fails to reproduce 
while an inferior one does so abundantly" (8). 
The difficulty here is surely plain and not new. Either superiority 
and inferiority are only identified by reference to reproductive 
success as in the first formulation or the act of identifying 
superiority/inferiority is separate from the measurement of 
reproductive success and not to be tread off' the latter as in the 
second formulation. Again let me emphasise that to make this point 
casts no aspersions on, nor indeed may have any implications for, the 
practices of biologists, past or present - it is simply to say that 
the issue is not resolved by translation into modern terminology. 
The ground clearing that has been done so far revealed some clues 
which may perhaps be followed up. Is it not strange that 120 years 
after its initial publication and after enormous advances in the 
biological sciences there is still intense discussion as to not only 
what the theory means but whether it is tautological or not? This 
alone surely constitutes some evidence of internal ambiguity, an idea 
which even Darwin's staunchest philosophical defender concedes (9). 
This feeling of wonder is reinforced, for the layman at least, by the 
realisation that when evidence is proffered on behalf of natural 
selection it in invariably of a limited kind and fits the categories 
exactly - one cannot, in other words, avoid the_work of H.B.D. 
Kettlewell on the moth biston betularia (10). Why does Biston fit so 
nicely and is there any basic difficulty in the Darwinian doctrine? 
The great advantage of biston (to borrow a phrase of Darwin) is that 
it enables us to more than "dimly see why the competition should be 
the most severe between allied forms which fill nearly the same place 
in the economy of nature" (11). Relating biston back to general 
(41) 
Darwinian propositions it is clear that the advantage of this example 
is that it is possible to say that this particular organism, looked at 
from this point of view (colouration), in this particular set of 
circumstances (environmental changes) can be seen to have a beneficial 
variation, an advantage which in turn has led to a greater survival 
rate of one organism rather than the other. The biston example brings 
into play all the key components of Darwinian analysis, namely, 
organic variation, environmental factors and therefore a selection 
process the effect of which is differential levels of adaptation (12). 
Biston quite clearly enables one to identify a beneficial variation 
and then check independently its greater survival rate. It is the 
favourite example of natural selection because it brings out so 
clearly the centrality of adaptation. 
To assert that the central theme in Darwinism is adaptation is by no 
means controversial, if not indeed a truism. At least at the level of 
rhetoric Darwints concern is obvious (13). Is there a clear concept 
of adaptation in the Origin? It would be quite futile to compete with 
other in composing yet another potted reconstruction of what Darwin 
said so the following argument remains narrowly focussed on a limited 
number of points. The notion of adaptation is perfectly understandable 
at a commonsense level; fish can swim, arctic creatures have white 
coats, bees carry pollen and so on. Darwin's problem was how these 
adaptations had come about, rejecting explanations referring to 
divine intervention or other miraculous causes. His argument required 
him to go to great lengths to establish first of all that there was 
much variation amongst organisms both under natural and artificial 
conditions. To this end he produced a wealth of evidence and indeed 
the general proposition would appear to be beyond dispute. The concept 
of adaptation has to link the two halves of this enormous problem -
the facts of organi: variation on the one hand and the facts of 
a.. 
environmental variations on the other. Adaptation i7<linking concept 
_ something must be adapted to something. 
However there is a little more than this. The image constantly recurs 
in the Origin (it has already been quoted above) of what Darwin calls 
the economy or polity of nature. tNature
' 
is to be seen as a 
structured set of places. This set is in a continuous d~a_ic process 
(42) 
which need not necessarily be the result of dramatic climatic or other 
change. "For as all the inhabitants of each country are struggling 
together with nicely balanced forces, extremely slight modifications 
in the structure or habits of one inhabitant would often give it an 
advantage over others; and still further modification of the same kind 
would often still further increase the advantage" (14). Now 
adaptation is surely,for Darwin, to be seen in this context, namely, 
the occupation of places. As he puts it, "Thus it will be in nature; 
for within a confined area, with some Elace in its Eolit:l:: not so 
perfectly occupied as might be, natural selection will always tend to 
preserve all the individuals varying in the right direction, though in 
different degrees, so as better to fill up the unoccupied place" (15). 
And the concept is further refined to be a matter of the degree of 
occupancy of a place. This is confirmed by the specific examples he 
discusses as his argument proceeds and indeed by his whole approach. 
Take the following - "Look at a plant in the midst of its range, why 
does it not double or quadruple its numbers? We know thaP it can 
perfectly well withstand a little more heat or cold, dampness or 
dryness, for elsewhere it ranges into slightly hotter or colder, 
damper or drier districts. In this case we can clearly see that if we 
wished in imagination to give the Elant the power of increasing in 
number we should have to give it some advantage over its comEetitors, 
or over the animals which Ere:l::ed on it" (16). 
Elsewhere Darwin gives a lengthy imaginary illustration (his term) of 
natural selection at work involving the mutual adaptations of plants 
and bees. This is done by the postulation of mechanisms of adaptation 
which would then lead on to reproductive success: "I can see no 
reason to doubt that an accidental deviation in the size and form of 
the body, or in the curvature and length of the proboscis, far too 
slight to be appreciated by us, might profit a bee or other insect, so 
that an individual so characterised would be able to obtain its food 
more quickly, and so have a better chance of living and leaving 
descendants" (17). Darwin's constant use of the term 'profitable 
variations' (18) is surely then to be taken in this sense with 
reference to the degree of occupancy of some place in the polity of 
nature. His argument in the Origin then takes the form of what might 
be called a mode one, that is to say, a statement of the relation 
----------
(43) 
between more or less adapted organisms and their reproductive success 
to the effect that the more adapted will live and the less adapted 
will die. In such a form the argument does not appear to be a 
definition or circular. It leads on to and has natural links with 
experiments of the Kettlewell type. 
There are two points that can be made about this concept of adaptation. 
It appears to involve the corollary that it cannot be used without 
reference to specific sets of circumstances concerning both organisms 
and environments. The Kettlewell experiments, as has been shown, fit 
this concept of adaptation precisely. It is reasonable to argue that 
industrial pollution opened up a new place in the polity of nature and 
that one type of organism was better placed than another type of the 
same organism to exploit that place by virtue of being less vi0itle. 
If the philosophers must have their conditions of falsifiability, then 
surely in this context had Kettlewell found the white moths expanding 
in population then something would be wrong with the proposed 
explanation. It remains the case that no general principles can be 
constructed. We can only see degrees of adaptation after they have 
occurred and we can only see them in their specificity_ We can only 
painstakingly investigate specific sets of circumstances. Darwin 
appears to touch on these difficulties when he says, "We see nothing 
of these slow changes in progress, until the, hand of time has marked 
the long lapses of ages, and then so imperfect is our view into long 
past geological ages, that we only see that the forms of life are now 
very different from what they formerly were" (19). 
Secondly the strong and regularly quoted examples of Darwinian 
principles all refer to very clearcut types of adaptation - indeed, at 
first glance perhaps colouration is the most obvious type of 
adaptation. It is not at all obvious what other types of changes 
might be adaptive e.g. internal organic characteristics or behavioural 
ones. Adaptation is clearly achieved on many dimensions of which 
external appearance is only one. The difficulty is therefore to 
measure it in a convincing way. Again Darwin appears to recognise 
this when he says, "but probably in no case could we precisely say why 
one species has been victorious over another in the great battle of 
life" (20). 
(44) 
Because of these characteristics there seems to be implicit in the 
structure of the argument another approach to the question of 
adaptation which cuts through these difficulties. When Darwin talks , 
as he constantly does, of profitable or injurious variations this can 
be taken to mean profitable or injurious to survival. I would suggest 
that many of Darwin's readers have found in his argument (because it 
is implicitly there) what might be called a mode two form of natural 
selection along the following lines: those that die are least 
-adapted, those that survive are most adapted. This mode is not 
contingent but, as many have argued, is a definition. It can be used 
to derive gen~ral statements about organisms irrespective of their 
specific natures or those of their environments. Of course when this 
mode is applied to, say, Kettlewell's moths, it generates a correct 
statement but that is because we have reasonable grounds for 
assessing (independently) adaptation in these circumstances. This 
then is the heart of the Darwinian tautology. The concept of 
adaptation, central to Darwin's interest and argument can be 
expressed in a form which links adaptive characteristics with 
reproductive success, in that the latter follows from the former. 
But it can also be expressed in the form of an identity of adaptation 
with reproductive success i.e. those that survive, survive (21). 
What has been argued so far concerns the general Darwinian doctrine 
and while this is, of course, central,the main focus of this research 
is on the application of Darwinism to human populations. This was a 
question which concerned Darwin himself and to which he devoted his 
work The Descent of Man (22) an examination of which reveals, I think, 
further difficulties and ambiguities in Darwinism. It has been 
suggested above that adaptation is the central issue and that Darwin l s 
constant use of the phrases economy and polity of Nature indicates a 
vision of Nature as an endlessly changing series of meshings between 
environment on the one hand and organisms on the other. There is no 
necessity to limit the changes in organisms to purely physical ones 
but t~ere would seem to be certain difficulties with extending the 
notion to human beings who are characterised by continuous 
manipulation of their environments. 
Take the following formulation from the Descent, "If then the 
(45) 
progenitors of Man inhabiting any district especially one undergoing 
some change in its condition were divided into two equal bodies the 
one half which included all the individuals best adapted by their 
powers of movement for gaining subsistence or for defending themselves, 
would on average survive in greater numbers, and procreate more 
offspring than the other and less well-endowed half" (23). Darwin has 
described here a state of affairs supposedly exemplifying natural 
selection. But other scenarios are surely possible. It might be 
supposed that the less well-endowed brethren build a stockade and 
develop a division of labour in which the longer-legged of them do the 
hunting and the shorter-legged look after domestic animals. Would 
this also be natural selection in operation? Surely in this second 
case circumstances are such that the polity of nature is being 
systematically manipulated by the organisms. Doubtless one can find 
amongst other creatures cases of cooperation and division of labour 
but among humans these characteristics appear to have a centrality 
and significance not shared by other forms of.life (24). 
Having demonstrated various anatomical and physiological links between 
Man and other organisms, Darwin's approach in the Descent is, as in 
the Origin, to proceed from establishing a struggle for existence to 
natural selection. "Natural selection follows from the struggle for 
existence; and this from a rapid rate of increase" (25). He quotes 
evidence of a struggle for existence amongst contemporary savages and 
civilised populations. This evidence includes all forms of checks on 
population growth i.e. not only the more obviously destructive forces 
like war and pestilence but also prudential restraint from marriage 
and poor housing conditions. The argument here is the familiar one 
that but for such checks populations would grow very quickly. Darwin!s 
account of such checks in the Descent consists of a chronological 
sequence of types the stages being primaeval, savage and civilised. 
Amongst the progenitors of Man, tperiodical deo~hs' are selected as 
the most significant item, "but checks of some kind, either 
periodical or constant, must have kept down their numbers, even more 
severely than with existing savages" (26). Amongst savages and 
civilised persons checks take a rather different form. 
While all this seems quite uncontroversial it clearly involves a 
(46) 
shift in the definition of the struggle for existence. It includes 
not only externally imposed effects - disease, climate, food supply, 
etc. (the same type of phenomena as are discussed in Chapter 3 of the 
Origin) but also what can only be called social events e.g. wars and 
individual practices e.g. abortion and infanticide. Leaving aside 
the question of whether these phenomena are adequately conceptualised 
as 'biological t once the concept of the struggle for existence is 
broadened to include them a number of effects tend to follow. In the 
Origin the struggle for existence derives its significance from its 
connection with the concept of adaptation. The deaths that take 
place in Nature·s realm must be related to adaptation to be of any 
importance. Those with the comparative disadvantages in the myriad 
places of the economy of Nature will tend to die. On the broader 
definition however this connection cannot be sustained. What is the 
comparative disadvantage of those killed by infanticide? Indeed since 
those suffering death by abortion or infanticide are never exposed to 
places in the polity of Nature what knowable biological effects can 
their deaths have? (27). It is clear that in the Descent Darwin is 
drifting towards a mode two view of selection. His procedure is to 
aggregate a whole series of disparate phenomena (mortality due to 
overcrowding, famine, infant mortality, war, beasts of prey, etc.) 
under the rubric of 'checks~ and then to assume that because people 
die from these various causes they must in turn be having selective 
effects. 
This new flexibility in the notion of the struggle for existence is 
paralleled by a broadening of the notion of natural selection and 
doubtless for the same reason. It arises from the fact that Darwin 
must grapple with the natural selection of both individual and 
social characteristics. He appears to take the position that Man's 
corporeal structure was produced by what might be called individual 
natural selection. The discussion of bipedality and of the functional 
separation of locomotion and prehension is all predicated on the 
assumption that such developments would have given individual men an 
advantage, whereas the development of what Darwin calls Man's social 
habits and intellectual faculties appears to be an effect of what 
might be called group natural selection. Thus, "We should, however, 
bear in mind that an animal possessing great size, strength and 
(47) 
ferocity, and which, like the gorilla, could defend itself from all 
enemies, would not perhaps have become social: and this would most 
effectually have checked the acquirement of the higher mental 
qualities such as sympathy and love of his fellows" (28). 
But even here Darwin's view of developments is not entirely clear. 
In Chapter two, on the'manner of development' he makes a distinction 
between the physical capacity for making weapons (i.e. a complicated 
hand structure) and a process of learning to do these things in fact 
- which, on his own account, not every primeaval man actually did (29). 
How can this state of affairs be rel~ted to the general conditions for 
natural selection - "modifications in structure or constitution which 
do not serve to asapt an organism to its habits of life, to the food 
which it consumes, or passively to the surrounding conditions, cannot 
have been thus acquired" (30). Clearly some primeval men had 
modifications which they did not as individuals exploit (31). This 
presumably explains Darwin's later observation that, "natural 
selection sometimes acts on the individual, through the preservation 
of variations which are beneficial to the community. A community 
which includes a large number of well-endowed individuals increases in 
number, and is victorious over other less-favoured ones; even although 
each separate member gains no advantage over the others of the same 
community" (32). 
Nevertheless it is when Darwin moves on to Man·s social habits and 
intellectual faculties that the necessity for broadening the concepts 
of the struggle for existence and natural selection becomes most 
apparent and the theoretical difficulties involved in this broadening 
become most severe. Three aspects of his discussion deserve further 
comment. The first concerns Darwin's use of the 'tribe against tribe' 
formula to explain human evolution and specifically his identification 
of the intellectual faculties with techniques. The following passage 
situates this point: "At the present day civilised nations are 
everywhere supplanting barbarous nations, excepting where the climate 
opposes a deadly barrier, and they succeed mainly, though not 
exclusively, through their arts, which are the products of the intellect. 
It is therefore highly probable that with mankind the intellectual 
faculties have been mainly and gradually perfected through natural 
(48) 
selection lt (33). This passage illustrates the new breadth of natural 
selection, now to include any kind of conquest of one group of men by 
another which deprives it of even a tenuous connection with the 
organism/environment link so central to Darwin's earlier formulations. 
Additionally, in order to make natural selection apply to nations 
Darwin here takes the development of 9 arts ' as an index of 
intellectual faculties or capacities. This is not argued for, nor lS 
it intuitively obvious, and if the identity argument is denied then 
the natural selection one falls too. 
A second aspect is Darwints account of moral faculties and his use of 
the term instinct in this connection. Darwin argues from some 
residual instinctive sympathy that Man is gradually driven in the 
direction of adjusting his behaviour to the demands of the group -
"Consequently man would be influenced in the highest degree by the 
wishes, approbation and blame of his fellow men, as expressed by their 
gestures and language" (34). This is again subsumed under the general 
formula of benefit to the tribe - "No doubt the welfare and happiness 
of the individual usually coincide: and a contented happy tribe will 
flourish better than one that is discontented and unhappy" (35). But 
this formulation is plainly inadequate. The account of primeval man 
responding to the wishes of his fellow men, leaves unexplained what 
those wishes will be and how they are determined. If instinctive 
sympathy is sufficient explanation then no reference to the wishes of 
the community is required; if reference to the wishes of the community 
is necessary then it must be more than an aggregation of individual 
instinctive sympathies. Not surprisingly Darwin is completely lost 
when it comes to dealing with the actual wishes of actual communities 
- "Hence the strangest customs and superstitions, in complete 
opposition to the true welfare and happiness of mankind, have become 
all-powerful throughout the world lt (36). Faced with reality he is 
driven to ethnocentric labelling, vacuous rationalism and vague 
appeals to the timpressible t brain (37). 
A final difficulty concerning the individual/group formulations is 
raised by Darwin himself. It is, of course, the selfishness problem. 
As he puts it, "It is extremely doubtful whether the offspring of the 
more strongly sympathetic and benevolent parents, or of those who were 
(49) 
the most faithful to their comrades, would be reared in greater 
numbers than the children of selfish and treacherous parents 
belonging to the same tribe" (38). Darwin's resolution of this 
difficulty is a pot-pourri of utilitariantsm, habit, the instinctive 
sympathy, the advantages of tribal example, topped off by natural 
selection. The tribes that included the tgood guys' (as it were) 
would triumph over the other tribes. As Darwin put it, "At all times 
throughout the world tribes have supplanted other tribes; and as 
morality is one important element in their success, the standard of 
morality and the number of well-endowed men will thus everywhere tend 
to rise and increase" (39). But this is to solve the problem by 
abandoning it. Not least Darwin does not explain what the gain is to 
a tribe that conquers another but more important he does not deal with 
the selfish members of the tribe who might simply exploit the 
benefits of the tribe's 'success' to augment their own reproductive 
performance. In the end presumably the superior tribe would be 
brought down to the level of all the others. 
The theoretical difficulties resulting from the subtle alteration that 
Darwin effects in his concepts in order to apply them to human 
societies become more sharply outlined as he approaches civilised 
society. But it is there from the beginning, indeed implicit in his 
whole standpoint. The very opening questions of the Descent betray 
the conceptual ambiguities outlined: "The enquirer would next corne to 
the important point, whether man tends to increase at so rapidly a 
rate as to lead to occasional severe struggles for existence, and 
consequently to beneficial variations, whether in body and mind, 
being preserved and injurious ones eliminated. Do the races or species 
of man, whichever term may be applied, encroach on and replace one 
another, so that some finally become extinct" (40). The attempt to 
assimilate social phenomena to biological concepts is almost explicit 
in this passage and yet throughout Darwin's text unexplained categories 
referring to such phenomena periodically surface like so many 
recalcitrant corks. 
The reductio ad absurdum comes with a reference to the Greeks whose 
decline is explained by small size, multiplicity of states, the 
practice of slavery, and sensuality, none of which appear to be 
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(50) 
notably biological, nor indeed to have anything to do with natural 
selection, assuming that term is to retain any coherent meaning (41). 
But there are many other examples. The references to checks in 
civilised societies (with their selective effects) include the death 
rate among the 'poorest classes' and among the ·overcrowded'. As has 
been argued it is stretching credibility to equate the selective 
effects of those phenomena with places in the polity of nature. An 
overcrowded dwelling is not an environment to its inhabitants in the 
same way that a tree is to biston betularia. The primary check to 
the growth of human populations is -gaining subsistence' and 'living 
in comfort'. A notion like comfort clearly cannot be reduced to an 
organism/environment relationship but implies and requires normative 
assumptions. The whole of human his tory between ithe progeni tors of 
man and Victorian England is labelled tribe. Nowhere is this term 
defined or explained and it plainly means whatever Darwin wants it to 
mean. Business and professional activity is described as a struggle 
for existence "so that the able in body and mind succeed best" (42). 
It is not surprising then that Darwin's failure to think through 
these issues led him to accept without question the eugenic arguments 
of his timE even when they flagrantly parted company from the 
structure of his theory. Thus he quotes Greg approvingly - "given a 
land originally peopled by a thousand Saxons and a thousand Celts -
and in a dozen generations five sixths of the population would be 
Celts but five sixths of the property, of the power, of the intellect, 
would belong to the one sixth of Saxons that remained. In the 
'eternal struggle for existence' it would be the inferior and less 
favoured race that had prevailed - and prevailed by virtue not of its 
good qualities but of its faults" (43). This is a theory of racial 
types which has none of the characteristic elements of the Darwinian 
analysis (variation, changes over time, adaptation, relation to the 
environment, etc.). 
Thus far I have tried to show how, even in the hands of its inventor 
and foremost exponent the theory of natural selection when applied (at 
least without further theoretical development) to human societies 
teBded to produce propositions not only contrary to common sense but 
also incompatible with Darwinism itself, that might indeed be called 
(51) 
misreadings (44)0 It has further been suggested that these ambiguities 
and difficulties drew towards themselves certain extraneous theoretical 
ideas so that by the turn of the century Darwinism was not just the 
theory in the Origin of SpE:C-1es but that theory plus various 
accretions. It remains now to examine some of the accretions not it , 
must be said, in order to develop a systematic classification but 
simply in order to provide further illustration of the theoretical 
mechanisms at work and of the intellectual context in which eugenics 
was born. This will be done firstly by a look at some of the 
'biological! social theory published at the turn of the centu1:Y and 
secondly by some discussion of the notion of degeneration and 
associated ideas. 
It will have become clear that the two major mechanisms of as it were, 
misreading the Darwinian theory were firstly, the suppression or 
redefinition of important conceptual distinctions and secondly, the 
extension of the Darwinian concepts into non-relevant domains which 
often involves the surreptitious introduction of new or different 
concepts. The texts to be considered all provide useful illustrations 
of these mechanisms at work. DoG. Ritchie was clearer than most about 
the nature of his project, namely, firstly to prove that, "the theory 
of natural selection lends no support to the dogma of laissez-faire" 
(45) and secondly to discover, "in what form, if any, can the theory 
of natural selection properly be applied to the intellectual moral 
and social development of man" (46)Q Nevertheless the method of 
achieving it involved the transformation of the Darwinian concepts 
into empty abstract formulae which made possible the introduction of 
entirely new contents. Thus, "natural selection operates in the 
highest types of human society as well as on the rest of the organic 
realm, but it passes into a higher form of itself in which the 
conflict of ideas and institutions takes the place of the struggle for 
existence between individuals and races" (47). The point here is that 
'higher form' is quite gratuitous since no principles were provided 
for the derivation of the forms or the definition of higher or lower 
(48). More fundamentally it is rather difficult to see how til ere 
could be such concepts within the Darwinian framework as the theory 
is purely concerned with adaptation to given environments: one form 
of adaptation cannot behigher or lower than another; indeed the whole 
(52) 
theory had to be ttranslated t into something quite different. 
Haycraft likewise made convenient adjustments to Darwinian concepts: 
"The struggle for existence between members of the same community is 
not therefore so much a struggle for existence as a struggle for the 
superfluity of the good things obtainable" (49). Here the biological 
struggle for existence was simply equated with a human contest for 
scarce goods. Harvey similarly drew on such amendments to Darwinism: 
"That a state is an organism, and that the facts of struggle, 
selection and cooperation exist in all organisms or collective life 
is abundantly clear" (50). 
The extension of Darwinian principles usually took the form of a 
search for equivalents. Thus, according to Ritchie, there were two 
causes of variation in the animal world, sex and the direct action of 
the environment. It was then necessary to investigate what 
corresponded to these in the world of human institutions. As a result 
he argued that the equivalent of sex was the "mingling of races" (51). 
Harvey following the same line of reasoning concluded that, "The whole 
history of Great Britain, of its internal institutions and its 
external empire is a record of variation and adaptation by compromise, 
and this has been made possible by the fact that the British are a 
composite people" (52). Elsewhere Ritchie concluded that ideas had 
"the same tendency to variation that we find throughout nature" (53). 
He was followed in this practice by Harvey who discussed for example 
Puritans, Jesuits and Quakers as different tvariations' (54). 
Another group of ideas which became attached to Darwinism were those 
going under the various names of degeneration, diathesis and 
neuropathic taint (55). This idea is usually credited to B.A. Morel 
who used it as a general label to cover all pathological deviations 
from the normal type. These he argued were transmitted through 
heredity and obeyed a law of gradual progression towards death i.e. in 
each succeeding generation the deviators became more serious. In the 
words of one of its most popular exponents, "The degenerate individual 
deviates from the racial type either through a check in development 
or through erratic formation. Arrested development results in 
atavism, where the individual comes to a stop at an early point on the 
(53) 
road over which the species has travelled, and cannot go further. 
Erratic development leads to monstrosities, which do not correspond 
to any point which the species in its normal development, has ever 
passed. All the anomalies of degeneration can be referred to these 
two formulas - arrested or aberrant development; atavism or 
monstrosity - but as a rule they combine the two" (56). 
The application of these doctrines led to the identification of 
" "bl t 1 varlous susceptl e types e.g. t.b., alcoholism and other disorders 
which (by modern standards) were not well understood. Thus for 
example, "a phthisical type of person is one who comes of a family 
liable to fall a prey to this microbe and he is recognisable by many 
distinctive characteristics of hair and complexion, and by qualities 
of temperament, feature and figure" (57). Equally it was possible to 
identify good types - "One cannot look at a lowland Scot without 
feeling that his stock had in days gone by and for many centuries, run 
the gauntlet of oatmeal porridge and cold east wind" (58). Generally 
speaking in the field of mental disorders the theories of degeneration 
involved the assumption of an equivalence of such disorders. 
"Degeneracy in the parent may be evidenced by insanity of all kinds, 
epilepsy, alcoholism, moral perversion and the like - and the presence 
of any such element of degeneracy in the parent is apt to engender in 
the offspring similar defects or a state of general instability" (59). 
It was further assumed that all such disorders were rooted in organic 
factors. "Degenerative disorders are more or less interchangeable and 
are merely proofs of an unstable nervous organisation. Where such 
conditions do not develop they may exist in a latent state, and pass 
as a legacy to another generation. Whether the neuropathic taint be 
manifest or latent, we are apt to find, on careful examination, 
indications of degeneracy" (60). 
These views and doctrines were so widely accepted in the late 
nineteenth century both in medical and other circles, that one 
authority could conunent that, "with the close of the year 1883 the 
degeneracy doctrine may be regarded as having practically been 
accepted in biology, in anthropology, in sociology, in criminology, 
in psychiatry, and general pathology" (61). This broadly speaking 
rema~ned the case until the war though by then certain elements of the 
(54) 
doctrine, particularly the notion of stigmata of degeneration 
(physical signs and correlates), had corne in for severe criticism and 
were partially discredited. In general it seems that these ideas 
survived rather longer in Britain than elsewhere (62). 
Degeneration and diathesis had the dual characteristic of theoretical 
closure and empirical openness. Notions of heredity in medical 
discourse took the form of general designations, that is, they were 
empirical devices that aggregated much clinically observed pathological 
variation. Such designations created no open problems which could be 
posed and solved; rather these notions of heredity were empirical 
summations (which might, of course, reflect genuine realities) not 
conceptual tools of research. These summations now seem extra-
ordinary - W. Duncan McKim could unite under the heading of 
degeneration, "insanity, idiocy, imbecility, eccentricity, hysteria, 
epilepsy, the alcohol-habit, the morphine habit, neuralgias, 
'nervousness', St. Vitus' dance, infantile convulsions, stammering, 
squint, gout, articular rheumatism, diabetes, t.b., cancer, deafness, 
blindness, deaf-mutism, color blindness" (63) amongst other things! 
As chapter six will show the situation was not fundamentally altered 
by the addition of statistical methods. In the biometric camp 
traditional notions of heredity took their place within a circuit of 
statistical devices whose function was precisely the organisation of 
rigorous observation and questions of heredity were articulated in 
terms of these devices and the research problems they generated (64). 
It is easy to say that these notions "could so readily be brought 
into line with Darwinismu (65) but the question is how the Darwinian 
notion of fitness, rooted in a concept of adaptation, is, on a strict 
interpretation, incompatible with degeneration and similar concepts. 
The connection is clearly in part an effect of the general confusion 
in theories of heredity in the late 19th century and early 20th 
century. The theoretical structure of Darwinism requires only some 
general notion of heredity - it cannot of itself specify the nature 
of the appropriate concepts of heredity. In these circumstances 
medical hereditarianism was a possibility among others. But the link 
also seems in part an effect of the difficulties attached to the 
notion of adaptation. Darwinism stressed adaptation as the central 
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(55) 
issue but, as has been shown, was vague and contradictory about how 
adaptation was to be recognised in a human context. This created 
as it were a theoretical vacuum which attracted to itself concepts 
and arguments which, while apparently similar in that they used 
biological rhetoric, were ultimately normative and foreign to the 
structure of the Darwinian theory. It has only been possible to 
give the most cursory treatment to concepts of degeneration and 
suggest posible theoretical links between them and Darwinism but in 
the chapters which follow the attempt will be made to show at 
greater length the connections between Darwinism and Eugenics. 
(56) 
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Chapter III - THE EUGENIC PROBLEM 
"The subject of 'eugenics' is in the air; it is dealt with in the 
newspapers, and it has found its way into light literature". 
BMJ (1913) 
Having elaborated some of the connections between Darwinism and 
biologistic social doctrines this chapter and the next examine the 
structure of Eugenic thought as it appeared in Britain. British 
eugenic thought was not a rigorous and theoretically coherent 
doctrine. It borrowed freely, even indiscriminately, from a wide 
variety of sources with the result that it encompassed a number of 
inconsistencies and divergent positions. But at the heart of this 
complex lay the twin concepts of heredity and selection. The attempt 
will be made to show that the major inconsistencies and difficulties 
in the eugenic position were rooted in its deployment of these two 
major concepts. 
Like any theoretical doctrine Eugenics can be characterised at 
various levels of complexity but it is convenient to start with a 
general sketch of the world view, as it were, in the mind of the 
average Eugenist in, say, 1914. In this view Man is part of the 
natural world and exhibits variations which are hereditary. There is 
a struggle for existence in which certain qualities get selected. 
Thus those who are more fit, more able, survive diseases and so on, 
become successful. As a result they reproduce or more than reproduce 
their replacements and so their fit stocks are carried on in the 
population. Naturally it is clear that Man has a cultural tradition 
which includes a moral sense and this may even have an evolutionary 
basis i.e. moral solidarity of a diffuse kind is a biologically 
adaptive mechanism. This aspect is related, as Darwin argued, to the 
operation of natural selection at the group level. Although natural 
selection operates at the individual level and this is probably the 
more important, it may also operate on societies and produce moral 
and other traditions which may, in turn, moderate and divert the 
effects of natural selection at the individual level. Within limits 
this moderation is acceptable. 
(64) 
However this moral aspect of humanity also forms the basis of more 
drastic interference in the operation of natural selection. This 
interference may effect changes such that the unfit no longer suffer 
the consequences and the fit no longer enjoy the advantages of their 
respective conditions. Under these circumstances not only may the 
beneficent results of natural selection be lost but the situation may 
actually deteriorate. Yet since there can be no return to the old 
forms of selection (because they are morally unacceptable - "It is 
better to spend thirteen millions a year than to relax the cords of 
human sympathy which bind us all together" (1) the effects of natural 
selection must be continued in the form of eugenic selection that is, 
a policy about who, or rather what stocks, are permitted to reproduce. 
Thus natural selection may be seen as operating in a sequence of at 
least two phases. The first phase produces the fit stocks - " •••• 
but equally surely the various forms of ability have been sorted out 
during the past centuries by the action of natural selection of like-
to-like mating, of direct inheritance and exist ready in certain 
strains in an intensified form" (2). Once established however these 
qualities are threatened by a subsequent phase because the qualities 
'Nature' has selected need not be preserved. The heart of the eugenic 
argument is that in this later phase there is social selection of the 
previously naturally selected and this social selection must be made 
eugenic. So for example in Crackanthorpe's three stage sequence of 
human evolution the stage had been reached where natural selection had 
done its good work and had to be replaced by something better (3). It 
was never a question of returning to natural selection - it was rather 
a question of achieving the same results eugenically. "The primary 
object of eugenics is, no doubt, to substitute for the slow and cruel 
methods of nature some more rational, humane and rapid system of 
selection by which to ensure the continued progress of the race" (4). 
This highly condensed version clearly includes a number of basic 
concepts and arguments which require further analysis. On the face 
of it this eugenic account carried considerable empirical conviction 
as well as having some pleasantly acceptable implications. Not only 
did it root Man in the natural world - Darwin's achievement was to 
place "Man in his proper position in the animal world, and to show 
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that he was subject to the same processes, the same limitations, the 
same influences as the rest of creation, and no longer required 
entirely seperate methods of investigation and study" (5) - but in its 
approach to human history it unified much messy diversity while 
retaining the essential point of the struggle for existence. It 
explained or at least provided a place for morality. The harsh work 
of natural selection had been done - it remained for Man to preserve 
its results by the most humane and progressive methods. Appealing 
though this picture might have been in what follows it will be 
maintained that underneath the surface of this argument there were 
a number of important conceptual shifts. Taking the concept of 
natural selection first it will be argued that this played two main 
roles in eugenic discourse. Firstly it made possible the 
identification of innate abilities and fitness with social position 
and social reward and thus provided a picture of the distribution of 
the fit and the unfit. Secondly it allowed for the inference of 
fitness from norms rather than reproductive success. 
As the eugenists conceived it natural selection necessarily produced 
a situation in which the naturally immune, the naturally more able and 
so on must survive; these superior stocks would be aggregated and 
would take the available social rewa~ds. This was often described in 
the rhetoric of the favourite social Darwinist cliches - as a harsh 
struggle for existence, denoting the frequent but exemplary 
destruction of men by famine, of tribe by tribe, of conquered by 
conqueror. In short, as many eugenists liked to say, the race is to 
the swift and the battle to the strong. Thus natural selection, 
"increases the proportion of the fit by assuring to them the 
advantages attendant on innate ability and a consequent better 
chance of survival to rear a large family" (6). It was generally 
agreed that people were at the bottom of the social scale either 
because of bad luck or inborn defects, the latter preponderating the 
lower down one went. "Is it not certain therefore, that the lower 
we look in the scale of the classes of the community if measured by 
the degree of their poverty, the smaller will be the proportion of the 
merely unluckly, and the larger will the proportion of the natural 
unfit" (7). Dr. Inge was in no doubt that the working classes were 
"inferior to the upper class" (8) and Dr. Campbell was inclined to 
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argue that "the poor are (in my opinion at least) inferior mentally 
and, to some extent, physically to the well-to-do" (9). On similar 
grounds it could be argued that the upper classes were the result of 
a long-term process of selection. This was in part a matter of 
personal taste. Dean Inge felt that "the well-to-do classes in this 
country are, on an average, among the finest specimens of humanity 
which have appeared since the Ancient Greeks" (10) while the 
Whethams considered the "present upper classes are the result of a 
thousand years of selection" a time during which Itnatural selection 
has worked well" (11). 
The parallels with the arguments discussed in chapter two are apparent. 
Eugenics was an attempt to extend the Darwinian concepts to the human 
realm - with the social environment largely taking the place of the 
natural one, human characteristics of all kinds taking the place of 
organic variations, and the struggle for existence encompassing 
various forms of human conflict as well as its more traditional 
designations. Finally the emergence of social groups as embodiments 
of (un)fitness or specially (un)fit persons was conceived as a process 
of adaptation to a social environment and therefore success could be 
defined both biologically (reproductive success) and socially(social 
success~ "But the essence of natural selection consists in the 
conjunction of success in the struggle for life and its fruits with 
a preponderating rate of reproduction" (12). Thus natural selection 
functioned as a link between the aggregation of qualities in stocks 
and the distribution of groups in the social structure i.e. it made 
possible the connection between the innate qualities and social 
criteria of 'ability', 'success', and so on. 
To use the terms introduced in the second chapter this is a 
sociological variant of the mode two form of Darwinism i.e. it amounts 
to saying little more than those that survive and are successful are 
those that survive and are successful. The superiority of stocks is 
inferred from the nature of their success. "Thus a stock which at one 
period of social evolution produced successful warriors may at another 
give rise to organisers and administrators" (13). This argument is 
circular and consequently has a very serious deficiency namely, that 
it cannot deal with the possibility of a divergence between the two 
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indicators of Isuccess
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Clearly once the indices of natural selection in operation are 
moving in different directions there are two logical possibilities. 
Either one can continue to argue that natural selection is still 
functioning or that it is no longer functioning. A variant of the 
second position is that it is still functioning but badly or in the 
wrong direction. Both variants of the second position can be seen 
to involve a basic shift in the argument. If natural selection is no 
longer working it is because the fit no longer reproduce (as much) 
and the unfit do reproduce (more). But it therefore follows that 
fitness and unfitness are no longer being judged with reference to 
reproductive performance. Clearly to abandon the link between 
fitness and reproductive performance is to abandon the mode two style 
of argument. But, equally clearly, it is to pose afresh the question 
of how the fit and the unfit are to be identified. 
This problem is dealt with by a shift back into a sociological variant 
of the mode one form cf Darwinism. This, as has been shown does not 
involve the problem of circularity, but requires a concept of 
adaptation as an organism/environment relationship. However in the 
eugenist version there 1S a crucial substitution. In sharp contrast 
to a concept of places in Nature (as with Biston for example) fitness 
is not judged from an organism/environment relationship. There is no 
serious attempt to apply a concept of environment to human relations, 
rather fitness and unfitness are simply derived from certain moral 
and ideological norms. "By fitness or unfitness are here meant the 
presence or absence of that amount of health, intelligence and 
aptitude for moral training which goes to make up civic worth and 
usefulness" (14), or as Mott put it " ••••••• and by well born I •••• 
mean ••••• coming from good stocks of broad chested sires and deep 
bosomed mothers; endowed with courage, honesty and commonsense, which 
is the inborn aptitude of profiting by experience to do the right 
thing at the right moment" (15). 
But once this shift has been made, to the identification of fit and 
unfit in terms of norms (however derived), natural selection of the 
old kind ceases to be of any importance. The focus shifts to the 
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comparative reproduction of designated types i.e. the stocks as 
located in different social groups. The crucial point is to 
"inquire what classes of the community are reproducing themselves 
fastest" (16). There is no list, nor could there be, of adaptive 
mechanisms because anything and everyihipg can be examined for its 
effects on the comparative birth rate of groups whose value has 
already been assessed on eugenic (ultimately normative) grounds. 
These conceptual shifts in the argument must engender difficulties 
at the practical level and this is confirmed by the disagreements 
amongst the eugenists themselves on a wide range of proposed 
diagnoses and cures. The eugenic use of Darwinism concepts made it 
possible to consider the social structure as both the result of and 
an obstacle to natural selection. Some eugenists were more concerned 
with the bad effects of the social structure on the upper classes. 
The major problem of Schiller's eugenic education programme (17) was 
the equipping of the youth of the upper classes with an adequate 
motive to make the best of themselves and not succumb to the 
temptations of dissipating their substance. Similarly the social 
structure could be an obstacle if those in the lower ranks of society 
who were there by accident could not climb out. "With improved 
surroundings and greater opportunities of self-help, people of this 
type will readily seperate themselves out from the families who have 
fallen into the depths by reason of the badness of their inborn 
qualities. Thus a new classification is obtained which is of real 
value from the point of view of the race. Fresh recruits are obtained 
for the effective selection of the communal life, and the residue can 
be more justly dealt with as a seperate problem of degeneration" (18). 
Many eugenists were inclined in practice to relax the rigours of the 
natural selection argument. While they remained convinced that the 
higher social classes were of superior stock there was a tendency to 
stress also comparisons within classes. Rather than the upper classes 
being good stocks and the lower classes being bad stocks it was 
frequently argued that there were good and bad stocks in all classes, 
and that gradually the bad were weeded out of the rich and the good 
promoted out of the poor. Thus it was possible for the Whethams to 
say, "There is undoubtedly much fine material among casual 
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labourers" (19). Clearly this possibility was most convenient from 
the propaganda point of view since then and subsequently (20) the 
eugenists were not unaware of the danger of class prejudice. Darwin, 
reviewing one of Wheltham's books, accepted that, "the existence of 
any correlation between ability and social status is certain to be 
stoutly denied in many quarters" (21). While class prejudice was 
undoubtedly present (as Saleeby put it, "Thus we Eugenists assume, if 
we belong to the middle class that the middle class is the backbone of 
the nation; if we are aristocrats, we tend to think that aristocracy 
really means what it suggests ....... (22) it was not simply a matter 
of such prejudice. The ambiguousness of the eugenists was a genuine 
reflection of the ambiguity of their concepts. Nevertheless whether 
the natural selection argument was to be deployed in its full rigour, 
relaxed or even abandoned altogether the eugenists could not do 
without the support of another crucial concept, that of heredity. It 
was essential to have some notion of heredity, however vague, in order 
to sustain the idea of natural selection and additionally heredity 
might offer a firmer foundation for eugenic arguments. It is to the 
functioning of this concept that I now turn. 
An essential part of any eugenic discourse is some means of 
characterising human qualities and their distribution in populations. 
These qualities are most obviously divisible into two kinds, physical 
and mental. Physical characteristics can be relatively easily 
measured and this partly explains Eugenics connections with and 
continued interest in anthropometry and physical anthropology. 
However such a demarcation was not always easily maintained and many of 
the mental categories were problematic (if not many of the physical 
ones as well (23). A number of different types of classificatory 
category were available. 
empirical estimates (24). 
There were a wide variety of commonsense 
There were psychiatric or quasi-psychiatric 
categories, some used officially (e.g. 'insane') to identify certain 
sections of the population, others in general, though not official, 
use such as 'feeble-minded' or 'moral defective'. Lastly the 
Eugenists themselves often referred to more general characteristics 
like 'ability', 'eminence', or 'civic worth'. Any system of eugenics 
must of course be concerned with hereditary qualities. But there are 
two problems here - not to be confused: the problem of qualities and 
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the problem of their hereditary basis. For the Eugenists these two 
problems were both fused and solved in the designation, in what they 
supposed was Darwinian fashion, of fitness and unfitness. It is 
crucial then to investigate how these terms were delineated and 
ascribed. 
These considerations imply a scale of generality on which individuals 
could be mapped. The terms fit and unfit would be at the highest 
level of generality. But at this level there arises a problem of the 
combination of characteristics. Fitness and unfitness could be 
defined in such a way that they aggregated 'good i and 'bad' qualities. 
It was often argued against eugenics that had its practices been 
enforced in the past many great figures in a wide range of fields 
would never have appeared. An editorial comment in the British 
Medical Journal expressed a common view, "Yet the world could more 
easily spare a regiment of eugenically perfect bumpkins than the 
neurotic 'degenerate' Algernon ~harles Swinburne" (25). Long lists 
were compiled and fought over of those with tuberculosis, epilepsy 
and various other illnesses the Eugenists tended to consider 
hereditary - such lists included Alexander, Julius Caesar, Rousseau, 
Nietzsche, Maupassant, Chopin, Heine and Mill. 
Clearly universally acclaimed individuals ~cssessing some qualities 
which appeared to be fit and some which appeared to be unfit posed 
something of a problem for those who wished to see an increase in 
civic worth, defined by Crackanthorpe as "soUli.d heal th, a sufficient 
amount of energy, a well-bale.nced brain" (26). That such individuals 
existed could hardly be denied. It was of course possible to deal 
with this in the rather cavalier way that Sir James Barr did with 
Robert Louis Stevenson, who, he affirmed, "was a beautiful writer, 
and many of his epigrams are very fine, but much of his writings will 
not bear analysis according to the hard rules of facts, and I am 
convinced that if he had not been phthisical he would have written 
., 
much better and much more sanely (27). But this was really no 
solution. If the categories were to be retained and made to work they 
had to be shifted onto units where such contradictions were 
impossible. The resolution of this difficulty may be seen in 
Whetham's comment on a pedigree that, "This pedigree is also 
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interesting in that it illustrates the fallacy which lies in the 
common idea that great ability is often associated with unsoundness 
of body and mind. The truth is that ability and unsoundness usually 
enter a family from different sources and are transmitted 
independently of each other. Sometimes they chance to coincide in 
the same person, but more often they become seperated in different 
individuals"(28). Thus the argument brought to bear on this problem 
was that the qualities of an inGividual are an assemblage; what is 
important is not this assemblage as such but its sources in the 
stock - as Schiller put it: "It is clear, therefore, that the unit of 
heredity is not the individual but the stock: ability comes out in 
the individual because it lurks in the stock" (29). By definition 
the hereditary stocks cannot be both fit and unfit. The essential 
point is that the role of hereditary concepts was to make possible 
the transition from qualities to stocks at which level the categories 
'fit~ and 'unfit' could be brought to bear. 
But the structure of the argument while requiring concepts of 
heredity did not necessarily specify which ones. There was at this 
time something of a plethora of concepts available (indeed in dispute) 
and the eugenists could hardly ignore these differences. In the 
words of one popular scientific journal, "At any rate, Biology today 
teams with mutually incongruous opinions (e.g. those held by 
Mendelian, Mutationists, Biometricians, Selectionists etc) all of 
which are conceivably incorrect" (30). The magic talisman by which 
they overcame all theoretical problems might be called the argument 
from the average. Possibly the most frequently occurring piece of 
rhetoric in the eugenic canon was a biblical text about thorns and 
thistles (31). The eugenists promoted the phrase vlike produces like' 
to the status of a general axiom illustrated in a variety of ways, 
the favourites being the successes of animal breeding and the display 
of pedigree showing a variety of conditions 'running in families'. 
As Sir James Barr put it, " If the same case were taken in the 
selection of human parents as there is in the breeding of the lower 
animals this country might be purified in less than a century" (32). 
The argument from the practice of breeding was especially useful as 
it seemed to deal simultaneously with the accusation made against 
the eugenists of insufficient knowledge. As Darwin said in his 
(72) 
address to the first International Eugenics Congress, "If we tell 
the breeders of cattle that their knowledge of the laws of heredity 
1S so imperfect that it is useless for them either to attempt to 
avoid breeding from their worst stocks or to try only to breed from 
their best stocks, why they would simply laugh at uS" (33). 
The effect of the concept of stock and the use of divers hereditary 
concepts to sustain it made it possible to talk in terms of the 
average. " • • • • • • Eugenics deals with averages rather than with 
individual cases. In the average the law of heredity works with 
practical certainty; and all race questions are questions of 
average" (34). This use of the term abolished at a stroke the 
difficulties of particular combinations of qualities among individuals 
and the difficulties of. rival theories of heredity. "A moment's 
reflection suggests that the capriciousness is a question of the 
individual, and that, on taking a large number of cases we should 
expect to find definite laws holding good, as we do in other forms of 
life" (35). 
Thus the Eugenists took up biological science in a somewhat 
opportunistic manner in that they drew on all concepts which could 
bolster the notion of stock. Where for example simply Mendelian 
categories fitted certain conditions (like eye-colour or brachydactyly) 
they were cited. In the case of more complex qualities there was a 
tendency to use statistical or commonsense modes of argument. Other 
pedigrees, those of mental defect for example, were discussed in terms 
of some notion of degeneration and the different forms this might tak& 
All this was underpinned by the eugenists reading of Weisman's 
doctrine of the continuity of the germ-plasm. Thus Crackanthorpe, 
lecturing the Royal Commissioners on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes 
in elementary eugenics invoked the names of Weisman, J.A.Thomson, 
R.H.Lock, K.Pearson, Archdall Reid and A.Ploetz (36) with the comment 
that, "I do not say that all those authorities are agreed. They are 
not. But there is enough agreement among them to establish this 
proposition that insanity, feeble-mindedness, syphilis, tuberculosis 
and many other diseases (including eye defects) are inherited in the 
same way and to the same extent as are stature, ability and eye 
colour" (37). This quotation illustrates the points being made here. 
(73) 
The authorities to whom Crackanthorpe referred worked in the fields of 
biology, medicine and statistics; what they were supposed to have 
demonstrated was in relation to clinical entities in very different 
stages of elaboration; and finally their work is compared with 
stature (a classic continuous trait worked on by Quetelet and Galton): 
ability, perhaps the most frequently discussed commonsense hereditary 
entity; and eye colour, one of the first human characteristics to 
which the Mendelian rules were found to apply. 
Having sketched the use of the concept of heredity within the eugenic 
doctrine it is now appropriate to examine certain problems that grew 
up round that use since contradictions between different eugenists 
were not so much a matter of personal idiosyncracy as of unresolved 
problems built into the very tissues of the doctrine. The 
abstractness of the Eugenists' hereditarianism encouraged the 
attribution of hereditary components to almost any condition. As 
H.G.Wells drily commented one could have an hereditary components in 
the susceptibility of skulls to fracture by falling bricks (38). 
The eX&l:lple was barely a caricature as the Eugenists frequently made 
similarly vague remarks. Saleeby commented that, "We know by 
observation amongst ourselves that hardness and tenderness are to be 
found running through families, are things which are transmisible" 
(39) while Whetham observed1that, "The arts of the demagogue, who 
possesses the power of influencing the masses, are also highly 
specialised qualities and will be inherited directly from father to 
son" (40). 
Such an abstract position on heredity implied an equally abstract 
one on 'environment' which goes some way to explain the variety of 
models and analogies that the ~genists employed. Whetham compared 
heredity and environment to capital and income. Heredity "may be 
compared to an actual gain of capital as far as the human race is 
concerned" while "environment involves a constant expenditure of 
income, perfectly justified as long as the increase in capital ~s 
maintained" (41). Saleeby throughout his writings used more 
'scientific' t1rms calling for a multiplicative model of heredity to 
replace the a~tive one (42). But the postulated rigour of the 
relation was belied by the absence of the terms. What was to be 
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multiplied by what? These models and analogies were little more than 
a cover for, on the one hand, as has been shown, an abstract general 
notion of inheritance, and on the other hand a completely 
undifferentiated category of environment. 
A second problem resulted from the opportunistic relations with 
biological science-. It has been shown that the Eugenists tried to 
insist that difference amongst schools of biologists or scientists 
were generally unimportant. As Schiller put it, "For upon any 
biological theory it is an established fact that the hereditary 
constitution of a stock has an enormous bearing on the value of the 
individuals generated from it. And social institutions plainly 
ought to take account of this fact" (43). Despite this rhetoric the 
Eugenists had to deal with the difficult fact that the different 
practices to which they appealed - genetic, medical, statistical -
obstinately refused to submerge themselves in the general fact of 
inheritance. These practices all had their own dynamic: Mendelianism 
refused to accept that it could not explain continuous traits; medical 
practitioners insisted that they dealt with individual cases and not 
averages. Many doctors would have sympathised with Mercier's no 
doubt exaggerated comment that "neither biomet:M'5" nor Mendelism is of 
the slightest value to the practi ing physician" (44). The Eugenists 
claim to scientific backing drew them into scientific controversies; 
their participation in such controversies~made their practical 
policies seem less convincing. 
The analysis so far has suggested that the concepts of heredity and 
natural selection in the readings of the Eugenists were deployed in 
inconsistent or even contradictory ways and were thus the site of 
certain discursive problems. It has been suggested that eugenics 
oscillated in emphasis between these two concepts. The idea of such 
an oscillation can be extended to other features of British eugenic 
thought, namely the concern with the status of Eugenics itself and 
the problem of how much knowledge was required before eugenic 
intervention became possible. 
The conventional definition of Eugenics was Galtons: "The study of 
agencies under social control that may improve or impair the racial 
(75) 
qualities of future generations either physically or mentally", 
which, more prosaically, as Whetham pointed out, meant, "The study 
of heredity and its bearing on social problems" (45). Whatever else 
it was then clearly eugenists agreed that their doctrine had a 
scientific component and was concerned to promote a social practice. 
Professor Edgar called it "at once a cult and a practical policy" (46) 
Beyond that basic commitment differences emerged. The differences 
amounted to two versions of Eugenics, or at the very least two 
distinct emphases. Such a distinction is not immediately visible in 
the literature and was certainly never declared or proclaimed but it 
can be shown to be a defensible interpretation. 
In the first version tending to emphasise heredity the unfit are 
those with a specific, objectively verifiable, characteristic whether 
it be disease, deafness, mental illness of some kind or whatever. 
The second step in this version is to establish the hereditary 
component in the characteristic and this again is done by reference 
to the appropriate practice, medicine, Mendelism or whatever. The 
third step is then to argue for the solution of this problem by 
limiting the reproduction of those affected. This is what might be 
called the less ambitious version. Something approaching it was 
taken by C.W. Saleeby who in his 1914 book listed as the foundations 
of Eugenics, genetics, the medical sciences, obstetrics (Dr. Saleeby 
'L 
was an obstetrician), dietetics, psychology, anthropology, sociology, 
civics, and statistics. Admittedly Saleeby was rather ecentric and 
insisted that Eugenics must have its own philosophy which he decided 
was Bergsonism (the book was dedicated to Bergson). No doubt he also 
had a certain penchant for the banal - in its new guise eugenics was 
now, "the practical application to human life, present and to come, 
of the eternal principles of morality, which have ever sought the 
ennoblement, enhancement and extension of life" (47). But behind the 
absurdity was a serious point. Saleeby had become increasingly 
disillusioned with the more sweeping statements of his fellow 
eugenists. 
Others felt less dependent on specialist disciplines. They took the 
view, with Crackanthorpe, that eugenics was a branch of biology 
concerned with, lithe investigation of racial qualities and their 
--
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transmissibility from one generation to another" (48). Clearly 
certain activities of the eugenists like the investigation of 
pauperism (see chapter five) required the rationa~that eugenists 
could investigate qualities, establish their hereditary basis and make 
judgements about fitness and unfitness. Nevertheless their position 
was not far removed from Saleeby's. 
In the second, more ambitious, version one begins with the concept of 
natural selection and then everything else tends to follow. The fit 
and the unfit are identified by their social performance. This 
version has the virtue of being less dependent on outside theoretical 
support but has an intrinsic tendency, as has been shown, to require 
the use of some (hereditary) norms, if it was not to be entirely 
circular. It also laid the eugenists open to damaging charges of 
snobbery which made many eugenists, in Saleeby's words, "somewhat 
chary of predictions and proposals based upon the relative fertility 
of different classes of the Community" (49). The existence of these 
two versions may go some way to explain the emergence of a vigorous 
eugenics movement at the time when it occured (see appendix). While 
many of the arguments could have been, and were, derived from 
Darwinism forty years earlier what gave the idea a considerable boost 
was the new work in heredity. The various developments in psychology 
and sociology of the late 19th century and early 20th century (50) 
made it seem much more feasible than it had been to identify general 
qualities and to establish their hereditary basis. If it is generally 
agreed that the weak point in Darwinian theory had been its theory of 
inheritance then the solution of that weak point would make the 
overall structure of Darwinism that much more impressive. It was the 
combination of the axiomatic conviction of Darwinism with more viable 
notions of heredity which brought the Eugenics movement into the 
world. 
The second question to be considered here is that of the degree of 
knowledge required to sanction eugenic intervention. There was as 
much confusion about eugenics as a social practice as there was about 
eugenics own status both a consequence of the two versions. There 
were on the one hand constant calls for more knowledge but on the 
other hand constant assertions that one could not wait until all 
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doubts were dispelled; on the one hand insistence on the fact of 
inheritance, on the other hand limitations placed on the area of 
eugenic intervention due to lack of knowledge. The eugenists grappled 
with this in accordance with their particular bias. Those placing the 
emphasis on the natural selection version were, predictably enough, 
keen on fairly sweeping measures. Darwin argued that, "In the present 
state of our scientific knowledge it would be as well to begin by 
endeavouring to make it impossible for those who are not only 
characterised by some signal defect but who are also below the average 
both in bodily and in mental qualities, to reproduce their kind" (51) 
and Whetham in 1909 agreed that, "as far as legislation is concerned 
two problems are ready to be attacked: those of the feeble-minded and 
the able-bodied pauper" (52). 
Other writers were rather more cautious. Schuster in 1912 (53) 
considered that only the care and control of the feeble-minded was 
acceptable. Other writers seem to have moved in his direction. 
Whetham by 1912 had drawn back to proposing action only for the 
feeble-minded and the "habitual offender of clearly criminal type" 
(54), while Saleeby who in 1909 had advocated dealing with the deaf 
and dumb the feeble-minded, the insane and the criminal, retreated 
considerably from that position. But such caution contrasted oddly 
with the tenor of their more general remarks. To a degree, playing 
the game of heredity and selection the eugenists could have their cake 
and eat it. The n~ion rang from end to end with their cries of 
biological doom - the catch words were 'deterioration', 'degeneration' 
and 'multiplication of the unfit' - yet there was no unanimity among 
them as to the rhythm or result of these processes but hysterical 
assessments of the present and both the immediate and long-term 
futures were a constant part of the eugenic scene. Schiller, 
referring to the heavy burden of taxation on the middle classes 
throughout the civilised world, assured eugenists that, "It means the 
degeneration of the European race. It may mean the collapse of 
civilisation" (55). Such statements informed most of the eugenic 
accounts of human history. "Although this suppression of the best 
blood of the country is a new disease in modern Europe, it is an old 
story in the history of nations, and has been the prelude to the ruin 
of states and the decline and fall of Empires" (56). In the 
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contemporary world there was also the imperial dimension to be 
considered. "Even if we do no more than study the lunacy returns or 
compare the gaps and patches in the mouths of our young men and women 
with the brilliant white teeth of Arabs and Negroes a dread that we 
are a decadent people must cross our minds" (57). Nor were these 
solely long-term prognostications. Racial decline was actually going 
on, indeed gathering speed. "If present tendencies are unchecked the 
quality of the race must deteriorate with ever-increasing rapidity, 
till it approaches that of the lowest type among us" (58). The 
situation was all the more urgent as the quality of the race was the 
root of all other problems - "There is no wealth but life; and if the 
inherent quality of the life fails, neither battleships, nor libraries 
nor symphonies, nor Free Trade, nor Tariff Reform, nor anything else, 
will save a nation" (59). 
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Chapter III - Appendix 
Generally speaking the beginnings of the Eugenic movement were in the 
period 1906-8. Darwin's comment that, "Anyone who endeavours to 
recall to his mind the state of public opinion with regard to the 
science of Eugenics, say, ten years ago, must, I think, be struck 
with the magnitude of the change which has recently taken place in 
the esteem in which this subject is held" (1) is basically correct 
and is confirmed by hostile observers (2). There were of course 
eugenic ideas in Britain before this period - Greg has been mentioned 
(3) but they did not receive widespread attention until the dates I 
have suggested. This being the case the approach followed in this 
chapter was to work on a representative 'core' of eugenic writings. 
There is of course always an element of arbitrariness which I tried 
to overcome as much as possible in ways briefly described below. 
The authors whose work was analysed fell naturally into three groups. 
A. Those who may be described as having 'posts of responsibility' 
within the movement i.e. were active in the Eugenic Education 
Society (EES) and in representations to official and private 
bodies on its behalf. Here I included M. Crackanthorpe (1832-
1913). As second President of the Society he persuaded Galton 
to give it his blessing (4). His writings, insofar as I have 
been able to find them (and of course ~is qualification applies 
throughout) were, 
(a) eugenics as a social force (Nineteenth Century LXIII (1908) 
962-72) 
(b) population and progress (Chapman & Hall 1907) 
(c) the eugenic field (ER I (1909-10) 11-25) 
(d) presidential address to E.E.S. (E.E.S. second annual 
report 1909-10) 
(e) marriage, divorce and eugenics (Nineteenth Century LXVIII 
(1910) 686-702) 
(f) the friends and foes of eugenics (Fortnightly Review XCII 
(1912) 740-748) 
(g) evidence to the Royal Commission on Divorce and 
Matrimonial Causes (Parliamentary Papers 1912-3 XX 84-96) 
I 
I (85) 
Secondly in this section I included L. Darwin, Charles Darwin's 
fourth son. He was active in the Society for a long period, 
becoming President after Crackanthorpe until 1928 (5). 
(a) sociology and evolution (Charity Organisation Review XXVI 
(1909) 364-378) 
(b) presidential address to E.E.S. (E.E.S. third annual report 
1911) 
(c) presidential address to E.E.S. fourth annual report (1909 _ 
10) 
(d) first steps towards eugenic reform (ER IV (1912-13) 26-38) 
(e) the eugenic ideal (ER V (1913-14) 2-9) 
(f) heredity and environment (ER V (1913-14) 153-4) 
(g) presidential address to E.E.S. (E.E.S. annual report 1913) 
(eugenics and the national economy) 
(h) presidential address to E.E.S. (E.E.S. annual report 1914) 
(eugenics during and after the war) 
(i) report of an address on practical eugenics (published 1914) 
I had wanted to include in this section Mrs. S. Neville Rolfe (1886-
1955) who played an important role in the formation of the Society, 
partially de$cribed in her book (6). She wrote very little however 
and therefore could not be included (7). 
B. My second group includes individuals who are perhaps best 
described as bringing to eugenics a prestige gained elsewhere. 
Here I included F.C.S. Schiller (1864-1937), well known as a 
philosopher associated with pragmatism (8). 
(a) eugenics and politics (Constable 1926) 
(b) social decay and eugenical reform (Constable 1932) 
These two books are collections of essays. With one or two 
exceptions I have used only pre-19l4 material from each. 
Secondly in this section I included W.C.D. Whetham (1867-1952) 
initially a chemist and later a widely read historian of science. 
He left an autobiography (9). 
(a) the family and the nation (Longmans 1909) 
(b) the extinction of the upper classes (Nineteenth Century LXVI 
(1909) 97-108) 
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(c) eugenics and unemployment - a lecture (Bowes & Bowes 1910) 
(d) heredity and parentage (Geo. Allen & Son 1910) 
(e) eminence and heredity (Nineteenth Century LXIX (1911) 818-
32) 
(f) decadence and civilisation (Hibbert Journal X (1911-12) 
179-200) 
(g) an introduction to eugenics (Bowes & Bowes 1912) 
(h) eugenics and politics (ER II (1910-11) 242-246) 
(i) heredity and society (Longmans 1912) 
(j) inheritance and sociology (Nineteenth Century LXV (1909) 
74-90) 
I had wanted to include in this section W.R. Inge (1860-1954) a 
well known commentator on religious and other topics, first as 
Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Cambridge then as Dean of 
St. Paul's (10). A consistent eugenics supporter until towards 
the end of his life. Again shortage of material precluded this. 
C. My third group contains those who were recognised by various 
publics as authorities on questions of central concern to 
eugenics and who were themselves eugenists. 
A.F. Tredgold (1870-1952). An authority in the field of mental 
deficiency and author of what was for many years the standard 
textbook in the field (11). 
(a) eugenics and the future progress of man (ER III (1911-12) 
94-117) 
(b) marriage regulation and national family records (ER IV(1912-
13) 74-90) 
(c) the study of eugenics (Quarterly Review 217 (1912) 43-67) 
(d) some medical aspects of eugenics (Medical Press (1912) 
110-112, 137-9) 
(e) heredity and environment in relation to social reform 
(Quarterly Review 219 (1913) 364-383) 
My second figure in this section is C.W. Saleeby (1878-1940). 
A prominent commentator on medical topics, referred to by Mrs. 
Neville Rolfe as the "stormy petrel" of the eugenics movement (12). 
A prolific writer and the author of an early textbook on 
eugenics. He was never on particularly good terms with the 
Society. 
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(a) biology and history (pub. E.E.S. 1908) 
(b) the obstacles to eugenics (Sociological Review II (1909) 
228-40) 
(c) parenthood and race-culture (Cassell 1909) 
(d) the methods of eugenics (Sociological Review III (1910) 
277-86) 
(e) the methods of race regeneration (Cassell 1911) 
(f) eugenics and public health (Journal of State Medicine XXI 
(1913) 440-445) 
(g) the first decade of modern eugenics (Sociological Review 
VII (1914) 126-39) 
(h) the progress of eugenics (Cassell 1914) 
The third writer here is E.H.J. Schuster (1879-1969). One of 
the less flamboyant eugenists and one of the first members of 
Pearsonts Eugenics Laboratory (13). 
(a) the methods and results of the Galton Laboratory for 
national eugenics (ER III (1911-12) 10-24) 
(b) the scope of the science of eugenics (BMJ (1913) 273-5) 
(c) eugenics (Collins 1912) 
I had wanted to include in this section E.J. Lidbetter (1878-1962) a 
Poor Law relieving officer whose research was consistently backed by 
the society when it was financially able but he wrote almost 
exclusively on pauperism (14). 
These writings formed the basic material for the purpose of analysing 
the Eugenic doctrine but of course I used (and quoted) other material 
where it was appropriate. In order to reduce the arbitrary element a 
little I would make the following points about the seven individuals 
I have selected. They all wrote in the first five volumes of the 
Eugenics Review (i.e. those before the Great War), indeed they 
dominated it. Four of them gave Galton lectures (Schiller 1925, 
Tredgold 1927, Darwin 1928, Lidbetter 1932), one of the Society's most 
important annual events and the dates of these lectures give evidence 
of their long standing commitment to the cause. All of them were 
involved in the firt International Eugenics Congress held in London 
in 1912 and an important point in the movement's growth. Lastly the 
material covered (the 'core l ) exhibits a wide range of sophistication 
and was addressed to the most diverse audiences including government 
(88) 
enquiries, upper class and university gatherings medical students 
and various reform organisations. I end on a lightly less serious 
but perplexing note. The attentive reader will have noticed the 
longevity of the figures mentioned. The average age of the ten was 
81.3, that of the seven whose writings are listed just under 80. 
Perhaps eugenics has some benefits after all. 
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(1) Eugenics and the national economy (pub. E.E.S. 1913) 
(2) See e.g. G.K. Chesterton - Eugenics and other evils (Cassell 1922) 
(3) Galton of course but also W.R. Greg - Enigmas of Life (1891 Kegan 
Paul - I have used the eighteenth edition, the book was first 
published in 1872) pp.89-l33. Greg commented on Galton that he 
had, "followed the same line of thought as myself, though both, 
till after the publication of our respective publications were 
unacquainted with the other1s writings". op.cit. pp.114-5 for 
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(6) Social Biology and Welfare (Allen & Unwin 1949) 
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Chapter IV - THE EUGENIC SOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM 
"The notion of heredity tickles the modern imagination in much the 
same way as the notion of the devil tickled the imagination of 
medieval men. There is something fearsome and fascinating about it". 
F.H. Hayward 
What solutions could the Eugenists offer to stave off the impending 
racial disasters? "we are safe in supposing that we shall tend to 
improve the average ability and beauty of the race by encouraging ;the 
growth of families in which these qualities are manifest, and 
discouraging those in which they are deficient. Whether our knowledge 
eventually becomes more exact, or whether we find the complete 
analysis of the problem for ever too difficult for solution the 
general fact of inheritance remains". (1). Such answers while 
heartrendingly obvious in principle proved irritatingly obscure in 
practice. No doubt science-based pressure groups have special 
problems to contend with. Their mastery of the relevant fields of 
knowledge may be deficient, leaving them open to attack by superior, 
or at least opposed expertise. Scientific work and scientific 
conclusions are seldom static and are ill--suited to the exigencies of 
ideological and political debate. Consequently the strategy and 
tactics of the eugenics movement was at least as complex a business 
as its theoretical and ideological foundations. 
A central distinction here, again following Galton, was that between 
positive and negative eugenics (2). The designation of qualities, 
the fact of inheritance and the dynamic factors of selection over 
time implied the existence of two general groups, the fit and unfit. 
The available alternatives for action were to use 'positive' measures 
to increase the number of the fit and 'negative' measures to decrease 
the number of the unfit, and indeed most measures proposed by the 
eugenists could be placed in one or other of these categories. 
However logical simplicity was balanced by a luxuriant profusion of 
eugenic remedies all of which at one time or another have had their 
advocates: Dean Inge, for example, demanded "compulsory national 
uniform for both sexes" (3) while Dr. Saleeby (in 1914) considered 
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the Boy Scout Movement, "the greatest step towards the progress of 
Eugenics since 1909" (4). Other measures included registers of 
defective adults, sex education, eugenic scholarships, health 
declarations, a variety of changes in the marriage laws, eugenic 
garden cities, the segregation of certain sections of the population, 
changes in the tax structure, eugenic colonies, manipulation of the 
education system and so on. By various forms of reasoning it was 
possible to link eugenics with rather more bizarre practices likely 
to disturb the English middle-class mind e.g. polygamy or nudism _ 
so much so that the 'official' Eugenics movement felt compelled to 
warn about the dangers of cranks within its own ranks (5). 
The reasons for this proliferation of solutions are not hard to find. 
All the proposals involved two types of problems. Firstly what 
might be called the problems of the solution that is all those 
problems that a particular policy might have other than the practical 
ones of implementing it. This kind of problem is discussed in 
subsequent chapters. The second type of problems were those of 
implementation. The various obstacles invariably had their roots in 
public opinion, and many eugenic solutions, particularly those of the 
negative variety, had common features of which undoubtedly the most 
conspicuous was the question of the role of the state and therefore 
of compulsion. For convenience the problems of implementation and 
the question of public opinion may be separated into moral and 
practical terrains of debate. This term is simply intended to 
designate the given set of ideas and practices generally felt to be 
relevant to a particular policy issue or the framework of thought 
felt to be appropriate. 
On the moral terrain the eugenists faced tremendous difficulties not 
helped, as Darwin plaintively observed, by the fact that, "the more 
thoughtful classes stand so much aloof and give us so little 
encouragement" (6). There is no doubt that the Eugenists felt let 
down by those who should have been their natural supporters. "Why do 
so many men of the highest intellectual eminence, including not a few 
of the leaders of science - biological and medical - and of social 
reform, look upon the cause of eugenics with ironical cynicism, 
patronising tolerance or at best reluctant and tepid sympathy?" (7). 
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To a large extent this was perhaps because Britain before the first 
world war thought the issues of life, marriage, disease and death 
within a framework of Christianityo Eugenics could be profoundly 
subversive of Christianity and could be seen to have connections 
with doctrines such as that of Nietzsche that would be found 
obnoxious by respectable opinion (8). Even shorn of Nietzschean 
themes (which Saleeby once dramatically referred to as liThe order of 
the beast" (9» it was difficult to disguise the fact that eugenics 
was aggressively secular in tone. The function of procreation was 
the production of healthy fit specimens, not in obedi~ to some 
mystical values but according to the dictates of natural laws. Nor 
did this involve, as a corollary, in any logical way, the institution 
of marriage - indeed quite the reverse in that partners might later 
become biologically incompatible which would imply that such 
marriage ties should be broken (10). 
The Eugenists were aware of this o "The Eugenics Education Society 
claims, by spreading knowledge of the law of life, to be an 
essentially moral agency and it is not to be deterred from the task 
before it because its methods are in some quarters denounced as 
-materialistic'"(ll). It was vitally important for them to downgrade 
these implications of their doctrine and be seen not to commit 
themselves to anything subversive of morality as that was 
conventionally understood o Time and again the representatives of 
eugenic opinion strove to make it clear that they were not a threat 
to morality. Crackanthorpe argued that eugenists could have nothing 
to do with "any policy that tends to sunder family ties or to impair 
family responsibility" (12)0 Darwin assured numerous audiences that 
one could not advocate disease as a selective agent (because of the 
suffering involved) (13), that the sacredness of marriage could 
overrule eugenic considerations (14) and that eugenic practice must 
never run counter to religious belief (15). 
Aside from Christianity's quite precise views on questions such as 
marriage the eugenists also faced a more diffuse ideology containing 
both Christian elements (charity, poverty as a virtue, helping one's 
fellow man etc.) and secular ones drawn from liberalism and 
11 "Ho individualism, as the eugenists themselves were we aware. 1S 
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(Galton's) great work, Hereditary Genius published in 1869, marks an 
epoch in the evolution of sociology, though the prevailing 
individualist philosophy prevented it from receiving adequate 
recognition till recent years" (16). Again, logically speaking, 
nothing could be more incompatible with the implications of eugenics 
which were all in the direction of the ruthless elimination of the 
unfit as a threat to the future well-being of the race. The eugenists 
did not want to be seen attacking these other aspects of conventional 
morality. War for example might be extremely dysgenic (and it's 
surely difficult to see the First World War as anything else) and yet 
the duties of patriotism and associated values might well have an 
overriding priority - "Moreover the eugenist must always give due 
weight to immediate consequences, as, for example, to the moral 
damage inevitably experienced by a nation when refusing to help a 
friendly power through fear of the consequences which might result 
from intervention" (17). Saleeby rebuked Shaw for suggesting drastic 
changes in the family structure to further eugenic objectives (18) 
while Schuster pOinted out to a medical audience "I take the 
opportunity of stating most emphatically that eugenists are not 
antagonistic to medical science even if it does lead to the 
prolongation of good-for-nothing lives" (19). 
On the more practical terrain the eugenists were not unaware that 
what they had to offer might appear more desirable if it could be used 
to achieve less esoteric ends of which the favourite was reduced 
public expenditure and taxation. Frequent attempts were made to 
estimate the total costs of 'degenerates'. An example of such 
attempts appeared in a book which made a considerable stir at the 
time, R.R. Rantoul's Race Culture; or, Race Suicide? published in 
1906 (20). The author was a doctor, gave evidence to several Royal 
Commissions and was known in eugenic circles. Sir James Barr 
referred to him at the 1907 Royal Institute of Public Health Congress 
in the following terms: "Although I believe that the degenerates are 
not so prolific as Dr. Rentoul asserts, and that there is a tendency 
for such to die out, yet I quite agree with him that they work an 
enormous amount of mischief before they die out and his methods to 
prevent them from propagating their kind are important steps in the 
right direction"(2l). Rentoul, trying to estimate a total for 
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degenerates gave the following figures: 60,721 - "publicly recognised 
idiots, imbecile and feeble-minded"; 117,272 - lunatics; 23,244 _ 
criminals; 9,822 - deaf and dumb from childhood; 60,000 - prostitutes; 
67,187 - epileptics; 88,347 - backward children; 18,247 - habitual 
vagrants, "all engaged in breeding degenerates" (22). 
Many of these kinds of calculations were produced and while the 
eugenists do not appear to have been particularly concerned with the 
actual sums involved they imagined that they formed useful propaganda 
for the eugenic case. As Saleeby put it, "Segregation of defectives 
is condemned as expensive. They are a hundredfold more expensive, 
to the present and future as they are. No other reform can be named 
which should be so grateful at once to those who worship life and 
those who worship gold" (23). Before upper class audiences Darwin 
decried the burden of social welfare expenditure and most eugenic 
commentators felt that the distribution of taxation was dysgenic, "the 
fiscal system now in force in England is obviously capable of 
improvement with reference to the aims we have in view" (24). 
Complementary to this strategy of hit~hing Eugenics to oEher goals 
was the reverse of hitching other goals to Eugenics. A development 
that will serve as an example of the second strategy is the 
beginnings of a more rational attitude to sexuality. Indeed many 
contempor~\te~. saw close links between this and eugenics (25) (quite 
rightly, though doubtless there were other factors). The eugenists 
were ambiguous about this. On the one hand they had natural affinities 
with a more rational approach to sexuality and reproduction yet on 
the other they were clearly frightened of its explosive implications. 
A widely discussed question of the time was sex education or sex-
hygiene as it was then called. The EES organised a conference on this 
in 1913 which was addressed by Darwin. In such contexts the eugenists 
resolved these ambiguities in the direction of conservatism and a 
narrow 'scientific' attitude towards this whole set of issues, of 
which the following is a typical (if somewhat simpering) example. 
"It is so easy to interest little people in the mysteries of botany, 
and with that foundation everything can be kept pretty, poetic and 
charming, yet true to nature, while the children's minds are led 
along the lines that will finally result in their acceptance of the 
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great truths of heredity and eugenics" (26). The intention then was 
clear. The contemporary interest in sex education was to be given a 
eugenic content and so eventually help to form eugenic habits of mind 
in future generations. 
Finally in order to examine the problems encountered on both terrains 
and clearly show their interrelationships I want to examine in detail 
a single text, namely Crackanthorpe's evidence to the Royal 
Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes (27). Early on in his 
evidence Crackanthorpe stated the core of the eugenic position. "The 
eugenic position with regard to all the above defects is, I repeat, 
that when before marriage any of these defects are known to be 
present in either of the parties, the marriage ought not to take 
place, and that if it has taken place and the wife is not past 
childbearing it ought to be dissoluble at the instance of the 
untainted, unblemished party. He-..J.ce, too, it follows that a husband 
or wife who is divorced on any of the above grounds should be 
debarred from marrying again, otherwise the mischief, instead of 
being extinguished (so far as it can be extinguished by law), might 
break out afresh in a new quarter" (28). Clearly this assessemnt of 
a human institution on eugenic grounds necessarily involves a clash, 
however delicately phrased, with traditional Christian doctrine -
"The doctrine that, once it has been solemnised by the Church, marriage 
is indissoluble, appears to the eugenists to be, even on biblical 
principles, irreligious, because inimical to the welfare of 
humanity, since man 'having been made in the image of God', humanity 
is of all divine institutions by far the best and the highest" (29). 
But on the other hand the institution of marriage is accepted as 
given. The position taken here then is that marriage must be made 
more eugenic. This does not follow logically from eugenics but it 
would tend to follow from a recognition of the durability of certain 
human institutions. The position taken is a not unintelligent 
compromise between eugenic principles and social facts. 
Nevertheless it will be seen that the position as stated has certain 
problems, particularly insofar as it makes no distinction between 
procreation and marriage and the implications of this equation of the 
two came out in the Commissioners' interrogation. A second feature 
(97) 
of Crackanthorpe's position is that it . ~ d h h of 1~ ore t e w ole question 
sexuality and this again emerged later in the questioning. 
The first of Crackanthorpe's objectives was the prevention of 
non-eugenic marriages to be effected primarily by means of a system 
of health certificates. Even given the implementation of this 
measure (i.e. ignoring what has been called problems of implementation) 
the Commissioners raised two very obvious objections both of which 
turn on the failure to distinguish marriage and procreation. The 
first point to be raised was in the form of a question about 
illegitimacy. 
"The effect of such a certificate might be to throw on the world 
more illegitimate children, who would have less chance of being 
well looked after than legitimate ones?" - "That is perfectly 
true"o 
"Is not that so? - Yes. There is a great deal to be said on 
that; it is an argument but not a dominant argument, because I 
think the other is the stronger. You cannot make any change 
without some disadvantage" (30). 
The point here was quite a simple one. If 'unhealthy' people were 
prevented from marrying they would simply have more children outside 
marriage, not stop having children - which was the intention of any 
eugenic measure. Crackanthorpe's answer was to resort to a device he 
often used in a tight spot. "I am not formulating an Act of 
Parliament; you would not expect me to do it" (31). Crackanthorpe's 
solution was not logical because it did not solve his own problem. 
The issue arose later in circumstances in which one of the 
Commissioners voiced the logical extension of the idea of health 
certificates if they are to have more than propagandistic value. 
"In order to carry out your views, would not segregation be the 
necessary result with the unfit, lookin~ to this, that 
preventing their marriage does not prevent reproduction by them? 
- The whole of the class of the unfit could not be dealt with 
by segregation. The feeble-minded, who are a class of the 
unfit, could be. 
It involves that necessarily, as far as practicable? - Certainly, 
(98) 
but public opinion will do a great deal without legislative 
segregation" (32). 
The same Commissioner also raised fundamental questions in relation 
to the practicability of Crackanthorpe's proposal. 
"Has it not been found in every age, race, and country, 
impracticable? - I do not think so. What was impracticable in 
one age may be practicable in another. It depends upon the 
scientific knowledge of the time" (33). 
Again Crackanthorpe1s answer relies heavily on an abstract appeal 
to 'public opinion' influenced by modern science. 
The second of Crackanthorpe's eugenic objectives and again it is 
quite logical, was that if marriages are seen to be dysgenic they 
should be dissoluble on eugenic grounds. This proposal was 
necessarily linked to Crackanthorpets third main proposal, namely, 
that given dissolubility of marriage on eugenic grounds the tainted 
party should be prevented from remarrying. There were two exchanges 
on these points between Crackanthorpe and Sir Lewis Dibdin the only 
one of the Commissioners to really critically probe Crackanthorpets 
position. 
"I want to ask you a practical question. Supposing that 
divorce takes place, you have a man in the prime of life with 
tubercular taint, but perfectly well. How are you going to 
prevent that man getting another family? How can you prevent his 
setting up another establishment? - By creating such a sound 
public opinion that no man would dare to do it. I rely upon 
public opinion. We are all governed by public opinion, and a 
man will no more do that than pick a man's pocket at his club" (34) 
As well as questioning Crackanthorpe's failure to distinguish 
procreation and the institution of marriage Dibdin brings out more 
clearly the other undiscussed factor, namely sexuality. 
"The whole of this inquiry about the enlargement of divorce has 
at the back of it the natural craving of the human being for 
sexual relations - put it how you like? - It assumes that" (35). 
Once Crackanthorpe agrees Dibdin forces him to concede that the 
problem is whether "the natural craving of the sex can be dealt with 
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without the evil of getting children", forcing Crackanthorpe to 
concede one of the logical solutions - "0 . 
ne way 1S sterilisation, 
asexualisation" (36) but he does not actually recommend it. Because 
he will not recommend it he tries to revert t h' b o 1S pu lic opinion 
solution, the exchange ending as follows, 
"Are you not attributing to that man a perfectly unu!ual 
amount of heroism? In the circumstance I put to you, he has 
been divorced on account of the taint which has not become 
active? - With great respect, I think not. I am attributing 
to him that cowardice which will not face public opinion on a 
vital question" (37). 
Having described the eugenic doctrine in some detail it remains to 
cast a briefer glance at its contemporary reception. This will focus 
firstly on contemporary critical comment and secondly take a closer 
look at a debate amongst eugenists themselves about their problems 
and difficulties, providing an opportunity for a partial check on my 
characterisation of eugenics. 
Not surprisingly contemporary criticism focussed largely round the 
difficulties already indicated (though it did not examine so intently 
the nature of the relationship between Eugenics and Darwinism). Two 
groups of issues seem to have struck contemporaries as particularly 
significant. The first concerned what has been called the problem of 
qualities and the associated notion of breeding for certain qualities. 
The second group of issues was that of concepts and theories of 
heredity and the associated questions of what constituted sufficient 
knowledge to act eugenically. With reference to the question of 
qualities critics singled out four problematic questions. Firstly, 
what characteristics were the eugenists trying to create more of? 
Secondly was it possible to refer to unambiguous characteristics in 
the conceptual sense? Thirdly was it possible in the practical sense? 
And fourthly how could these qualities be achieved? 
It was an easy point to make against the Eugenists that there were 
serious problems about what points to go for. Wells among others 
showed the contrast between the cattle breeder and the eugenist: "We 
are, as a matter of fact, not a bit clear what points to breed for 
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and what points to breed out" (38). This problem was not resolved, 
as we have seen the eugenists tried to do, by reference to general 
qualities like 'health~ or 'ability'. The more astute critics of 
the time seized on the difficulties here. "Are such 'characters' as, 
for instance, lability' or Iprobity', really indications of 'stock' 
qualities? Are they germinal and transmissible or acquired?" (39). 
Aside from questions of stock the labels themselves were open to 
question - "By giving a name like 'conscientiousness' to a series of 
subtle and complex phenomena we do not establish the existence of a 
'unit character' amenable to statistics" (40). Even assuming these 
theoretical difficulties could be resolved, "we are scarcely more 
certain that the condition of 'perfect health' in one human being is 
the same as the similarly named condition in another, than we are 
that the beauty of one type is made of the same essential elements as 
the beauty of another" (41). 
The conceptual difficulties were compounded by a number of practical 
ones. An anonymous reviewer pointed out that "we must remember that 
a quality once bred out of existence can never by any possible 
measure be recovered, and that if some extinguished character were 
afterwards found to have correlated with it some other unperceived 
character of great or vital advantage, that character could never 
again be acquired by humanity" (42). This general problem of the 
linkage between qualities was frequently seized on - "your energetic 
person may be moral or immoral, an unqualified egotist or as public 
spirited as an ant, sane or a raving lunatic" (43). And contemporaries 
were concerned almost to the point of obsession with the problem of 
genius. Sir Clifford Allbut became almost lyrical - "We cannot tell 
where genius may come; out of Maiden Lane perchance, or an ostler's 
yard; it is no appanage of rank or wealth, it comes as it lists; 
indeed by too much system we may trample it under jog-trot 
conformity" (44). Not only did it seem that people could possess 
good and bad qualities as Wells had argued, but it did not seem 
necessarily to be associated with the higher stocks,taken to mean the 
higher classes. As F.H. Hayward put it, "there are plenty of 
'geniuses' travelling in workmen's trams every morning" (45). 
With all these difficulties the critics of eugenics were doubtful of 
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achieving any beneficial results, particularly not by the methods in 
any way analogous to breeding. As Kenrick put it, "No doubt the 
eugenist would like to be able to say that the object of Eugenics is 
to produce a race of physically, mentally and morally perfect men and 
women. If so, his problem is infinitely more difficult than that of 
producing the dual purpose cow - a problem as yet unsolved by the 
cattle breeder" (46). Most of these criticisms of course tended to 
apply more to projects of positive eugenics rather than negative 
eugenics. If it was very difficult to say what one wanted to breed 
for it was much easier to say what one wanted to breed out. 
The second group of issues which attracted most critical comment was 
the question of the sufficiency of knowledge for eugenic action. It 
has been shown that amongst the eugenists themselves there were doubts 
on this and again, not surprisingly, their critics seized on this 
weakness. It was not difficult for the layman to appreciate that 
there were disputes and controversies amongst the scientific 
community often of a vehement indeed vitriolic nature. As an 
anonymous reviewer put it the biologists' "scientific discussions are 
of that amiable character to which we have been accustomed by 
termperance reformers holding forth on the subject of whisky, and by 
women suffragists discoursing on men" (47). Though in practice most 
of the leading representatives of genetic science showed some kind of 
acceptance of eugenics (48) their theoretical disputes and arguments 
(49) made it easier for the critics to dismiss specific eugenic 
measures on the basis of inadequate knowledge. As G.K. Chesterton 
argued, "I simply cannot conceive any responsible person proposing to 
legislate on our broken knowledge and bottomless ignorance of 
heredity" (50). 
This last point in particular but all the points so far discussed 
were raised in a sophisticated way amongst Eugenists themselves in a 
response to an article by A. Carr-Saunders (51). This article and 
the replies to it (52) concerned fundamental principles, involved 
major figures in the eugenics movement and occurred at the peak of 
eugenic discussion and debate. It therefore provides the 
opportunity of examining a small amount of material indicating not 
only how the leading members saw the key issues and difficulties but 
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whether the analysis proposed in Chapter III has any validity. 
Carr-Saunders divided his assessment of eugenics into three main 
sections within which he raised a number of issues. Firstly he 
examined its biological foundations in which he included (a) the mode 
of inheritance, (b) the question of the relative effects of heredity 
and environment, and (~) the mode of operation of selection. 
Secondly he posed the questions as to whether it was possible to 
estimate what inherited qualities there were in a population and if 
so whether it was possible to encourage some and discourage others. 
Thirdly given the possibility of an affirmative answer to the 
preceding questions he asked whether (a) the successful stocks (in a 
situation of equal environment) would be the most valuable and (b) 
whether an increase in the stocks possessing these qualities would be 
a net gain. It is clear that Carr-Saunders was raising major issues 
and that his disclaimers notwithstanding (53) they were linked. 
As far as the practicability of the eugenic project is concerned the 
central questions are those under Carr-Saunders' second heading. As 
has been argued above there are serious difficulties with the 
characterisation of qualities. Carr-Saunders' position threatens the 
viability of any eugenics. "Of all the qualities here mentioned 
(referring to a statement by Galton) supposing them for the moment to 
be inherited, not one, with the possible exception of ability, is 
sufficiently definite to enable us to define and mark off the stocks 
which possess it" (54). The problem named in this quotation is the 
transition from qualities to stocks, which, it has been suggested, 
was ensured by the various concepts of heredity. In Carr-Saunders' 
position the transition could not be made because limits and 
conditions are imposed on hereditarian concepts such that they cannot 
perform their normal function within the eugenic argument, the 
conditions being that the question of the relative influence of 
heredity and environment could only be solved if one or other of the 
factors is suppressed. He questions the validity of biometric 
correlation coefficients as a technique for assessing the relative 
influence of heredity and environment. There can be no hereditarian 
principle in general, or, insofar as there is (55), nothing can be 
derived from it (56). 
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The second major issues raised by Carr-Saunders is "whether even if , 
we can estimate with sufficient accuracy their (i.e. qualities) 
nature and quality it is possible to encourage some and discourage 
others" (57). This clearly demands some position be taken on how the 
existing distribution is effected given that one wishes to interfere. 
Here I have suggested that the question of distribution is handled 
by eugenics' concepts of natural selection. Using the analogy of a 
race Carr-Saunders argues that the idea that the social structure 1S 
the result of open competition and therefore that the competitors 
final places in it are even indicative of any endowment is 
untenable. What in fact takes place, he says, is a series of distinct 
races which, because they are run at the same time, give the illusion 
of being the same race. At its simplest Carr-Saunders' position 
amounted to saying that there was intra-class but not inter-class 
competition. 
But even conceding that the competitors begin on a basis of equality 
Carr-Saunders registers considerable doubt about the eugenic thesis 
firstly on the grounds of the massive handicaps bearing on a large 
section of the population (drawing here on the researches of Booth, 
Rowntree and Bowley) and secondly on the grounds that what information 
was available (he refers for example to the experience of the WEA) on 
the intellectual ability of the lower classes indicated that these 
classes were not in any way intellectually inferior to their social 
superiors. 
What could be expected on the basis of my sketch of the eugenic 
doctrine as a eugenic reply to these fundamental criticisms? While 
the question of the definiteness of the qualities could be conceded 
it would be imperative that the general principle of heredity be 
renewed. The significance of the problem of particular concepts of 
heredity would have to be denied and a general consensus reasserted. 
Secondly the process of selection would have to be ratained both in 
terms of its explanatory role in the differentiation of stocks and as 
that from which the necessity of a eugenic programme could be 
deduced. 
Carr-Saunders l criticisms were answered by both Darwin and Schiller 
(104) 
and their major points seem to fit the requirements. The point 
which Darwin plays for all it is worth is the question of sufficiency 
of knowledge. I have argued above that the problem of what 
constitutes sufficient knowledge for intervention is an effect of the 
eugenists' utilisation of the concepts of heredity. Rather than 
confront the gross deficiencies Carr-Saunders pinpoints, Darwin 
attacks the form of his argument i.e. that it demands perfect 
knowledge which is never available. The answer has a superficial 
conviction which evades the question of how much knowledge and what 
kind. This abstractness is replicated vis-a-vis the heredity/ 
environment problem. The 'importance' of environment is conceded but 
since heredity is 'also' important social reform based on the latter 
still have a raison d'etre - but Carr-Saunders~ problem was 
precisely one of the combination. 
Darwin's other main argument seeks to retain the notion of the 
natural selection as the connecting process between stocks and social 
groups l.e. he argues that there has been a weeding out of elements 
of the rich and promotion of elements of the poor. This very 
promotion is an important part of the eugenic case because if the 
able stocks among the poor are promoted to higher social status as an 
effect of which they cut their birth rate then the eugenic argument 
is reinforced. 
On both points Schiller follows Darwin. Again the argument takes the 
form of general assertions about heredity and natural selection -
"there is no biologist who denies the enormous difference between a 
good and a bad inheritance"; "whether or not we hold natural 
selection is all powerfu+,there is no denying that it occurs" (58). 
Given this the specific biological debates are of no importance. As 
a corollary at the level of social practice we know enough to 
experiment and again the perfect knowledge point is played. There 
are almost bizarre inconsistencies. In this version of eugenics 
Schiller concludes that "for eugenics to exercise any appreciable 
influence over the fortunes of humanity will most probably take 
centuries" (59) - this from the man forecasting elsewhere the 
impending degeneration of the European race (60). Finally the 
biological model of social mobility is retained - "a large 
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proportion, therefore, of the ability in existence forces its way 
into the higher ranks" (61). What has been illustrated in this 
Chapter is the almost painful contrast between the surface 
plausibility of the eugenic ideal and the almost insuperable perils 
and obstacles in the way of practical action. The Eugenists, labouring 
hard to translate their ideal into reality, seem to have had two 
different feelings towards their reception by public opinion. On the 
one hand there was a resigned acceptance that the main instrument of 
change was an educated public opinion - "the most important task 
before the apostle of eugenics is the dissemination of the eugenic 
ideal" (62) - on the other hand there were periodic outbursts of rage 
at the public's failure to move and the positively glacial rate of 
change that resulted. Nevertheless the Eugenists might expect to get 
more support if they would bring their doctrine to bear, in a useful 
way, on some of the great social questions of the day and it is to 
an examination of this effort that Part 11 is devoted. 
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Part II - INTRODUCTION 
Following the description of the theoretical foundations and the 
general structure of eugenic thinking the second part of this 
research extends the analysis by means of a series of case studies 
of particular issues. The issues considered almost selected themselves 
as they were some of the most discussed and debated at the time. 
What is not self-explanatory is the particular focus in each case 
and the kinds of problems which had to be confronted. 
The first objective in these case-studies was to enlarge and make 
more accurate the picture of Eugenic thought. A certain amount of 
repetition was unavoidable as they involve the description of 
specific applications of the general concepts already considered. 
This applied both to the analytical concepts and to the proposed 
solutions for eugenic problems. Thus in each chapter the heredity/ 
natural selection contrast tends to appear as does the difficulty 
of treading off" eugenic solutions from eugenic explanations. 
In pursuit of this objective it was obviously necessary to go beyond 
the central 'core' of material used in chapters three and four. 
This necessitated looking at a wider range of eugenic writings, 
including other figures closely associated with the eugenic idea, 
for example, Pearson's school (discussed in chapters five and six) 
and Archdall Reid (discussed in chapter six). A second and 
subsidiary objective of these studies was the analysis of the impact 
of Eugenic ideas on public opinion and on legislation. This 
enlargement of the first objective posed familiar problems of 
boundaries and selection. In surveying public opinion and law 
making one is immediately faced with the problem of how much to say 
about other modes of thought or about institutional practices. The 
dilemma is clear: to say too much is to become diverted from the 
main task; to say too little is to risk ignorance and 
superficiality. 
There were no simple solutions to this dilemma but fortunately the 
rna terial itself sugges ted particular avenues of approach. \d th the 
issue of alcoholism for example what was particularly striking was 
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the divergent eugenic positions - as a result almost no attention 
was given to other views and attitudes. In the case of mental 
deficiency on the other hand it became necessary to try and 
distinguish eugenic positions from the general medical consensus. 
Nevertheless, as the last example illustrates, even where such 
approaches suggested themselves, there were limits to the extent to 
which they could be pursued given the virtually total absence of 
secondary literature in some areas. In such circumstances it was 
necessary to place the emphasis in such a way as to bring out the 
significance of the material in the context of the analysis of 
Eugenic thought offered in chapters three and four. 
(114) 
Chapter V - BROKEN MAINSPRINGS: EUGENICS, POVERTY AND PAUPERISM 
The most conspicuous fact about eugenic statements on poverty and 
pauperism and contributions to the discussion of the time was their 
relative paucity. Despite the Eugenics Society's impressive-sounding 
Pauper Investigation Committee these were phenomena the eugenists 
found it difficult to grasp and which, in the end, they tended to 
avoid.(l). However circumstances required the Socie~jto 
participate in the national debate and specifically, to formulate 
some eugenic response to the publication of the Report of the 
Royal Commission on the Poor Laws (2). 
To propose some sort of general eugenic orientation towards the 
issue was not difficult. Indeed in their initial approach the 
eugenists did not differ from any other commentators on social 
problems. Who was the pauper? The pauper was a being with certain 
behavioural characteristics - he was 'without manly independence', 
he was a 'typical dependent', he was 'inefficient'; in short "his 
mainspring came into the world broken" (3). However the matter went 
deeper than that for efficiency was at bottom a matter of hereditary 
quality since "an individual is one of a family or stock before he 
is one of a community" (4). As J.W. Slaughter wrote in a review of 
C.S. Loch's Charity and Social Life, "No place is found in the book 
to discuss the relation of chard~y to eugenics, as Dr. Loch's 
methods of thinking do not associate the two very closely. His 
great desire to see the dependent restored to independence and to 
save the independent from decadence, has kept his attention from the 
operation of biolQgical forces with which the modern student of 
he~ity has become familiar. But the eugenist is easily able to 
supplement the interpretation which Dr. Loch gives to his array of 
facts. He sees that degenerative influences not only consist in the 
demolition of character through relief from the strain of life, but 
also that some degenerate more easily than others, and that these are 
through charitable practices given equal opportunity for survival, 
not only individually, which is unimportant, but with respect to 
multiplication of numbers through descent" (5). The Eugenist could 
also argue that non-Eugenists had failed to consider "the possibility 
that an hereditary caste of morally and physically deteriorated 
(115) 
persons ••• is being created" (6). 
Going beyond the characteristics of the pauper it was necessary to 
investigate "that element in pauperism which represents and transmits 
the original defect" (7). Paupers formed a special section of the 
unemployed, who themselves represented relatively weaker stocks 
since they were unable to work at the standard required by industry. 
Nevertheless the unemployed remained more or less effective stocks 
in that with "judicious administrative assistance" (8) they could be 
brought back into the arena of the struggle for existence. The 
pauper however was of such feeble stock that any rescue operation 
was out of the question. The paupers were those who " are not touched 
by social forces and purposes, and whose conduct demands coercion" (9). 
Not only were they a threat in themselves but their close contact 
with poor quality but fundamentally sound stocks posed a threat to 
the latter (10). 
Within this general orientation the task of detailed response to the 
Poor Law Commission was undertaken by the Pauper Investigation 
Committee (11). What the Commission had signally failed to do was 
"to analyse or define the personality of the pauper, his character, 
antecedents and capacities" (12) and this omission the Society 
proposed to rectify. The immediate object of the PIC was "to 
ascertain the full nature of the pedigree of some individual 
paupers" (13) and its report was a mixture of further evidence about 
the characteristics of the paupers and inferences from family 
histories. 
There was clearly a question of general qualities here, as the paupers, 
when examined, displayed an extraordinary range of characteristics. 
" ••• the experience of the committee is quite clear that the paupers 
whom they have seen and examined individually, are characterised by 
some obvious vice or defect such as drunkeness, theft, persistent 
laziness, a tubercular diathesis, mental deficiency, deliberate 
moral obliquity, or general weakness of character, manifested by 
want of initiative, or energy, or stamina and an inclination to 
attribute their misfortune to their own too great generosity, or too 
great goodness, and generally to bad luck. Inquiry into the nature 
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of bad luck or too great generosity usually resolved the matter into 
one of stupidity or folly upon the part of the complaining victim" 
(14). But there was a way through this difficulty to be found in 
the development of two of the Committee's conclusions. The 
Committee had found firstly that one "pauper family has a tendency 
to marry into other pauper families" (15) and secondly, "when we 
find it possible to trace four generations of paupers there can be 
little doubt as to the hereditary transmission of the defects" (16). 
Thus it was possible to draw the conclusion that the real problem 
was one of a degenerate stock which produced "paupers, feeble-minded, 
alcoholics and certain types of criminals ••• a few thousand 
family stocks probably provide this burden which the community has 
to bear" (17). By such methods the Eugenists arrived at an 
explanation of the pauperism that so perplexed contemporary 
opinion - "There exists this hereditary race of persons, capable of 
work, but refusing to do it, either continuously or at intervals, 
and when they work, spend the money earned in drink or debauchery" (18). 
Similar investigations were being pursued by one of the Society's 
leading experts on the matter, E.C. Lidbetter. His objective was 
also to establish, by the same means of pauper pedigrees, a class of 
habitual clients of the Poor Law who suffered from chronic disorders. 
In his articles and lectures he presented a variety of pedigrees 
under the headingsof sick and able-bodied. These charts resembled 
those produced by the American studies (19) in that when followed 
up the families concerned revealed a ghastly tale of disease, 
lunacy, crime etc as in the following extract: "At the tail end of 
the story comes a most striking addition. No. 53 the child of one 
of the last family, was admitted to the Infirmary as an imbecile. 
Its paternal grandfather's brother (No. 11) was a lunatic, but 
further enquiry was made. The mother was questioned and stated 
that her father was an insane epileptic, her mother co~sumptive, and 
her maternal grandmother probably a consumptive and certainly a 
pauper. She herself was illegitimate and had fits" (20). 
But the degenerate stocks were not limited to the obviously 
physically sick and here the difference between a properly eugenic 
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account and the more traditional fears and stereotypes may be more 
clearly seen (21). For Lidbetter was quite unconcerned about the 
work-shy layabout beloved of the commentators. In his view there 
were few genuine unemployed. "Th· . 1 ere 1S no more mlS eading or 
persistent error than that which regards the table-bodied' pauper 
as, on the one hand the healtpy, virtuous, and efficient 
unemployed workman, or, on the other hand, as the capable but 
scheming 'work-shy' n~er-do-well. Both these points of view are 
very far from the truth. None of the former are to be found 
personally chargeable, and of the latter there are very few - the 
number is greatly exaggerated" (22). The various types of 
degeneracy were rather a function of a general incapacity. 
The need to establish some kind of general quality in this area shows 
itself in the sheer number of terms the eugenists used - fit, civic 
worth, social value, efficiency, dependence, competence and so on.-
these were all terms designed to log individuals on a scale of 
general behavioural competence which could then be related to an 
hereditary basis and the struggle for existence. "What is suggested 
is that, on the whole, the casual worker or unemployed person is of 
a lower mental type than those in regular employment and that those 
classes include many persons (many more than is generally admitted) 
whose mental condition is so weak as not merely to make them 
unempl~yable, but also to prevent their supporting themselves except 
by the aid of the rates" (23). Lidbetter's specifications of this 
quality included such phrases as "rational without being intelligent" 
and "failure to grasp the essential facts of life" (24). 
Given this type of designation there was almost a necessity to place 
the emphasis on feeble-mindedness. It is not surprising then to find 
Lidbetter presenting a paper on pauperism at the National Conference 
on the Prevention of Destitution in the mental deficiency section. 
(25). The postulation of feeble-mindedness as the crucial component 
of pauperism put everything on much firmer ground and at a stroke 
brought order to a great deal of messy diversity. In his summarising 
paper Saleeby said of the feeble-minded, "Both directly as 
economically inefficient and indirectly ••• they contribute to the 
number of the destitute, constituting the majority of the naturally 
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as distinguished from the nurturally unemployable" (26). To make 
the question of destitution and pauperism one of feeble-mindedness 
or low mental capacity was to go from traditionally acc~pted but 
vague cat~ories of character and 'grit' to the apparently firm 
ground of the clinical designation of forms of mental defect. 
Having established the true nature of the problem some explanation 
had to be offered in order to derive a solution. 'Nature' was 
charged with two roles - the elimination of the unfit and the 
preservation and increase of the fit. Yet here was a clear case 
where natural selection was not producing the eugenic goods. Some 
assessment was required of the agencies determining the 
reproduction of racial stocks and the effects of their operation. 
Firstly the principles of the 1834 Poor Law had been and were being 
continually weakened as more relief was given away on a less rigorous 
basis (poor law infirmaries etc) and there were other forms of 
relief completely outside the framework of the poor law (school 
meals etc). Secondly due to Workrnen·s Compensation Acts employers 
were much more careful as to who they selected from the labour 
market (the eugenists called it a "segregation of efficiency") and 
it had thus become overburdened with casual labour. Thirdly, all 
these increasingly better preserved weak strains were reproducing 
and their progeny in turn increasingly being preserved. As 
Lidbetter put it "under pampering legislation and administration it 
(the low mental type) had a survival value not to be found among the 
higher and more sensitive types" (27). 
On the other side of the balance sheet the eugenists, aware of the 
declining fertility of the upper and middle classes, argued that it 
correlated with the introduction of education and various other 
social reforms the cost of which, needless to say, rested on the 
thrifty and careful elements of the population. It was the 
combination of these two processes, pampering legislation and 
burdens of taxation, that produced the differential decline in 
fertility and more specifically with reference to pauperism an 
increasingly large degenerate stock. 
Whetham's papers on this question illustrate both the inferential 
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nature of much of the eugenic explanations and the shifts of position 
within them (28). In these articles Whetharn sought to deal with 
the problem of why the social segregation of ability was not more 
marked than the evidence indicated - "why the process has not gone 
further, why the upper classes do not show preponderant ability more 
markedly than they do, is worthy of consideration" (29). This 
problem could only arise for a model of selection which was really 
a model of social mobility, regarded as a process producing in the 
long-term a biologically appropriate division of labour. The 
explanation as to why this did not work to the limit clearly 
illuminates the eugenic incapacity to grasp specifically social 
phenomena and thus its tendency to see the social structure as both 
result of and obstacle to natural selection. Thus, "while selection 
is keen enough while a family is rising in the social scale, it 
becomes relaxed when an assured position has been reached (30). 
Constructed as it was Whetharn's argument could shift from one ground 
to another. Natural selection, being a process of eliminating the 
unfit and promoting the fit, must produce a certain result. If it 
failed to do so there must be interfering causes - natural selection 
has been relaxed. However supposing the identification of the upper 
classes with general abilities is rejected? The second line of 
defence was the 'facts' i.e. the actual incidence of the falling 
birth rate, given the hereditarian interpretation. liThe prediction 
that the differential birth rate will lead to average race 
deterioration, and to a loss of the net efficiency of the nation, is 
seen not necessarily to depend on the proof of complete segregation 
of ability, but to have behind it the whole of the overwhelming and 
almost undisputed evidence for the inheritance of physical and 
mental traits from ancestors to descendants" (31). Finally there 
was a third line of defence - the assertion that a substantial 
number of those administering the poor law were convinced that the 
1 lib h h t problem lay in the paupers themse ves - ut everyone w 0 as 0 
administer the poor law knows that a certain number of paupers 
become destitute from congenital defects of mind and body" (32). 
It may be noted that the proportions were left suitably vague. 
What evidence was there that degenerate stocks were increasing (as 
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opposed to the Local Government Board's general figure for 
pauperism)? A frequently cited work in this connection was the first 
monograph in the series Studies in National Deterioration (33). 
Heron's work (34) a w ld b d 
, s ou e expecte , did indeed use all the 
available data, censuses, Registrar General's reports, Medical 
Officer·s reports and so on. Its main object was to answer the 
question - "if it be possible to show marked relationships between 
size of the family and social conditions can it be shown that these 
relationships have changed, and if so changed for the better or worse 
during the last fifty years?". Heron proceeded by constructing 
various indices of wealth and education, poverty and lack of culture; 
but these indices assumed the nature of pauperism. Thus for example 
one of the indicators of poverty was the number of pawnbrokers per 
thousand males on the grounds that the presence of pawnbrokers 
"indicates a high degree of improvidence" (3S). Having shown in 
various ways that there were class or social status differences in 
the birth rate similarly unfounded assertions were made which shared 
the aura of statistical exactitude - "I doubt if there is any better 
measure of the undesirability of a class and its unsuitability for 
reproducing its kind, than the extent of infantile mortality within 
it" (36). Infant mortality did indeed correlate with birth rate 
(O.S± 097) which proved that "where the mothers and fathers have the 
maximum of unde~irability there is produced a maximum of children" (37). 
The final claim that "I have brought forward evidence enough to show 
that the birth rate of the abler and more capable stocks is 
decreasing relatively to the mentally and physically feebler stocks 
(38), like all the others, only followed if these categories could be 
identified with those of high and low social status respectively. 
The third aspect in the eugenic position was the solution to the 
problem. Of course in one sense this followed axiomatically i.e. 
fit must breed more and unfit must breed less. The problem of 
pauperism (and its growth) and the possible contamination effects 
therefore necessarily led to some consideration of the mechanics of 
d · Even l.·n the refinement of Edwardian England the fact repro uctl.on. 
had to be faced that human reproduction was not entirely a matter of 
economics and charity handouts - and it is clear that the eugenists 
thought the prolific classes were prolific because they lacked 
(121) 
se.lf-control (39). The general po' t h . h ~n ere ~s t at the eugenic 
solutions could not be directly 'read off' the eugenic explanations. 
Clearly, logically speaking, given the unambiguous identification of 
the unfit stocks, there were several options which would effect a 
reduction in their numbers; physical extermination, direct or 
indirect (40), sterilisation, isolation, birth control or abortion -
these are all, as it were, biologically equivalent. Thus in making 
a choice among these other criteria become relevant; economic ones 
(e.g. cost) and political/ideological ones (e.g. liberty of the 
subject). In this sense there was (or is) no logical eugenic 
solution, only a general consensus which was hammered out in an 
attempt to make eugenics practical politics and feasible administrative 
practice. 
The solutions offered to the problem of pauperism were punitive, 
involving some form of segregation or detention and this was not, of 
course, original to the eugenists~(4l). The difference lay in the 
fact that they were uninterested in the potentially reforming effects 
if any of such colonies. Their function lay solely in the separation 
of the sexes and thus the rapid termination of the reproduction of 
the unfit. The alternative of sterilisation was not regarded as 
feasible in the light of probable public reaction to it (though 
there were other factors e.g. the legal position of doctors 
performing such operations was not entirely clear), though Saleeby 
did argue that, "it has its place in the eugenic armoury - and even, 
as Indiana illustrates, in the records of Eugenic legislation" (42). 
Segregation was arrived at as a compromise between two sets of 
factors that had to be reconciled. On the one hand biological 
necessities, obviously the cessation of procreation and on the other 
hand the state of the law and public opinion, shot through as they 
were with humanitarianism, notions of liberty of the subject and 
other rights (indeed the eugenists themselves differed on these 
questions). Though the eugenists did feel the necessity to mount an 
ideological attack on the assertion of certain rights (43) they 
tended toward the compromise of 'kind' (and this was always stressed) 
segregation. No attempts were made to put forward eugenic measures 
against pauperism in the form of specific legislative proposals. 
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In this area at least the eugenists either avoided the question or 
insisted on the all-encompassing validity of their own position 
without submitting themselves to the disCl"pll"ne of t I" rans atlng their 
explanation into policy and social action. 
Eugenics' relative lack of interest in pauperism was mirrored by the 
disinterest of other positions in it. The Poor Law report of 1909 
had the effect of crystallising opinion and none of the major 
positions (44), with the exception of the Webbs, devoted much 
attention to eugenic questions. This does not mean of course that 
individuals within these currents of opinion were averse to using 
the eugenic rhetoric, "there is some cause for fear, lest in their 
anxiety to protect the weak and the unfortunate, they should retard 
the advance of the race or even bring about its debasement" (45). 
Probably the Eugenics Education Society contained members from all 
tendencies as well as those who, like G.P. Mudge, subscribed to what 
Saleeby called the -better-dead' school. 
The Webbs made two major statements on eugenics in relation to the 
reform of the poor law (44a). In both papers they showed 
considerable sympathy for certain eugenic positions, some deliberate 
misunderstanding, but quite an acute grasp of the fact that the 
Minority Report could be presented as the nearest thing to eugenic 
legislation possible. At the level of formal statement the Webbs 
might almost be described as eugenists themselves. They accepted 
the implications of the differential birth rate (46) and the role 
of the poor law in this process. Beyond this they had a four-fold 
quasi-eugenic indictment of the operation of the poor law, on the 
following grounds: the laxity of its provision for feeble-minded 
maternity; the opportunities for 'undesirable acquaintanceship' 
afforded by the general mixed workhouse; its inability to sort out 
defectives and wastrels who did not apply for relief; its failure 
to provide any practical alternative to the outdoor relief afforded 
to tens of thousands of feeble-minded or physically defective parents. 
There was almost nothing a eugenist could disagree with here (though 
there would be differences of emphasis). In order to make their own 
solution convincing the Webbs had to present the insoluble problems 
that would stern from any other solution conceivably derivable from 
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eugenics. This they did by portraying the eugenic position, as they 
put it, as "just now the most fashionable kind of laissez-faire" (47) 
i.e. a return to a state of nature with the consequences that might 
be expected of that. 
Their first point was that such ideological realities as the influence 
of Christianity, humanitarianism and sympathy for the deprived had 
to be recognised. In the event of the removal of the social machinery 
dealing with poverty these currents would merge into a flood of 
private charity~ something that all social reformers condemned. To 
drive horne the point the Webbs posited a situation where force was 
used to prohibit private charity (48). They denied any advantage 
accruing from the subsequent high death rates - "There is, in truth, 
absolutely no evidence that the unchecked ravages of disease ••• ever 
result (any more than a war or a famine) in an improvement in the 
human stock" (49). They made two further points in support of this 
assertion. Nature did not use eugenic ('highest type') criteria and 
therefore was really irrelevant. The second point concerned 
resistance to disease and they argued that such resistance was more 
than likely the result of a constitutional peculiarity that need not 
correlate with any other valuable quality or qualities (50). Though 
the argument was rather overdone many eugenists would have accepted 
it. 
The alternative the Webbs offered was a mixed bag consisting of their 
own version of positive eugenics plus that aspect of negative 
eugenics that the Royal Commission on the feeble-minded had 
favoured, namely legislation for the detention of the mentally 
deficient. The first of these was covered by proper and adequate 
provision for all mothers, infants and children in need on an 
honourable basis, i.e. removing the stigma of pauperism. Though this 
might have the additional effect of subsidising the inefficient its 
general effects would be beneficial because the capable would have 
access to material aid of a non-stigmatised kind. In their own 
phrase the important thing was to make the well-born child an 
economic asset or at least less of a burden. The second aspect was 
covered by much firmer measures being taken against the feeble-minded, 
including the question of procreation. Only in this area, the Webbs 
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implied, could Parliament and public opinion be expected to tolerate 
extremely coercive legislation aimed at a particular group. 
In contrast, C.S. Loch (the leading spokesman for the Majority 
report) could offer very little to eugenists. For him eugenics only 
became a serious issue in relation to the feeble-minded and for the 
rest he emphasised even more strongly the limits to which public 
opinion would go. Elsewhere the partisans of the Charity 
Organisation Society exhibited considerable scepticism toward both 
eugenic explanations and proposals. An editorial commented sharply 
that, "it is more than doubtful how far pauperism can be attributed 
to any inherited qualities" (51). A more formal statement of the 
COS position appeared in a lecture by Bosanquet (52). Bosanquet had 
no trouble in pinpointing the main problems and the disagreements in 
the eugenic ranks. "When we further ask whether the conceptions of 
the unfit and the fit can safely be applied in the comparison of 
social strata with a view to the discouragement of certain strata as 
inferior apart from defects specially diagnosed, and of the ' 
encouragement of others as superior, there seems to be a fundamental 
division of opinion" (53). Elsewhere Bosanquet politely but bluntly 
expressed the view of many social reformers that, "I do not think we 
can be sure that our rough classification of types of labour 
corresponds with any sets of inborn qualities, desirable or 
undesirable" (54). 
Such critics could draw both on the experience of many social 
reformers and professional experts for the means to reject the 
eugenic arguments. It was widely agreed amongst social reformers 
that, in Beveridge's words, "infant mortality is neither a symptom 
nor a result of social degeneration ••• the vast bulk of all 
children are born physically sound - the national stock is not 
tainted, it is the environment before and after birth that counts" 
(55). Many members of the medical profession accepted that, !'it 1.S 
a matter which can easily be verified that children of even the 
poorest and weakest of mothers are themselves as likely to be strong 
in as many cases as if the parent came from the healthiest 
environment" (56) and statistically competent authorities in public 
health, notably Arthur Newsholme, were tireless critics of the eugenic 
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studies and provided endless examples of the damaging effect of poor 
environment - "The fact that the poorest are lowest in the social 
scale cannot be used as a completely satisfactory argument that - as 
proved by selection - they are the poorest stock. The results so 
far as they are concerned, may have been biased by conditions that 
have thwarted natural competence" (57). 
It lS clear then that the eugenists made little headway in the area 
of pauperism meeting either complete scepticism or finding their 
proposals and rhetoric taken up and inserted into a different 
project with the essential point left unclear (58). The stumbling 
blocks in both cases were the same; firstly, the inadequacy of their 
arguments for an hereditary component in pauperism; secondly, the 
fact of public hostility to any coercive measures compounded in this 
case by the indefiniteness of the group they were intended for, took 
the whole idea out of the realm of practical politics. The paupers 
had their revenge; it was the eugenic theories of pauperism that were 
beyond repair (59). 
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(Eugenics Review II 1910-11 233-41 
ii) B. and S. Webb - The prevention of destitution (pub.191l) 
ch. 3 Destitution and Eugenics 
b. i) C.S. Loch - Eugenics and the poor law - the majority 
report (Eugenics Review II (1910-11) .229-41) 
ii) Cha~tty Organisation Review - various articles, reviews 
and editorial comments 
c. i) British Constitution Association leaflets No. 1 - Aims 
and Objects (nd. but ca. 1905) 
ii) B.C.A. Poor Law Papers No. 1 - Poor Law reform not 
revolution: a statement by the national committee of the 
BAC (2nd. ed. 1909) 
iii) B.C.A. Poor Law Papers No. 2 - W.A. Bai1ward - The reports 
of the poor law commissioners of 1834 and 1909 (1909) 
iv) W.A. Bailward - Socialism and the Poor Law (Anti-
socialists union pamphlet No. 70 n.d.) Cf. Also 
Constitution Papers vols. 1-4. I can find almost no 
reference to heredity in the voluminous evidence given 
to the Poor Law Commission. 
45. Sir Arthur Clay - the principles of poor law reform (British 
Constitution Association Lecture 1910 pp.10-11. The BCA also 
included on its councilor committee such figures as W. Chance 
and T. Mackay, both regular contributors to the Charity 
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Organisation Review, taking what for convenience may be called 
the right-wing position within it. Cf. for example T. Mackay -
The poor law commission - what is it all about? (CoO.R. vol.XXIX 
(1911) 136-146) 
46. "There is considerable evidence that as a nation we are breeding 
largely from our inferior stocks. The action of the present 
poor law in subsidising the reproduction of mental, moral and 
physical defectives and in discouraging the thrifty from 
undertaking the responsibilities of parentage, is one of the most 
important factors in this process, and one of the most easily 
dealt with". (Eugenic Review II (1910-11) p.240 
47. The Prevention of Destitution p.47 
48. So far as I know no eugenist ever suggested this in public but it 
is possible some may have thought it. 
49. Prevention of Destitution p.47 
50. The eugenists were not unaware of these points Cf. J.A. Lindsay -
Immunity from disease considered in relation to eugenics (Eugenic 
Review IV (1912-13) 117-135). Eugenists in fact tended towards 
Webb's position on this point, see e.g. the Whetham articles 
cited in footnote 27. Webb's point was not a fanciful one - for 
a modern and of course more serious version see P.B. Medawar 
Do advances in medicine lead to genetic deterioration? in C.J. 
Bajema (ed.) - Natural Selection in Human Populations (John Wiley 
& Sons Inc 1971) where innate resistance to epidemic diseases is 
characterised as a "cheap genetic trick" (p.302) 
51. Charity Organisation Review 28 (1910) p.365 
52. B. Bosanquet - The problem of selection in human society (Charity 
Organisation Review 28 (1910) 369-86) 
53. ibid. p.379 
.J..-' t • 
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54. ibid. p.377 
55. Quoted in J. Harris - Beveridge (Oxford University Press 1977) p.103 
56. Eichholz - The Alleged Deterioration of Physique (Brit. Jnl. of 
Nursing 33 (1904» p.4l0 
57. A. Newsholme - The Declining Birth Rate (Cassell 1911) See pp.46 
for criticisms of Heron's book referred to above. And see 
critical comment on eugenics in The Crusade (Dec. 1910) 
58. Cf. Royal Commission vol. III Minority report pp.674-5 where 
detention colonies are proposed but it is unclear what the 
relations of the inmates to their families, if any, would be. 
59. It may be of interest to note here that after the First World War 
pauperism disappeared as a concept and was replaced in Eugenic 
circles by the notion of the social problem group. Sir Bernard 
Mallet designated the investigation of this group as the Society's 
next great task in 1932 (Eugenics Review XXIII p.203). It formed 
the centre piece of the Galton Lecture that year by E.J o Lidbetter 
entitled the Social Problem Group - as illustrated by a series 
of East London Pedigrees (Eugenics Review XXIV (1932) 1-12). A 
year later E.J. Lidbetter's great work was published or at least 
its first volume, financed partly by the Society and partly by the 
L.S.E. called Heredity and the Social Problem Group vol.I (Edward 
Arnold 1933). Leonard Darwin in his introduction remarked that 
"students of sociology will consult it for many years to come" 
(p.6). This does not appear to have been the case, indeed no 
further volumes saw the light of day. The discussion did not end 
there though. A later volume edited by C.P. Blacker called a 
Social Problem Group? (Oxford University Press 1937) whose 
interrogative title alone indicated accumulating doubts, an 
impression confirmed by the writings of many of the contributors. 
Later in the 30s and 40s discussion in the Society of these 
matters seems to have been strongly influenced by F. Lafitte and 
R. Titmus neither of whom appeared to have much sympathy with the 
social problem' group concept. For a review of later debates see 
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A.Phelp and N.Timms - The Problem of Problem Families 
(134) 
Chapter VI - DEGENERATE PARENTHOOD: EUGENICS AND ALCOHOLISM 
"On February 14, 1908, the first General Meeting of the Society was 
held at Denison House, the Hon. Sir John Cockburn in the chair ••• 
Dr. Saleeby drew attention to the then recent action of the London 
County counc~l in clos~the Hom~s for chro~ic inebriate women in 
the Metropo11tan area~the follow1ng resolutlon was unanimously 
passed. That the Eugenics Education Society enters a protest against 
the recent administration of the Inebriates Acts (of 1898) whereby, 
through the closing of the Inebriates Homes, some hundreds of chronic 
inebriate women will be set adrift in London, with an inevitably 
detrimental result to the race". Eugenics Review 1909. 
The Eugenics Education Society more or less began on an alcoholic 
note (1) and the issue is of interest primarily for the virulent 
controversy generated within the ranks of eugenists themselves. 
There were three distinct positions within the broad eugenics movement 
on the question of alcoholism (2). Perhaps the most publicised was 
the 'racial poison' school whose chief architect and spokesman was 
C. Saleeby (3). Within the Society he was closely 4upported by 
Crackanthorpe and in a more qualified manner by Tredgold (4) while 
outside it he had the backing of eugenically inclined doctors and 
temperance reformers (5). As the opening quotation indicates he early 
established his dominance over the Society's policy (6), but, his 
crusading manner notwithstanding, he faced opposition within the 
eugenics movement. A major opponent inside the Society, (elected a 
vice-president in 1910) (7), was Dr. G. Archdall Reid whose 
controversial position was of long standing and well known in the 
medical world. Outside the Society the figure most closely 
associated with eugenics was Karl Pearson, whose Eugenics Laboratory 
produced six major statements on the alcoholism question over the 
period 1910-1912. 
These three positions are most conveniently approached by looking at 
two rather separate disputes namely, that between Pearson and Saleeby 
(and their respective 'schools') and that between Archdall Reid and 
his critics. Their debates focussed largely in the first case on the 
question of heredity and in the second on the question of selection. 
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It must be made clear at the outset that in principle there was much 
that Pearson and Saleeby could agree on. Pearson's general position 
was broadly acceptable to all eugenists. He argued that alcoholism 
was a somatic mark of a germ-plasm defect. Necessarily then there 
were defects at the somatic level and at the germ-plasm level and some 
form of correspondence between the two. So e.g. a child might be 
defective "not because the parent is alcoholic, but because it is the 
product like the parent of a defective germ-plasm. The child may be 
physically and mentally fit, and yet when adult may exhibit alcoholic 
tendencies" (8). Here there was a form of direct correspondence -
alcoholism could be a specific germ-plasm defect with a definite 
chronology of appearance at the somatic level (9). For Pearson there 
was a second form of heredity which he called cross-heredity 
requiring a second type of correspondence, between a generalised form 
of defect at the germ-plasm level and a variety of forms at the 
somatic level, one of which might be alcoholism. The implications 
were clear - "If, as we think, the danger of alcoholic parentage lies 
chiefly in the direct and cross-hereditary factors of which it is the 
outward or somatic mark, the problem of those who are fighting 
alcoholism is one with the fundamental problems of eugenics" (10) that 
is, of course, problems of defective stocks. 
While there was much that Saleeby could accept - "the Eugenics 
Education Society has from the first recognised and fought for the 
principle that alcoholism is often a symptom of natural nervous defect 
such as should most certainly disqualify for parenthood" (11) -
Pearson1s formulations made no mention of any fdea of alcoholic 
poisoning of the germ plasm indeed one of the major argumen~of his 
various studies was that such poisoning did not occur. Controversy 
then centred on the possibility of a third form of heredity - a direct 
toxic effect on the parental germ-plasm caused by 'racial poisons' 
and requiring (in Saleeby's view) as a corollary of its acceptance a 
third form of eugenics (after positive and negative), a preventive 
eugenics (12). 
The essential ingredients of the notion of racial poison were firstly 
. 
that it involved a poisoning of the germ material and was thus to be 
clearly disting~ished from ante-natal poisoning. It could affect the 
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germ cells of either parent. Secondly, the damaging of the germ plasm 
could take place without damaging the individual himself - i.e. he 
could simply 'carry' the potential bad effects. Thirdly the racial 
poisons could damage certain entities, without fundamentally 
altering them. Thus for example damaged versions of nerve cells 
remained nerve cells, they did not become liver cells or whatever. 
This was Saleeby's explanation of the fact that blastophthoria (a term 
coined by Forel, a Zurich psychiatrlst, to describe the process) was 
not a case of heredity in the proper sense (not a mutation) and 
therefore not subject to the Mendelian rules (though Saleeby was not 
always consistent on this). Finally there seems also to have been a 
somewhat ill-defined notion that even having sustained damage the 
germ-plasm could regenerate itself (13). 
Thus these two different positions, both claiming to be eugenic and 
both attributing a great deal of importance to heredity, approached 
the question of alcoholism in quite different ways. How was such 
discordance and disagreement possible? One obvious answer was that 
the whole controversy was ultimately trivial because animated on one 
side by Temperance fanaticism, intolerant of any evidence that denied 
the more extreme views of the Temperance cause. In this view (14) the 
problem lay in the genuineness or otherwise of the protagonists in the 
debate rather than the arguments themselves. Indeed as a Lancet 
editorial rather tartly put it, liTo minds with a bent for fantastic 
speculation it might be suggested as a subject of curious consideration 
why controversy on the question of alcohol is so apt to produce in the 
controversialists many mental phenomena which have a singular 
resemblance to the effects which alcohol itself produces on the 
judgement and temper of those who take too much of it" (15). This 
explanation was prompted by undoubted inconsistencies in the 
criticisms levelled against Pearson. For example, as he showed, the 
research that was often cited against him frequently failed to observe 
some of the very criteria he was himself accused of failing to observe 
and on the basis of which his research was rejected as fundamentally 
misconceived. Of course this element was present (16) as well as a 
dislike of Pearson himself but possibly there was a little more to it 
than that. There is at least the question why should Temperance 
fanaticism find its expression in an hereditari~Aargument? The 
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answer can only come from a deeper analysis of the two positions. 
There was some disagreement about characterisation of qualities which 
proved in this area to be a great problem. Both Saleeby and 
Sullivan made the criticism that the classifica";:ion wIthin the saraples 
used in Pearson's study was carried out by non-medical personnel which 
seriously reduced the value of the survey. According to Saleeby, 
" many ••• cases notably amongst women ••• , which to the outsider,or 
even for very long periods to the relatives, are reckoned sober, are 
really cases of steady decent tippling of the very kind which we should 
expect to have most marked effects upon the germ-plasm or upon the 
foetus" (17). The point here is that, on the one hand, doctors had 
made a rough distinction between alcoholism and drunkeness (18), but 
on the other hand the same problem applied to many studies which 
supported the Temperance cause and were used against Pearson. For 
example Laitinen, in his survey (19), asked his sample to 'diagnose' 
themselves! Thus it seems that medical men who were committed to the 
Temperance view, faced with a study which used certain methods 
rigorously and produced unacceptable conclusions, searched immediately 
for any possible criticisms and therefore obviously for what they 
knew best, namely the principles of their own practice. 
Disagreement extended also to the question of heredity. It has been 
pointed out that both positions (the racial poison school and 
Pearson) accepted a form of alcoholism which was symptomatic of 
hereditary nervous defect or degeneration. Both wanted to make a 
distinction between this and other forms. Thus much depended on how 
the notion of nervous defect was used. Sullivan distinguished between 
intoxication in those with normal and abnormal constitutions on the 
basis of different observed behaviour during drunkeness. In those of 
the former type "emotional instability is expressed in fatuous 
gaiety, in sentimental drivel, or in motiveless whimpering" (20) 
whereas those of the abnormal type showed wild maniacal excitement or 
prolonged dream consciousness. He also tried to deal with the 
statistical aspects of the question. Others besides Pearson were 
aware of the fact that "statistics which show nothing but the 
co-existence of the two conditions, or which attribute a causal 
influence to alcoholism on no better grounds than a history of 
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drunkeness prior to the recognition of lunacy, are of small value" (21) 
and in his examination of the insanity statistics Sullivan cast doubt 
on the attribution of insanity to antecedent alcoholism. The 
relation of parental alcoholism to the state of the progeny is, 
statistically at least, identical to the insanity question and 
Sullivan looked at this too. As with insanity alcoholism was "one of 
the most easily traced antecedents, and is pretty sure, therefore, to 
figure disproportionate1ly amongst the assigned causes of defect" (22). 
Yet despite this drawback Sullivan outlined and defended this data on 
the grounds that it had "the value that must attach to opinions based 
on wide experience and trained judgements" (23). As to the 
perennial difficulty of whether alcoholism was a ca.se or a symptom 
of nervous degeneration Sullivan argued on the basis of "the direct 
knowledge which we have of the possible effects of parental 
intoxications" (24) by which he meant experimental knowledge gained 
from animals; and he referred to the researches of Grassman, who 
found that in the family histories of the insane, while insanity was 
found in the grandparents and the collateral line alcoholism was met 
with chiefly in the father or mother. He concluded from this that 
"Obviously such a contrast would not appear if parental alcoholism 
were, like parental insanity a mere manifestation of a degenerate 
trait and not as it really is its direct and efficient cause" (25). 
These kinds of arguements were often repeated by others. When Miss 
M. Dendy (26) suggested that alcoholism was most often a result 
rather than a cause of feeble-mindedness the rights of doctors were 
swiftly reasserted in the British Journal of Inebriety: "Miss Dendy, 
of course, writes as a lay woman, without special knowledge of the 
medical aspects of this difficult problem ••• many careful observers 
in the best position to form unprejudiced opinion based on an actual 
clinical experience contend that there is a very close aetiological 
relationship between alcoholism and mental defectiveness" (27). 
There were numerous similar expressions of medical opinion (28) almost 
always containing two elements, namely a very great deal of trust in 
clinical experience and a preference for 'direct l , which usually 
meant experimental 'proof'. In a discussion recorded in the British 
Journal of Inebriety Sims Woodhead stressed the difficulty of 
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gathering reliable statistics, Clouston was cautious but emphasised 
his clinical experience; Mott also expressed caution but offered the 
opinion "that the combination of a drunken father and a feeble-minded 
mother is a fertile source of feeble-mindedness in the offspring" (29). 
P. Jones, an asylum physician found it impossible "to conceive that 
the germ-plasm (bathed as it is in the plasm of the blood) should be 
unaffected by its environment when we know that alcohol is taken up 
directly into the blood for it is exhaled by the lungs and excreted 
by the kidneys, and we have further proof of its direct effects upon 
living cells by experiment in vitro" (30). Some of these authors 
offered their version of a crucial experiment e.g. Jones in the form 
of a reductio ad absurdum - "two identical persons of identical 
tendencies from identical parents married to identical wives, and 
having ,identical families, with an identical environment, except that 
one (or both) was placed under the direct effect of alcohol - a 
condition which only a very trivial imagination could conjure - and 
then observation and records, which is plainly impossible" (31). 
Similarly Horsley and Sturge, in what must have been the medical best 
seller of the day (32) offered a critique of Pearson, telling him what 
should be done, "The fact is, the only way in which this comparison 
can be properly made is by obtaining data from some source which can 
provide instances of genuinely abstaining families for three of four 
generations. These should then be compared with people in similar 
circumstances of life amongst whom it can be proved that drinking 
habits have prevailed for the same period. A careful investigation 
into the health and total life history (say up to thirty years) of 
persons born with these two types of ancestry would be of great 
value" (33); and they added their voices to the chorus of faith in 
clinical judgement - "It is, of course, impossible for a mere onlooker 
to connect a special state of health in a girl or boy with what is 
observable by the outward eye in the physique of the parents, but the 
skilled physician finds it comparatively easy to understand the 
causes which account for the condition of body and mind in the 
children under his care, when the family history is known to him for 
two or three generations" (34). 
What was it that Pearson had said that had caused such a fuss? The 
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Pearson school argued firstly, that extreme alcoholism was due to 
mental defect and fuis could be proved statistically (the two extreme 
alcoholism monographs) and secondly, that alcoholism not due to 
hereditary degeneration did not produce degeneration and that this 
also could br proved statistically (the substance of the two parental 
alcoholism monographs which started all the controversy). On the 
second of these questions the fundamental charge Pearson levelled 
against the medical school was their failure to control for the 
factors of hereditary stock in their samples. He set up the problem 
as follows - alcoholism (which tended to mean drinking in the 
Pearson studies) could have three possible modes of effect -
hereditary, 'toxic influence' (either on the germ-plasm or the 
foetus) or environmental. However before these distinctions could be 
broached the quantitative measure of alcoholic influences on the 
physical and mental characters of the offspring had to be found. In 
doing this there was a trap that had to be avoided i.e. the now 
familiar problem of the spurious correlation, as in Pearson's own 
example below: 
~ more alcohol~ \, 
Virile people~ , ~ good offspring 
real chain of causation 
Feeble people --' ----, ,~,-,,---,-,--j feeble offspring 
Thus in this example the spurious correlation is alcohol/good 
offspring, while the treal t correlations are virile people/virile 
offspring and feeble people/feeble offspring. The obvious way round 
this problem was to take an undifferentiated sample with differential 
exposure to the variable in question viz. 
physical and mental state > ? 
Identical drink 
physical and mental state -- . -} ? 
do not drink 
This was the course pursued and the technique argued for in the first 
Eugenics Laboratory monograph. However it is necessary to probe a 
little deeper into this obvious methodology. 
There seems to have been an implicit assumption at both 'ends' of the 
causal chain that the correlation of physical/mental states in 
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parents and offspring irrespective of environmental variables 
amounted to the description of an hereditary relation. In fact in 
Pearson's usage the term hereditary stock was extremely problematic, 
argued inferentially from other treal' correlations. This can be 
seen in the central raison d'etre of the study. It will be recalled 
that the technique of getting round spurious correlations was to hold 
constant the physical and mental state of the parents while alcohol 
consumption varied. A secondary difficulty presented itself here. 
How could the researcher decide that the two populations drinkers and 
non-drinkers were in fact of more or less identical stock? It was 
decided to resolve this question by reference to wages on the grounds 
that "we think it may be safely affirmed that if the alcoholic parent 
were markedly inferior in physique or intelligence his average wages 
would be markedly less than those of the sober parent" (35). Wages 
were the best index "of the general status as to physique and 
intelligence of the parent" (36). 
Now irrespective of the viability of this index (which is what the 
debate with Keynes and Marshall was about) the method here was crucial. 
If the study meant anything the results must be interpreted as 
having controlled for heredity. As the results turned out, in a 
number of areas the offspring of the drinkers emerged rather better 
than the offspring of the non-drinkers. In intelligence for example 
Pearson found a small correlation between intemperance and 
intelligence i.e. the intemperate had slightly less mentally 
defective children. The logic of the study would indicate that the 
qualities of the offspring, whether good or bad, were due to alcohol 
yet, "here again we must repeat that we do not suppose temperance to 
be a cause of mental defect any more than we supposed it to be a 
cause of phthisis or epilepsy" (37). The question must be asked, 
bizarre as it may seem, why not? The logic of the data, however small 
the coefficients, was that intemperance caused less disease and less 
mental defect. 
When it came to explaining apparent anomalies Pearson resorted to two 
rather odd arguments. The first depended on variability in the very 
factor which should be controlled i.e. hereditary stock. Indeed his 
results were, on these supplementary arguments precisely what the 
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monograph on its own terms was supposed to avoid (38). Thus with 
reference to general health (taking phthisis and epilepsy as 
indicators) Pearson argued "Tft~ fact, as shown in these figures, that 
the children of the intemperate are healthier th~n the children of 
the sober is probably due to the more virile and physically fit 
members of the community being liable to alcoholic temptation, and ~s 
as such an indirect effect of heredity and not a result of alcohol" 
(39). The natural obverse of this was used to explain odd results in 
connection with intelligence - "The small association, if it be 
significant, is probably a secondary ~ffect of an herditary influence, 
the mentally defective children coming from a feebler stock, which 
has not the desire or possibly the capacity for alcohol of a stock 
of a more vigorous physique" (40). This second argument, in itself 
rather vague and dubious appears to have been in at least partial 
contradiction with one of the fundamental axioms supposedly proved by 
the monograph and extreme alcoholism that "the bulk of the mentally 
defective became criminal or alcoholic" (41). 
ThMs in the Pearson studies the two crucial elements were 
quantification and differentiation, but the first two pages of the 
monograph were taken up with what may be called the modes of effect 
of alcohol and these were not drawn from statistics but from the 
existing state of medical and hereditarian discourse. The 
Pearsonian elements functioned in relation to these discourses. The 
first element was the quantitative measure which supplied the 
criterion of the necessity to differentiate (i.e. did alcohol have 
effects on the offspring?) the modes of effect. The second element 
was the capacity to handle such differentiation should it occur in 
terms of distinguishing the modes of effect. As the examples that 
have been cited show when such differentiation did occur (in some 
cases in favour of intemperance) the modes of effect could only be 
brought to bear on the results by speculation and by sabotaging the 
crucial principles of the study. This is not to say that the methods 
could not produce results of greater accuracy as for example in the 
first set of correlations between parental drinking and the height and 
weight of offspring. From the fact that the mother/daughter 
correlations were higher than the mother/son ones Pearson concluded 
that he was dealing with an environmental relationship rather than a 
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direct toxic one because the latter would affect boys as much as 
girls. Nevertheless the fact remains that the correlations were not 
incompatible with a toxic effect i.e. the methods employed did not 
make possible the distinction of the modes of effect. 
Thus we have here a conflict not between men of reason and men of 
passion, not even between partisans of incompatible methods. For all 
their savage denunciations of each other the two schools had much in 
common but their shared commitment to eugenics could not resolve their 
differences. Both these differences and the common features were 
rooted in the confused melange of theories that constituted 
hereditarianism at the time (42). 
For both Pearson and the racial poison school the central issue was 
heredity yet there were others for whom a quite different concept was 
of critical importance, nrunely, selection. Foremost among these was 
Dr. G. Archdall Reid (43). In SQme ways Reid saw himself as 
fighting on two fronts. Like Pearson he objected to the racial 
poison school not so much on statistical grounds but rather on the 
basis of his ruthlessly Weismannist position on the germ-plasm i.e. 
it was immune to any outside effects. Unlike both Pearson and the 
racial poison school he posited susceptibility to alcohol as an 
hereditary characteristic not necessarily a function of any general 
germ-plasm defect. The racial poison school for their part were 
prepared to concede some minimal selective effect to alcohol but for 
them alcohol produced more degenerates than it removed • 
. 
For Reid the most fundamental questions of the contin~~ty of the 
germ-plasm and the explanatory value of natural selection were at 
stake. The arguments were at one level relatively straightforward so 
much so that Reid delighted in impressing on his opponents the 
supposedly axiomatic structure of his theory which could be reduced to 
five propositions. Firstly, individuals differed in their 
susceptibility to alcohol and this was grounded in the hereditary 
material. "A drunkard drinks because he is so constituted that 
experience of alcohol awakens in him a craving for alcohol. Whether 
he drinks or not he tends to transmit this inborn constitution of 
mind to his child" (44). Since the susceptibility trait was 
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hereditary it could exist without being fulfilled - "The facts remain 
however, that though many people who are very susceptible to the 
charm of alcohol do not fall victims to it, yet, whether it be 
indulged or not, the susceptibility exists, is greater in some 
, 
people than in others, tends to be inherited in its various degrees •• " 
(45). 
Secondly men consumed alcohol in proportion to their desire for it. 
This was argued as a general axiom - " ••• generally speaking, men 
indulge in sugar, salt, or tobacco, or anything else in proportion to 
their desires" (46). The combined effect of these first two points 
was to considerably downgrade the question of self-control and Reid 
backed this up with an ingenious appeal to introspection that must 
have been appreciated by a public somewhat disenchanted with decades 
of Temperance propaganda. Reid enquired of his reader whether he had 
"observed in his wife or mother, for instance, a tendency to 
intemperance, checked only by a sense of duty? Are his father, his 
brother and his ~~ter victims of this miserable craving, as they are 
tvictims' if I may use the word, of the cravings for food and water?" 
(47). Here Reid was simply drawing on the obvious fact, that most 
people did not experience personal dramas of resisting the 
'temptations' of alcohol, while producing an apparently satisfactory 
explanation of the fact that alcoholics, though endlessly exhorted to 
control themselves, generally failed to do so. Reid l s third 
proposition, which would have found few opponents, was simply that 
alcohol in excess was a poison causing death and that alcohol and 
alcohol related conditions were important causes of mortality (48). 
It was Reid's last two propositions and their legislative implications 
that made him a controversial figure. He insisted that alcohol in 
parents did not have a degenerative effect on offspring on the usual 
grounds: that there was no generally accepted case of the inheritance 
of acquired characteristics; that the degeneracy school consistently 
confused post hoc and propter hoc (49) and that if alcohol did cause 
degeneration then races which had used it for millenia should have 
degenerated, which was clearly not the case (50). This topic disposed 
of Reid was able to proceed to his final point that alcoholic 
mortality was exercised on the hereditarily susceptible and to 
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conclude therefore that this mortality had a selective effect. 
These arguments were derived from Reid's version of orthodox 
Darwinism, which is best approached in terms of three aspects: firstly, 
the main structural features; secondly, the prominence given to the 
facts of human disease in his model of Darwinism; thirdly, the 
appropriateness of this disease model to alcoholism. Reid's version 
of Darwinism put into play three features, namely definitions of 
'fit' and 'unfit' and the facts of what he called 'injurious 
agencies' (with the proviso that only inborn characters were being 
dealt with). 
DarwiniaA. evolution "infers that, as a rule, the individuals who 
survive and have offspring, are those which are better fitted to the 
environment in which they are placed than those which perish" (51). 
Thus two major problems were set up: firstly, innate variations (how 
are they known?), secondly, death rates (what are their effects?). 
In Reid's Darwinism selection appears to oscillate between two roles. 
It is on some occasions credited with producing a certain structure, 
on other occasions as a means of inferring that structure. Take the 
following "It follows, if an injurious agency is so little injurious 
as not to influence the death (or birth) rate, or so very injurious 
as not to discriminate between the fit and the unfit that it cannot 
be a cause of evolution. In the one case the unfit are not 
eliminated, in the other the fit do not survive. Haphazard deaths 
again are not causes of evolution. Thus fire and water may destroy 
many lives in this country but they do not select for survival any 
particular type of individual" (52). This passage makes a firm 
distinction between the identification of the fit/unfit and the 
effects of death rates and indeed this point was crucial to Reid's 
argument that human data were much more suited to Darwinism than 
plant or animal data precisely because in the latter case, "we 
cannot declare, with certainty that this or that type, as a rule, 
perishes" (53). 
The strategy here then is quite clear. In order to proceed it would 
be necessary to be able to identify 'types' and then investigate how 
death rates affected the reproduction of these types. How then in 
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the case of human disease were these types to be identified? - lilt is 
a matter of common knowledge that men differ in their powers of 
resisting this or that disease. Some men take a disease and perish; 
others take it and recover, yet others do not take the disease at all 
they are totally immune. It is also a matter of common knowledge 
that every prevalent disease tends to afflict certain families more 
than it does others; in other words, parents weak or strong against 
any given disease, tend to transmit their peculiarities to children" 
(54). The reasoning here is rather different - the distinction 
between the fit and unfit types in the matter of human disease is 
, 
made by inference from who survives and who perishes. They are not 
identified independently from death rates but as an effect of death 
rates. This is then argued as an example of the general case -
according to Darwinism "evolution results from the selective 
elimination of inferior individuals, and then only when the selective 
elimination is considerable in volume ••• We have, therefore, only to 
note the principal causes of the death rate to discover the actual 
lines of evolution" (55). In this mode of argument the category of 
haphazard deaths (i.e. deaths having no systematic effect on an 
identifiable type) - could not exist - so there is now nothing ~o 
prevent the postulation of innate susceptibilities to death by e.g. 
fire and water (56); fire and water tend to destroy those who are less 
alert, less quick in their reactions etc; it is 'common knowledge' 
that men vary in their alertness, their reaction times etc. 
Thus Reid1s Darwinism, while axiomatic, was entirely circular. His 
answer to the question how can one prove that alcoholic causes of 
death are selective, required the examination of the destruction of 
the unfit types. But the unfit types could only be recognised by 
virtue of their destruction. Nevertheless in Reid1s view it 
followed "that every deadly and prevalent zymotic disease plays the 
part of a breeder. It eliminates the unfittest, leaving the fittest 
to continue the race" ~57). This Darwinism had some paradoxical 
characteristics. Its central feature was a list of obvious 
empirical facts (58) - the extensive documentation of human disease 
that Reid pointed to, causes of death, number of causes of death and 
so on was a question of classification and tabulation which 
contained of itself no evidence one way or the other about innate 
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susceptibilities - and while being impossible to apply to animal or 
plant life it was easily applied to Man (59). 
It was this model Reid used to explain alcoholism since "the 
analogy between narcotics and disease is so close that it is more 
convenient to deal with them at once especially as narcotics usually 
kill by producing disease" (60). Applied to alcoholism Reid argues 
that the disease model required an additional postulate, a 
psychological one referred to as point two above (61) which reveals 
another aspect of the open-endedness of the innate susceptibility 
argument. In the context of alcohol the fit and the unfit were 
obviously those who did not desire enormous amounts of drink and 
those who did - hence the irrelevance of self-control. But this was 
superfluous since the theory already contained all the resources it 
needed to deal with the problem. Just as men varied in all kinds of 
characteristics so they varied in their degree of self-control with 
regard to liquor. Clearly if you attempted to meet Reid·s 
psychology you got hit over the head by his Darwinism (62). 
The main terrain on which alcoholic selection was argued was 
historical and ethnographic. Reid concluded that races were immune to 
diseases (and by extension, narcotics) in proportion to their 
experience of them (63). This clearly followed - the longer natural 
selection had to work the more its results would be in evidence. All 
the conditions for the transferrability of the disease model were 
present - "since alcohol weeds out enormous numbers of people of a 
particular type, it is a stringent agent of selection - an agent of 
selection more stringent than anyone disease" (64). 
Reid did not shrink from drawing the practical implications of his 
doctrine. At the psychology section of the 1899 BMA conference he was 
quoted as saying - "The Temperance Reformer's plan of abolishing 
drink was not the true method of reform. Were such a procedure to 
corne into force for a time the result would be that the race now 
removed from alcoholic selection would revert to the ancestral type 
in which the tendency to excessive drink was greater, and directly the 
opportunity recurred drink almost to extinction, like savage man 
unacquainted in the past with alcohol" (65). The difference between 
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Nature's method and Temperance Reform was clear - "She (Nature) has 
eliminated drunkards; temperance reformers propose to eliminate 
drink" (66). This was the basic point besides which all the detail 
about the failure of Temperance legislation in the U.S. and the 
British Dominions paled into insignificance (67). Clearly the only 
way out was a eugenic one. Reid's suggestions were forthright and 
uncomplicated showing a robust disregard for practicality that no 
Temperance Reformer, however fanatical, could have hoped to rival. 
"If drunkards were taken before magistrates, sitting in open or 
secret session, as the accused preferred, and, on conviction, were 
warned that the procreation of children would subject them to this or 
that penalty, say a monthts imprisonment, the birth-rate of drunkards 
would certainly fall immensely" (68). 
Perhaps surprisingly in view of its initial enthusiasm the Eugenics 
Education Society seemed to lose interest in the matter (69). It seems 
reasonable to conclude that this was in part an effect of Saleeby!s 
waning influence and the intractable differences among eugenists on 
the question. In 1915 Darwin then President of the Society was 
invited by the Society for the Study of Inebriety to lecture on 
alcoholism and eugenics (70), and he attempted to steer a judicious 
middle course. He would not concede that there was such a phenomenon 
as alcoholic damaging of the germ-plasm more or less on the grounds of 
the Archdall Reid position but against the latter he refused to accept 
that the banishment of intemperance would lead to reversion. In his 
speech there was no raison d'etre for any specific eugenic interest in 
alcoholism and Darwin's position was the popular eugenic one (in this 
sense closest to Pearson) that "the natural qualities which lead to 
crime are, in fact, those which we have seen lead to intemperance, 
and here the eugenist finds a reason why crime and alcoholism are 
closely correlated" (71), the ground for both these being, of course, 
feeble-mindedness. Leading figures in the debates - Reid, Sullivan, 
Saleeby - gave their views on the paper and little change is 
observable (72). 
Almost as Darwin spoke, however, many aspects of these theories were 
about to be put to the cruel tests of real life. In D'Abernon's 
words, as a result of the Liquor Traffic Control Board's activities 
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(of which he was Chairman) " ••• within eighteen months drunkeness had 
diminished by one half, within three years ••• by more than eighty per 
cent on the pre-war convictions ••• Inefficiency ••• bad time-keeping, 
cases of Delirium Tremens and illness proceeding from drunkeness, all 
diminished rapidly" (73). And the benefits remained, reversion 
failed to put in an appearance while convictions for drunkenness and 
deaths from alcohol fell precipitately. Where was natural selection, 
where were the feeble-minded? In 1939 Mapother, a leading British 
psychiatrist, writing on the physical basis of alcohol mental 
disorders briefly mentioned previous debates as if thQy had taken 
place on another world - "I doubt whether even a dictator would 
propose to improve his race by alcoholic massacres of the innocents 
upon such evidence as exists" (74); the theory of selection was "no 
longer tenable. The poverty-stricken peasantry of rural Italy and 
Spain were and are sober, but the populations of the industrial towns 
of these countries are not more so than in the north" (75). 
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Chapter VI - FOOTNOTES 
1. There was a considerable correspondence between Eugenists and the 
LCC on this matter which can be followed in The Times 19/2/08; 
27/2/08; 18/4/08; 21/4/08 and the Pall Mall Gazette 4/3/08. 
2. The general background I have taken from J.F.C. Harrison (Drink and 
the Victorians, Faber & Faber 1971), ("the temperance movement from 
1872 to first world war badly needs a historian" (p.20»; 
R. M. MacLeod - The edge of hope: social policy and chronic 
alcoholism 1870-1900 (Jnl. Hist. Med. Allied Sciences 22 (1967) 
215-245; G. Basil Price - Legislation and the care and control of 
the inebriate (British Journal of Inebriety X (1912) 25-34); anon -
The scientific study of alcohol and alcoholism (British Journal of 
Inebriety VII (1909) 24-34); G.B. Wilson - Alcohol and the nation 
(Nicholson & Watson 1940). A.E. Wilkerson - A history of the 
concept of alcoholism as a disease (University of Pennsylvania 
Dissertation in social work 1966) has some interesting material but 
is almost exclusively devoted to the United States. Unfortunately 
E. Gordon - The anti-alcohol movement in Europe (N.Y.: Fleming H. 
Revell Co. 1913) deals only with continental Europe. 
3. His major statements were, Alcoholism and Eugenics (British Journal 
of Inebriety VII (1909) 7-20): Racial Poisons II. Alcohol (ER II 
(1910-11) 30-52); also a great deal of polemical material which will 
be referred to where relevant. For Saleeby's influence in the 
United States see Bartlett C. Jones - Prohibition and Eugenics 1920-
33 (Jnl. Hist. Med. Allied Sciences, 18 (1963) 158-72). 
4. Cf. A.F. Tredgold - Some medical aspects of eugenics (The Medical 
Press (7/8/1912) 110-112; 137-9) 
5. And indeed other writers Cf. G. Chatterton-Hill - Heredity and 
Selection in Sociology (A. & C. Black 1907) p.279 
6. He claimed and his claim seems justified, to have written the 
Society's memorandum to a government enquiry into the subject of 
alcoholism. See Appendix IV. 
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7. See EES annual report 1910 
8. Pearson - A First Study of the influence of parental alcoholism on 
the physique and ability of the offspring (Du1au & Co. 1910) p.1 
9. op.cit. p.2 
10. op.cit. p.32 
11. Eugenics Review II (1910-11) p.33 
12. In Eugenics and Public Health (Journal State Medicine XXI (1913) 
440-445) Saleeby argued that opposition to the rac{a1 poison 
conception of alcohol was based on the biometric memoir and a 
misplaced Darwinism. In what follows, because of the somewhat 
fragmentary nature of Saleeby's statements on the question I have 
sometimes relied on W.C. Sullivan's Alcoholism - a chapter in social 
pathology (Nisbet 1906) which was written from a not dissimilar 
position. This seems justified also by the fact that both 
Crackanthorpe and Saleeby constantly cited it in their writings. 
13. This seems to have rem~ned a live issue for some time. The author 
of the revamped version of the Horsley and Sturge book, (see 
footnote 33), expounding the n.tion~of blastophthoria, said that 
"the condition induced does not necessarily become hereditary and 
thus transmissible to successive generations" but also argued that, 
"alcohol in excess is a definite racial poison inducing charges in 
the germ-plasm, which are transmissible to succeeding generations". 
C.C. Weeks - Alcohol and Human Life (H.K. Lewis 1929) p.III 
14. Taken, understandably, by Pearson. See e.g. the pamphlet replying 
to Horsley and Sturge. (Bibliographical Appendix II ref. 51 
pp.36-7) 
15. Lancet 21/1/1911 p.177 
16. As comments at the time make clear. e.g. " ••• the profession is 
indebted to him (Pearson) for his usefulness as a corrective factor 
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in - to mention only one instance - the absurd overrepresentation 
of the case against alcohol" (The Hospital LIV (1913) p.629) 
11. C.W. Saleeby - Professor Karl Pearson on alcoholism and offspring 
(British Journal of Inebriety VIII (1910) 53-66) p.61 
18. Sullivan op.cit. ch.IV 
19. Laitinen's paper, fA contribution to the study of the influence 
of alcohol on the degeneration of human offspring' is in J.T. 
Rae (ed.) - The proceedings of the 12th international congress 
of alcoholism pp.263-270 (National Temperance League 1910) 
20. Sullivan op.cit. p.38 
21. op.cit. p.172 
22. op.cit. p.186 
23. ibid. 
24. op.cit. p.189 
25. ibid. 
26. A leading mental deficiency campaigner who supplied half the 
data for the first Pearson study. 
27. British Journal of Inebriety VIII (1910) p.SO 
28. e.g. in the editorials in the Lancet 9 Feb. 1901 and 23 March 1901 
and National Temperance Quarterly symposium on the Pearson 
monograph. 
29. British Journal of Inebriety discussion of T. B. Hyslop's paper 
'The influence of parental alcoholism on the physique and ability 
of offspring'g VIII (1911) 175-215. Mott p.190 
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30. op.cit. p.192 
31. op.cit. pp.192-3 
32. The book was reported to have sold 60,000 copies in National 
Temperance Quarterly (March 1911) p.9. There are brief comments 
on Horsley's role in the controversy in S. Paget - Sir Victor 
Horsley (Constable 1919) and J.B. Lyons - The Citizen Surgeon _ 
A biography of Sir Victor Horsley (Peter Dawnay 1966) 
33. Horsley and Sturge - Alcohol and the Human Body (1911 MacMillan 
4th ed) p.247 
34. op.cit. p.244 
35. Pearson op.cit. p.4 
36. ibid. 
37. op.cit. p.14 
38. lilt is possible that the more virile members of the community 
habitually take more alcohol than the feebler members and we 
might thus be led to a spurious correlation between alcoholism 
and good physique in the offspring". ibid. p.3 
39. op.cit. p.ll 
40. op.cit. p.14 
41. Bibliographical Appendix II ref. 36 p.44 
42. It would be quite wrong to suggest that the whole of the medical 
profession were Temperance fanatics and I am not in a position 
to establish how typical of the profession medical temperance was. 
There are a number of points here that could be followed up. My 
impression is that complete confusion prevailed about definitions 
of alcoholism, drunkard, chronic alcoholic and so on. See for 
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example T. N. Kelynack - The Alcohol Problem in its biological 
aspect (Richard J. James 1906) in which the known medical facts 
are liberally flavoured with bluster and common sense. For 
another example see the reports of the Medico-Psychological 
Association (Lancet 28/5/1904 pp.1503-4), and Sullivan's paper _ 
A Statistical Note on the Social Causes of Alcoholism (Journal of 
Mental Science 1904). It would also be interesting to pursue 
the questions which sections of the medical profession asked 
which questions. Again my impression is that there was rather a 
difference between the amateur Darwinist wing and those who 
actually had to look after 'inebriates'. On attitudes to 
therapies Cf. J.W. Astley-Cooper - The Treatment of alcohol 
inebriety by psycho-therapy (British Journal of Inebriety VIII 
(1911) 135-42 - "Till recently in this country at all events 
the psychic treatment or inebriety has received scant attention". 
(p.137) and H. Crichton-Miller - Psychotherapy and the Inebriate 
(British Journal of Inebriety X (1913) 175-187) - "yet I venture 
to say that a generation hence our successors will smile at the 
almost complete absence of psychological diagnosis and analysis 
which at present characterises our treatment of the inebriate". 
(p.186). Crichton-Miller's later contributions to British 
psychiatry are, of course, well-known. And the eugenists had 
their sworn enemies. "Please do not say or think that my patient 
was degenerate. I think we doctors may leave the term to the 
amateur biologists who revel in eugenics and such nonsense". 
(M.D. Eder - A case of Obsession and Hysteria treated by the 
Freud psycho-analytic method (BMJ 30/9/1911) pp.750-752. Eder 
of course was not typical of the medical profession. See the 
references to him in volume two of E. Jones biography of Freud 
(Hogarth Press 1967). 
43. His writings, the discussion of which was very considerable (my 
bibliography is by no means complete) seem to be one of the lost 
chapters of British Darwinism. For my purposes the central 
texts are Alcoholism: A study in Heredity (T. Fisher Unwin 1901) 
and Human Evolution with special reference to alcohol (BMJ 31 Oct. 
1903 818-20) but where necessary or useful I have used other 
material. 
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44. Alcoholism p.89. Elsewhere in this book (pp.86-7) Reid uses the 
term 'alcohol diathesis'. 
45. Reid - The Laws of Heredity (Methuen 1910) p.294 
46. Alcoholism p.78 
47. op.cit. p.8l 
48. op.cit. ch.VI - The death rate from alcohol 
49. Cf. Reid - Alcoholism in its relation to insanity (Lancet 12 
August 1899) pp.45l-2 
50. Cf. "D •• Drummond thinks that alcohol circulating in the parents' 
blood may so damage the germ-cells as to render the offspring 
which arise from them more liable to drunkenness than they 
otherwise would have been. In that case, races which have 
longest used drink should be the most drunken, whereas the 
contrary is the fact". Reid - Alcoholism in relation to heredity 
(BMJ 6 January 1900 pp.46-7) p.46 
51. Reid - The Principles of He~ity (Chapman & Hall 1905) p.16 
52. Alcoholism p.16 
53. op.cit. p.25 
54. op.cit. pp.30-3l 
55. op.cit. pp.17-l8 
56. Cf. H.G. Wells' susceptibility to skull fracture by falling 
bricks (in Mankind in the Making) mentioned in chapter IV above. 
Funnily enough Reid actually comments on this passage himself 
(Principles pp.344-5) and seems to have completely missed the 
point. 
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57. Alcoholism p.31 
58. "It has long been recognised that most infectious diseases tend 
in course to 'wear themselves out!'. W.A. Brend-He~h and the 
State (Constable 1917) p.32 
59. One of the subtitles of chapter 3 of Alcoholism is "the 
impossibility of proving natural selection by a study of wild 
nature". 
60. Principles p.189 
61. " ••• the study of the effects produced by narcotics should be 
deferred till we have considered the phenomena of mind". 
Principles p.189 
62. "The fact remains that some men are so constituted that they 
succumb much more quickly and completely to the charm of alcohol 
than others. They acquire the habit and the craving for 
intoxication with much greater ease. Even if, ignoring obvious 
facts, we attribute differences in drinking habits solely to 
differences in powers of self-control, and insist that all men 
are equal as regards their susceptibility, that central fact 
would still remain". Principles p.194 
63. "Given equal accessibility of alcohol, in every case the most 
temperate races are those which have been most exposed and the 
least temperate are those which have been least exposed". Reid -
Recent Researches in Alcoholism(Bedrock No.1) p.41 
64. Alcoholism p.86 
65. Cf. Reid - Alcoholism in its relation to insanity (Lancet 12 
August 1899) pp.451-2 
66. Principles p.339 
67. Alcoholism ch.XIII - The Temperance Failure and Principles pp.340-
44 
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68. It would be unfair not to point out that elsewhere Reid 
expressed, as we would now see it, more moderate and practical 
views e.g. Laws p.465 but what is at issue here is the logic of 
his position. 
69. There is almost no mention of the topic in the Eugenics Review 
for example and no account of the various Parliamentary efforts 
to pass a new Inebriates Act whereas the Review always reported 
the legislative battles over mental deficiency. 
70. L. Darwin - Alcoholism and Eugenics (British Journal of Inebriety 
XIII (1915) 55-66) 
71. op.cit. p.64 
72. As footnote 70 reactions printed in the same issue of the 
journal. In general, with a few exceptions, the medical 
profession seems to have been unimpressed by Reid's case. The 
following is not untypical "Certainly, many careful observers 
will be inclined to agree with Dr. Robertson that at the present 
time one of the most potent causes of genetic variation depends 
upon the action of alcohol, and probably the majority will, 
whatever theoretical support they may be inclined to give to Dr. 
Reidts theories, agree with Dr. Robertson's practical advice that 
it is the duty of the State to remove from the environment of its 
people every inimical condition to which there is imperfect 
d t ·" a apta l.on • (Medical Press and Circular 20/1/1904 p.67) 
73. Lord D'Abernon quoted in M.M. Glatt - The English Drink Problem; 
its rise and decline through the ages (British Journal of 
Addiction 55 (1958) 51-67) p.58. And see M.E. Rose - The Success 
of Social Reform? The Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) 1915-
21 in M.R.D. Foot (ed.) War and Society: Historical Essays in 
Honour and Memory of J.R. Western 1928-71 (Elek 1973) 
74. British Journal of Inebriety XXXVI (1939) p.104 
75. ibid. pollO 
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Chapter VI - BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDICES 
These bibliographical appendices are loosely based on "A bibliography 
of the controversy between Professor Karl Pearson and his critics, 
with brief comments by Walter N. Edwards F.C.S." which appeared in 
the National Temperance Quarterly of March 1911 (pp.233-240). I have 
however made substantial alterations as follows. I have split it 
into two halves the first half covering the debate between Pearson 
and Keynes/Marshall and the second covering the debate between Pearson 
and his medical critics. In addition I have corrected a number of 
errors, deleted a number of unimportant or marginal items and inserted 
a number of other references of eugenic interest. 
Appendix I 
1. Marshall - Times 7/7/10 
2. Pearson - Times 12/7/10 (reply to 1) 
3. Keynes - Journal Royal Statistical Society (73 (1910~ 769-73 
4. Marshall - Times 2/8/10 (reply to 2) 
5. Pearson - Times 10/8/10 (reply to 4) 
6. Marshall - Times 19/8/10 (reply to 5) 
7. Pearson - Supplement to the memoir entitled: The influence of 
parental alcoholism on the physique and ability of the offspring -
a reply to the Cambridge economists (this appeared in a series 
called Questions of the Day and of the Fray in which Pearson and 
his colleagues published polemical pamphlets, 
the openly insulting). This was the first of 
appeared in October 1910 (Dulau & Co.) 
usually verging on 
the series and 
8. Keynes - Journal Royal Statistical Society (74 (1910) 114-21) 
(reply to 7) 
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9. Pearson - Journal Royal Statistical Society (74 (1911) 221-9) 
(reply to 8) 
10. Keynes - Journal Royal Statistical Society (74 (1911) 339-45) 
(reply to 9) 
Appendix II 
1. Ethel M. Elderton with the assistance of Karl Pearson - A first 
study of the influence of parental alcoholism on the physique 
and ability of the offspring (Eugenics Laboratory Memoirs X Dulau 
& Co.) 
2. Times 21/5/10 - editorial comment (favourable) and detailed 
summary of the memoir 
3. Times 31/5/10 - letter from H.B. Donkin (approving memoir) 
4. Times 2/6/10 - letter from M. Crackanthorpe President of the 
Eugenics Education Society (attacking the memoir on the basis of 
the limits of biometry) 
5. Times 3/6/10 - letter from F. Galton (defending biometry) 
6. Times 7/6/10 - letter from Crackanthorpe (explication of 4) 
7. Times 1Q/6/10 - letter from Pearson 
8. Times 21/6/10 - letter from Crackanthorpe 
9. Times 24/6/10 - letter from Pearson 
10. National Temperance Quarterly 2 (June 1910) 64-71 review of the 
memoir by W.N. Edwards - The memoir on alcoholism and offspring 
11. BMJ 2/7/10 - letter from W.A. Potts 
12. BMJ 9/7/10 - letter from Pearson (briefly reply to lIon questions 
of samples) 
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13. BMJ 23/7/10 - letter from Potts (reply to 12) 
14. BMJ 6/8/10 - letter from M. Dendy (who collected some of the data 
Pearson used defending its accuracy) 
15. Lancet 2/7/10 - letter from Sullivan (criticism of the memoir) 
16. ER vol II - Sullivan1s review of memoir pp.150-l 
17. BMJ 3/9/10 - letter from R.J. Ryle (a doctor - defending Pearson) 
18. National Temperance Quarterly (September 1910) article by R.J. 
Ryle (as 17). A large section of the September 1910 issue was 
devoted to discussion of the Pearson study - R.J. Ryle pp.167-9; 
G.W. Saleeby pp.170-2; and others on subsequent pages. 
19. T.H. Bickerton and C.T. Williams - Alcohol and Parentage (U.K. 
Band of Hope Union) - criticism of memoir 
20. BJI (October 1910) C.W. Saleeby - Professor Karl Pearson on 
alcoholism and offspring VIII (1910) 53-66 
21. Daily Chronicle 28/10/10 - review of memoir by Sir Thomas P. 
Whittaker 
22. Daily Chronicle 29/10/10 - Part II of review by Sir T.P. Whittaker 
23. Daily Chronicle 1/11/10 - reply to Pearson (to 21 & 22) 
24. Daily Chronicle 2/11/10 - letter ~om Saleeby 
25. Daily Chronicle 5/11/10 - letter from T.P. Whittaker 
26. Daily Chronicle 9/11/10 - letter from Pearson 
27. BMJ 12/11/10 - qualified editorial support for Pearson 
28. Daily Chronicle 14/11/10 - letter from T.P. Whittaker 
(161) 
29. BMJ 19/11/10 - letter from Sir Victor Horsley and Dr. Mary Sturge 
(first contribution from the leading critics of the Pearson memoir) 
30. BMJ 26/11/10 - letter from Pearson. Editorial WTiter defends 
himself. 
31. BMJ 3/12/10 - letter from Horsley and Sturge 
32. BMJ 10/12/10 - letter from Pearson 
33. National Temperance Quarterly 2 (December 1910) - R.J. Ry1e -
Does parental inebriety affect the offspring? This article 
appeared on pp.149-154 though in fact these numbers are misprinted. 
34. Karl Pearson and Ethel M. Elderton - A second study of the 
influence of parental alcoholism on the physique and ability of 
the offspring - being a reply to certain medical critics and an 
examination of the rebutting evidence cited by them (Eugenics 
Laboratory Memoirs XIII Du1au & Co.) 
35. BMJ 17/12/10 - letter from Horsley and Sturge 
36. BMJ 24/12/10 - letter from Pearson 
37. BMJ 31/12/10 - letter from Horsley and Sturge 
38. Amy Barrington and Karl Pearson - A Preliminary study of extreme 
alcoholism in adults (Eugenics Laboratory Memoirs XIV Dulau & Co) 
The controversy over the first monograph seemed to have the 
effect of completely obscuring their other research but this and 
a later second study by Heron are the Pearsonian answer to the 
other main problem i.e. the cause of alcoholism - it attempts to 
prove that mental deficiency is the main source of the prob1em.-
D. Heron - A Second Study of Extreme Alcoholism in Adults \ 
(Eugenics Laboratory Memoirs XVII Cambridge University Press 1912) 
39. BMJ 7/1/11 - editorial notice of and quotation from 38 - letter 
from Pearson 
.. 
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40. Times 14/1/11 - letters from both Pearson and Hors1ey/Sturge 
41. BMJ 14/1/11 - Sturge and Horsley - On some of the biological and 
statistical errors in the work on parental alcoholism by Miss 
Elderton and Professor Karl Pearson 
42. Times 16/1/11 - letter from Horsley and Sturge 
43. Times 16/1/11 - letter from Pearson 
4~. Times 19/1/11 - letter from Horsley and Sturge 
45. Lancet 21/1/11 - fairly judicious editorial summary of the debate. 
46. Times 23/1/11 - letter from Pearson 
47. Times 28/1/11 - letter from Horsley and Sturge 
48. Westminster Gazette 2/2/11 - A.C. Pigou - Alcoholism and Heredity 
49. BMJ 4/2/11 - letter from Pearson 
50. BMJ 11/2/11 - letters from Horsley and Sturge and Saleeby 
51. Nature 9/2/11 - E.H.J. Schuster - Alcoholism and Eugenics (an 
account of the debate defending Pearson) pp.479-480 
52. Karl Pearson - An attempt to correct some of the mis-statements 
made by Sir Victor Horsley, F.R.S., F.R.C.S., and Mary D. Sturge, 
M.D., in their criticisms of the Galton Laboratory Memoir: 'A 
first study of the influence of parental alcoholism, & co." 
(Questions of the Day and of the Fray No. III Cambridge University 
Press) 
53. BMJ 18/2/11 - letter from Horsley and Sturge (having seen the 
original Dendy material, attacking it) 
54. Economic Review (XXII (1912) 35-41) A.M. Carr-Saunders - The 
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problem of alcoholism (an account of the debate defending 
Pearson; ·such were the results which aroused so violent a 
controversy; it extended so far and found its way into so many 
newspapers that there can be few people failed to catch any echo 
of it". p.3B) 
Appendix III 
This appendix is intended simply to list some of the main items in 
Reidts writings on alcoholism and the widespread discussion both of 
his thesis on alcoholism and his position on the wider questions of 
heredity and natural selection. 
1. Reid - Alcoholism in its relation to insanity (Lancet 12/8/99 
pp.45l-2) 
2. Reid - Alcoholism in relation to heredity (BMJ 6/1/1900 pp.46-7) 
3. Reid - Alcoholism, a study in heredity (F. Fisher Unwin 1901) 
4. Reid - Human evolution with special reference to alcohol (BMJ 1903 
8lB-B20) 
5. Reid - Human evolution and alcohol (British Journal of Inebriety 
6. H. Laing Gordon - Alcohol and heredity (British Journal of Inebriety 
I 3 (Jan 1904) 202-20B) 
7. W. Ford Robertson ~ The pathology of chronic alcoholism (British 
Journal I, 4 (April 1904) 226-256) 
B. F.C. Coley - Some points in the etiology of inebriety (British 
Journal of Inebriety II, 1 (July 1904) 22-33) 
7.&B. attacks on Reid 
9. H. Campbell - reply to Ford Robertson (British Journal of Inebriety 
II, 2 (Oct. 1904) 54-63) 
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10. W. Ford Robertson - reply to Campbell (British Journal of 
Inebriety II, 3 (Jan 1905) 104-11} 
11. G.A. Reid - reaction to the debate between Campbell and Ford 
Robertson (British Journal of Inebriety III, 1 (July 1905) 16-30) 
12. W.C. Sullivan - Alcoholism and a priori biology (British Journal 
of Inebriety VIII (Oct 1910) 96-8} 
13. G.A. Reid - Recent researches in alcoholism (Bedrock I (April 
1912) 21-47} 
14. A.M. Gossage - Human evidence of evolution (Bedrock I (April 1912) 
123-30} 
15. G.A. Reid - Inheritance and reproduction (Bedrock I (July 1912) 
240-68) 
16. A.M. Gossage - Human evidence of evolution (Bedrock I (Oct1912) 
383-6) 
17. G.A. Reid - Dr. Gossage1s controversial methods (Bedrock I (Oct 
1912) 386-398) 
18. A.M. Gossage - Crucial tests of evolution (Bedrock I (Jan 1913) 
510-14} 
19. G.A. Reid - llrumunity and natural selection (Bedrock II (April 
1913) 83-101) 
There were also extensive debates (there are too many individual items 
to be usefully listed here) in the Lancet on the following occasions. 
20. 9 February 1901-21 September 1901. Started in this case by an 
editorial entitled Legislation against National Intemperance. 
The debaters included Reid, Laing Gordon and T.S. C1ouston as well 
as other less well-known figures. 
(16S) 
21. 4 June 1903-10 October 1903. Started by a long letter from 
Archdall Reid attacking medical doctrines of heredity. The 
debaters included Reid, Wiglesworth, Mercier, Laing Gordon. 
Appendix IV 
This appendix simply records some of the legislative background to 
alcoholism, more as a gesture towards further research than a 
statement of any conclusions. The legal context was laid down by 
the Habitual Drunkards Act of 1879 and the Inebriates Act of 1898. 
There was further discussion of the matter by a Departmental 
Committee which reported in 1908 (P.P. XII) to which Saleeby gave 
evidence. These developments are fairly thoroughly reviewed in an 
article in the British Medical Journal 30/3/1912 pp.737-40. 
In parliamentary sessions 1912,1913 and 1914 the government made 
efforts to bring in a new act which would have made compulsory 
detention of Inebriates easier. In the 1912 and 1914 sessions the 
bills went to Standing Committee but were not in fact amended. These 
bills ran into the same kind of opposition as the Mental Deficiency 
Bill (considered in Chapter VIII), especially on the grounds of 
liberty of the subject. Of course it was possible to see them as 
yet another example of the eugenic mood of the times, as Wedgewood 
did - "It is only one of a trio of bills - the others being the 
Mental Deficiency Bill and the Criminal Justice Administration Bill, 
all being directed to take in the unfits and the misfits - those who 
do not fit into our civilisation - and put them into institutions in 
order to turn out more useful citizens to the possessing classes". 
(Commons LXV col.lS20) 
While one may be sceptical of some of the implications of this 
comment the eugenists undoubtedly saw a link between the two. Yet 
as I have said after their initial representations they seem to have 
lost enthusiasm for the matter, and their efforts were not 
successful, (at least so far as I can tell - Glatt op.cit. following 
H. Levy - Drink (Routledge Kegan Paul)195l) p.156 says there was an 
Inebriates Act in 1918 which operated till 1921, but I can find no 
record of it. Sir Norwood EastYs comments on the problem (in Society 
(166) 
and the Criminal HMSO 1949) give no indication that there was a 
1918 act). 
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Chapter VII - EUGENICS AND FEEBLEMINDEDNESS PART I 
"The tendency seems to be at the present moment, in England at any 
rate, to concentrate attention far too exclusively on heredity as 
the cause of feeble-mindedness, and to look to segregation too 
hopefully as the one sure means for its prevention. There is almost 
a scare on the subject". Sir James Crichton-Browne (1912) 
The previous chapters have indicated the tendency for eugenists to 
focus on mental deficiency as the core social problem and it was 
undoubtedly the central feature of their pre-war campaigns. The 
centrality of mental deficiency in their thinking was no accident. 
The contemporary indictment of the feeble-minded (1) was thorough and 
wide-ranging. In this perspective the feeble-minded were 
reproductively prolific; their progeny, often illegitimate, were also 
mentally defective, neuropathic or dysgenic; they had strong criminal 
propensities; they were a prime source of sexual irregularities and 
thus a major factor in the propagation of the venereal diseases; they 
were characterised by occupational incompetence, destitution, 
pauperism and vagrancy and for this, if no other reason, were 
incapable of sustaining family life; finally there was a close relation 
between mental deficiency and alcoholism with respect to genesis and 
consequences. This and the following chapter attempt to elucidate 
the specifically eugenic features of this indictment and show their 
links with bio-medical doctrines on the one hand and legislative 
change on the other (2). 
For the eugenists feeble-mindedness was a social problem with a 
biological cause. The question of causation was their own special 
concern since many other social commentators were convinced (or 
became so) on ~on-eugenic grounds that the feeble-minded were both a 
social problem and the root cause of many other social problems. 
The model deployed by the eugenists had two main features. The first 
of these was a set of correspondences between the hereditary level 
and states of mind such that states of mind were rooted in certain 
general determinants of mental development. These two levels were 
integrated in the theory of degeneration. "In short, we may say that 
mental deficiency is the final expression of a progressive 
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neuropathic diathesis, which, beginning as hysteria, neurasthenia, 
and epilepsy, passes onthrough insanity to culminate in actual 
structural defect" (3). But this germinal impairment was variable 
in terms of its expression or manifestation. The eugenists made much 
of the fact that they did not say that mental disorders were inherited 
but rather, as it were, a specific developmental energy at the level 
of the hereditary material - "it is quite clear that in many of 
these cases what is transmitted is not the actual quality, but a 
tendency to the development of that quality" (4). In the process of 
degeneration itself, the two phenomena at each level ran parallel -
as the germ-plasm was progressively devitalised so the mental 
condition became more severe. 
These two levels also provided the space for the second main feature 
of the model, namely predisposition and stress factors. Mental 
conditions were such that certain potential states might be triggered 
by some environmental factor. This helped to explain a number of 
irritating and anomalous facts that for example idiots appeared in 
otherwise normal families or the different degrees of intensity of 
mental condition. As Tredgold informed the Royal Commissioners, 
investigating the feeble-minded "in cases in which morbid heredity 
is present but only very slight, I believe that these external 
factors have an extremely important contributory influence, and that 
they make all the difference between a development of the nervous 
system compatible with the needs of everyday life, and actual mental 
deficiency" (5). A favourite example of these stress factors was 
alcohol (6). These triggering factors were to be distinguished from 
what Tredgold called 'extrinsic causes' which invariably produced 
mental defect by way of an actual disease of the brain i.e. the kind 
of damage that could occur without the predisposition. 
Within this broad outline a number of other features of their doctrine 
stand out. Certainly their classification schemas seem to have been 
rather vague and their usages inconsistent. A distinction was 
frequently made between psychoses (disordered functions of mind), 
dementia (loss of mind), and amentia (absence of mind) (7). &ut 
elsewhere (8) imbecility was described as a form of insanity or the 
term neurosis was stretched to cover epilepsy, migraine, even 
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diabetes! (9). On other occasions Mott talked about ttemperaments'. 
The 'morbid neurotic temperament' for example he defined in the 
following terms the "signs of degeneracy which may be exhibited are 
self-centred narrow-mindedness in religious beliefs, fanaticism, 
mysticism and an unwholesome contempt for traditional customs , 
social usages and morality, often combined with a selfish, self-
seeking, vain spirit of spurious culture, or by a false sentimental 
altruism, or by eccent.f"'lc.ih e,s of all kinds" (10). 
Despite this somewhat confused terminology the bedrock of their 
position was the distinction between minds that were potentially 
unbalanced and minds that were not, as it were, completely equipped 
for full development (ll). The second of these conditions (generally 
termed amentia) was firmly rooted in organic physical defect - it 
was a "manifestation of a imperfect or arrested development of certain 
cells of the brain" (12) and the feeble-minded belonged to a "totally 
distinct and pathological group" (13). Considerable emphasis was 
placed on the continuity between feeble-mindedness and the other more 
extreme forms of mental deficiency, because "feeble-mindedness 
however mild, and idiocy, however gross, belong to the same order; 
although different in degree they are of the same nature; they are 
the result of similar causes ••• " (14). 
Curiously enough this strong emphasis on organic causes and clear cut 
pathologies did not preclude the frequent resort to sociological 
definitions of mental deficiency, as e.g. "The term 'mental defect', 
in my opinion should be restricted to those persons who are so 
lacking in general mental capacity, in common sense, that they are 
incapable of SUbsisting by their own unaided efforts" (15). There 
was no contradiction however. In the first of three lectures 
delivered in 1913 Mott gave most elaborate organic definitions of 
feeble-mindedness - "the degree of amentia or congenital absence of 
mind is proportional to the failure or superficial extent of the grey 
matter of the cortex - the anatomical basis of mind" (16) but went on 
to state that no physical causes were discoverable in the thigher 
grade imbecile' (i.e. feeble-minded), the epileptic or the, insane 
adolescent, attributed this to the fact that the right methods had 
not yet been invented and concluded with the necessity of falling 
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back on the estimation of the kind of stock the individual came from. 
Thus this question of what consituted a neuropathic stock and its 
effects on breeding clearly lead to the final plank in the eugenic 
argument. 
Just as the nature of the germ-plasm defect provided the place for 
the environmental triggering factors so it emphasised the place and 
effect of inter-breeding. The reader will recall from the chapter 
on pauperism the problem of the contamination of fit stocks. At the 
most general level, "the insane predisposition may disappear by 
marriage into perfectly healthy stocks but of course there is a 
danger of infecting a good stock with a bad" (17). Bad stocks if 
they inter-married, tended to die out on the principle of the 'law of 
anticipation' as Mott termed it. But situations did arise which were 
much more difficult to assess - "What we want to know is, did the 
patient come from good stocks or bad stocks? In a large family one 
child may be feeble-minded and all the rest sound, perhaps some may 
possess brilliant mental characters. We may not be able to ascertain 
any reason for this child being defective. By the laws of heredity, 
especially Galton's law of ancestral inheritance, a feeble-minded or 
insane individual coming from sound stocks of civic worth is much 
more likely to breed mentally sound children than a feeble-minded or 
insane individual of a bad stock in which are found a large number of 
members exhibiting various forms of degeneracy " (18). • • • 
Mott seems to have been more optimistic than Tredgold that a stock 
with a not very high level of morbid heredity, if it married into a 
healthy stock, would throw off the hereditary curse. How then were 
these morbid stocks to be identified? In practice the only method 
was by reference to family pedigrees. This is most easily 
illustrated by an early paper of Tredgold's which discussed the 
influence of morbid heredity on the child (19). Tredgold arranged 
the parents of the children studied in five groups depending on the 
degree of morbid heredity. So for example the first group contained 
those with insanity in the child's mother only, with antecedents and 
collaterals healthy, the third group included those with insanity in 
the mother and present in one previous generation of either the 
motherts maternal or paternal ancestors (20) whereas the fifth group 
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included all degrees of insanity on the mother's side plus insanity, 
alcoholism or phthisis on the father's side. Tredgold claimed to 
have shown that the death-rates of the infants correlated with the 
severity of the morbid inheritance. lilt is plainly evident that when 
a strong morbid heredity exists the vitality of the child is so much 
impaired that its chances of surviving more than a few months are 
small and I am convinced that this morbid heredity influence plays a 
very important part in the degeneration of the offspring and finally 
culminates in either idiocy or extermination" (21). 
In general the Mott/Tredgold view seems to have been widely shared by 
that part of the medical profession concerned with mental illness. 
What might be called the organic emphasis appears to have been well-
nigh universal. Clouston's book (a standard text) opened with the 
theme of Temperament and Diathesis and certainly confirms the 
universality of the notion of the insane diathesis - liThe great 
difficulty about its description is that we find few cases of this 
condition alike, and its special manifestations in different cases 
are as multiform as the human faculties and as complex as different 
combinations of unusual developments of those facilities can make 
it" (22). As has been argued there were two crucial aspects, - one, 
the reduction of states of mind and behaviour to organic levels (and 
at least by implication the 'hereditary stuff') and as a corollary 
of this the necessity to place the diverse forms of mental 
malfunctioning on a plane of equivalence. 
There could be endless behavioural diversity (which the innumerable 
classification schemas tried to capture) but there must be (in the 
last analysis) organic unity. Discussions tended to concentrate 
round certain key points - identifiable disease states and (in the 
case of mental deficiency) cranial abnormalities (23); there was 
great interest in the apparent capacity of parents with one kind of 
mental disorder to produce offspring with another kind; interspersed 
with these discussions there were often the most breathtaking abstract 
speculations e.g. - "It is not impossible that there is a kind of 
moral centre in the brain, and so these cases or some of them have 
been compared with cases of agraphia or aphasia. We have indeed, 
seen moral weakness develop after a head injury" (24). What seems to 
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have occurred is a complete disJ"unctl"on b t h e ween c aracterising 
behaviour and the endless invocation of ·unstable nervous systems' 
and so forth. This vacuum was filled with theoretical debris like 
diathesis, degeneration and so on (25). 
In addition to this general organic emphasis the major elements of 
the Mott/Tredgold position seem to have been widely accepted in the 
psychiatric literature of the time. These elements included the 
major distinction between insanity for which the predisposition/stress 
model was invoked·-and mental deficiency, characterised as incompleted 
cerebral development (26). The predisposition/stress model clearly 
had the characteristic of apparently endless extension (27) -
"Neurasthenia and insanity are very closely related diseases. In 
each of them, as exciting factors, we find such conditions as the 
stress and strain of modern life, (Cf. footnote 27) shock, grief, 
infections and intoxi:cations like influenza and alcohol ••• There is, 
in fact, no cause capable of determining the one which may not act 
as the excitant of the other. The predisposing cause is identical. 
In each disease there is diminished physiological margin - a weakness 
- of the central nervous system. In some instances this weakness may 
be acquired, but in most cases, both of neurasthenia and insanity, as 
we are now beginning to recognise, it is inherited. In short, we may 
say that sufferers from both these conditions are born under the same 
unlucky star" (28). 
As already indicated on the mental deficiency side proper 'incomplete 
cerebral development' seems to have satisfied everyone though many of 
those professionally concerned in the area must have been aware that, 
"comparatively few feeble-minded children belong to the distinct 
types ••• It is also true that physiologists have noticed certain 
peculiarities in the structure of the brain and cortical nerve cells 
or mentally defectives (sic); but this, again, cannot help us for 
our purpose, for we cannot open the living child's brain to see what 
is the matter with it, and even if we could, I doubt whether it could 
help us very much" (29). 
Nevertheless while the evidence indicates considerable support for 
the Mott/Tredgold view thefe was no shortage of sceptics. It was 
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possible to question the data of the eugenic enthusiasts. Sir James 
Crichton-Browne reported asking a specialist doctor to keep records 
of mental defect among his affluent patients and out of 12 cases, "In 
only four of these cases was there any trace of hereditary taint, and 
in no case was that in the direct line of descent" (30). Indeed this 
is not an isolated case. In the context of prisons for example the 
most divergent estimates prevailed. One writer, in contrast to the 
rather wilder estimates of the eugenists, reported that "The 
percentage of defectives in prison has been very variously estimated. 
Dr. Quinton, late of Holloway Prison a man of great experience makes 
it as low as 4% The modest estimates invariably come from those 
whose duties bring them into daily contact with prisoners" (31). 
Aside from the data the eugenists modes of reasoning could also be 
questioned - "As far as feeble-mindedness is in question, unless the 
relationship to it, in heredity of insanity, epilepsy, hysteria, 
neurosthenia, and even gross cerebral lesions were admitted, the case 
for inheritance would be a weak one" (32). As we have seen the 
equation of different forms of mental malfunctioning and the 
assumption of hereditary factors were complementary parts of a single 
theoretical structure. Both parts could be questioned. The analysis 
of 'marked heredity' was fraught with difficulties as some observers 
were well aware - "O"thers considered all cases of mental defec t as 
'hereditary' when there was any history of insanity as 'nervous 
disorder' of almost any kind among the more or less immediate 
ancestors" (33). 
Having examined the views of those eugenists professionally concerned 
with the problem of feeble-mindedness in the context of medical 
opinion generally it now remains to examine the content of the more 
popular eugenic literature of the time to provide a more balanced 
picture of the eugenic case. The most characterist\c image of this 
literature was the "stream of degeneracy" and these images portrayed 
in a frightening but effective way the notion of social prOblems with 
virtually unstoppable, because biological, causes - "Nothing is more 
wasteful than this army of degenerates who, when they are not living 
at the cost of the tax payer in work-homes or prisons, are wandering 
at large, idling, pilfering, injuring property and polluting the 
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stream of national health by throwing into it human rubbish in the 
shape of lunatics, idiots and criminals" (34). That mental defect 
was hereditary almost went without saying and the most widely used 
means of demonstration were the pedigree (35) and references to 
general medical experience - "where both parents are known to be 
feeble-minded, there is no record of their having given birth to a 
normal child" (36). 
Of course this was not unreasonable given, as Saleeby pointed out, 
"that the whole tr~d of modern research has been to accentuate the 
importance, if not indeed the indispensableness, of the inherent or 
inherited factor in the production of insanity" (37). The notion of 
the interchangeability of mental states was, of course, drawn from 
existing research but the implications were often stretched to the 
limit. Thus the Whethams, in the context of Lombroso's theories of 
crime, could write, "Almost all forms of chronic constitutional 
disease, especially those of a nervous character, may give rise to 
criminality in the descendants" (38). Eugenic writers treated 
insanity, feeble-mindedness and epilepsy in the same chapter of their 
books since they were seen more or less of the same order. Schuster's 
chapter (39) illustrates almost all the main features of the 
eugenic discussion. Insanity was a case of a general weakness of 
mental stability which gave certain people a predisposition to it 
during or as an effect of disturbing periods of life. A particularly 
difficult problem for eugenists here was recurrent insanity during 
certain periods of which, of course, the person appeared normal. 
The hereditary taint was there-- "There is one case on record in 
which such a man has begotten six more of the same kind" (40) - but 
given the periods of normality it was hard to justify any eugenic 
action (41). Mental deficiency, on the other hand, being a case of 
incomplete cerebral development, was open to more rigorous action. 
The stream of degeneracy was not simply alarming in itself but because 
if the eugenic explanation were correct it would continuously increase. 
The eugenists often presented their arguments as inferences from 
natural selection. The model of natural selection was more or less 
an aggregation of empirical factors that had, or could be assumed to 
have, lowered death rates among the feeble-minded. On this 
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principle there rested a network of arguments which explained the 
effects of humanitarianism and medicine while also drawing on both 
official and unofficial statistics. For the eugenist-in-the-street 
large numbers of feeble-minded persons existed because of the 
'relaxation' of natural selectJ.·on. Th ese persons, it was generally 
agreed, were both incapable of exercising restraint in their sexual 
functions and liable to be exploited in such a direction by the 
unscrupulous and evil-minded. The offspring of such pernicious 
unions in turn benefited from the relaxation of natural selection 
which, concretely, meant that they could turn for aid to a variety of 
public and private charitable institutions. Mrs. Hawkes voiced this 
theory with her usual forthrightness - "Then carne our charitable 
institutions and 'our modern human sympathy' aiding and abetting the 
feeble-minded and criminals by finding them homes (the workhouse, 
'homes', colonies, asylums, gaols etc), instead of, as at one time 
passively ridding the country of degenerates by allowing them to die 
because they could not fight the competitive battle of life, and 
actively ridding it of criminals by extensive capital punishments" (42). 
As was often the case the chronology and adminstrative facts were 
somewhat vague. The primary factor in this relaxation of natural 
selection was clearly humanitarianism. Reference was sometimes made 
to earlier historical practices in this area or the practices of 
primitive races and these were always assumed rather drastic - "In 
primitive states of society it appears to have been an almost 
universal practice to kill all children who were delicate or deformed" 
(43). Even without this model of natural selection the fact that the 
feeble-minded were reproductively prolific was also barely open to 
doubt (44). Everyone had their favourite story of the feeble-minded 
woman who had been to a workhouse infirmary n times to give birth (45). 
Clearly the villain of the piece here was modern medicine and its 
increasing availability. But like humanitarianism medicine could not 
be condemned; rather its effects had to be compensatedfor (46). Thus 
it was the extent of feeble-mindedness and its reproductive excess, 
which made the situation so urgent. 
There is one other aspect of the eugenic indictment, that, though it 
was a corollary of the preceding, deserves special mention. The 
.. 
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eugenists clearly believed (rightly) that feeble-mindedness was a 
good campaign issue for them and this explains certain features of 
their arguments. There was an mph· h e as~s on t e enormous benefits that 
would accrue from disposing of feeble-mindedness - obviously since 
feeble-mindedness was, if not the main, at least a major cause of 
most of the problems. There were three stages in this argument _ 
firstly a general conviction that since it was an hereditary 
phenomenon, once the feeble-minded ceased to reproduce the actual 
problem would rapidly disappear. "It is confidently asserted that 
feeble-mindedness could be practically stamped out in two generations 
if the State rigorously determined to check the perennial flow of 
the unfit into our national life" (47) or, as Saleeby put it, "The 
problem (of feeble-mindedness) would be at once reduced to 
negligible proportions if all cases of feeble-mindedness were dealt 
with as they should be" (48). 
As a result of this many other problems would disappear or be 
substantially reduced. We would be "able to abolish the majority of 
our asylums, gaols and workhouses, to reduce considerably the number 
of our judges and the paraphernalia of justice, and to reduce and 
simplify our charities" (49). It all seemed most likely to catch the 
eye of the careful calculating bourgeois and though cost was 
sometimes thought to be rather profane in this context it was a major 
selling point - "In such a supremely important question cost should, 
perhaps, not be considered, but even the costs would be covered in 
the next generation by the less provision required for workhouses, 
hospitals, asylums and prisons ••• " (50). As Major Darwin put it to 
the members of the Junior Constitutional Club, "everyone of us in 
this room is constantly, year in and year out, paying the debts of 
the wastrel" (51). Thus the eugenic case should be argued as both 
convincing and as offering an urgent and practical reform - indeed 
the only immediately practicable eugenic policy that could be 
legislated for (52). All eugenists almost without exception agreed 
that it was a fully justifiable step. 
Clearly it would be reasonable to conclude that this eugenic agitation 
h . ° tOde of demands for and propaganda had an impact on t e rlslng l 
action to deal with the feeble-minded in the period up to the First 
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World War. How far was this the case? It is clear that prominent 
representatives of the mainstream agitatl.°on h d °d bl a consl. era e sympathy 
for the eugenic position (53). A glance at their writings shows that 
they inclined to place in the forefront of their arguments the 
hereditary nature of mental defect, the explanatory role of natural 
selection and the necessity for powers of compulsory detention of 
the feeble-minded. Indeed the distinction between these writers and 
those placed under the heading of the popular eugenists may seem a 
very fine, even indistinguishable, one. 
Yet it is important to be aware of the context of this agitation. 
Concern about the feeble-minded seems to have come in the wake of 
national education which brought to light this group and thus 
attracted the interest of the social reform organisations of the day 
(54). The mainstream agitation thus had a longer history and a 
'broader basis than the eugenic denunciation of the feeble-minded. 
This longer history included some scepticism as to the question of 
heredity. As the COS report put it, " ••• though feeble-mindedness is 
largely due to heredity, in a great number of cases it makes its 
appearance independently of known hereditary taint ••• We may conclude 
then that the extent of the mischief due to this cause has been 
somewhat exxagerated" (55). Differences of opinion can be clearly 
seen in the evidence offered to the Royal Commission on the Feeble-
Minded by the various reform organisations. The representatives of 
Dr. Barnado's Homes, the Salvation Army and the Metropolitan 
Association for Befriending Young Servants all evinced considerable 
caution on the question of heredity and the notion of natural 
selection seems hardly to have arisen. 
While the use of eugenic themes undoubtedly increases in the years 
up to the Great War it might be suggested here that this use was in 
part, indeed in large part, rhetorical (56). For the Dendys md the 
Pinsents eugenics provided a convenient set of phrases to articulate 
already established objectives. The conclusion of this chapter is 
that the Eugenists made a greater impact in the area of feeble-
mindedness than in other areas of social policy not as great, perhaps, 
as some have imagined but certainly there was sufficient interest and 
agreement to act as a launching pad for a legislative campaign. The 
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issue of feeble-mindedness fitted the eugenic concepts better, it 
aroused no hostile interests, it promised to save expenditure and 
reduce immorality. It had all the characteristics of being a great 
opening battle for the young Eugenics Movement which if successful, 
would lead on to greater things. 
(179) 
Chapter VII - FOOTNOTES 
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P.S. King) 
2. An examination of the first six volumes of the Eugenics Review 
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34. C.T. Ewart - Parenthood (Empire Review XIX (1910) 314-320) p.3l4 
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Eugenics and the future progress of Man (Eugenics Review III 
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report of F.W. Mott's remarks at NCPD mental deficiency section 
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enter the workhouse time after ti~~~with illegitimate children 
is on the increase". Cf. Vanoc in the Referee 12/1/08 
46. Eugenists were always careful to insist that they in no sense 
implied that the doctor should ignore his primary duty to cure 
the sick - yet this insistence sometimes had a plaintive ring to 
it. Cf. "Medical men must, no doubt, strive to keep the unfit , 
alive; but are they not therefore doubly bound to join us in our 
effects to diminish the multiplication of all the unquestionably 
degenerate types?" (L. Darwin - Presidential Address to the EES 
June 1913) p.7 
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48. Saleeby op.cit. p.174 
49. Mrs. Hawkes op.cit. p.lO 
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H P Ko b M- Dendy - The Feeble-minded and Crime (Lancet A. •• lr y. _ 
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24/5/02); The Feeble-minded (Economic Review XIII (1903) 257-
279; evidence to the RCFM vol.1 39-64; Feeb1e-mindedness, 
Destitution and Crime (NCPD 1911 48-53); E. Pinsent - On the 
permanent care of the feeble-minded (Lancet 21/12/03); The 
importance of the Formation of After-care Committees wherever 
special schools exist (COR XXI (1907) 24-30); Social Responsibility 
and Heredity (National Review Nov 1910) A.W. Kirby - A plea for 
the Mentally Defective (COR XXI (1907) 120-31); The Feeble-
minded and Voluntary Effort Eugenics Review I (1909/10); a speech 
at a Penal Reform League reported Penal Reform League Monthly 
Record (IV (1912) 3-4) 
54. Cf. The Feeble-minded Child and Adult (Swan Sonnenschein & Co. 
1895) (a report of the Charity Organisation Society) 
55. op.cit. p.136 
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-
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Chapter VIII - EUGENICS AND FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS PART II 
The last chapter has shown that there was considerable support for 
some kind of legislation to deal with the feeble-minded and that 
much of this support had been couched in at least eugenic sounding 
terms. Doubtless this inclined the Society to take the possibility 
of eugenic legislation in this area much more seriously than in the 
cases so far examined and to make considerable efforts to achieve 
such legislation. The nature and the result of th~se efforts are 
discussed in this chapter. But to approach this one detour is 
necessary. The eugenists had established to their own and many other 
people's satisfaction that the problem of feeble-mindedness should 
be dealt with eugenically. The question of the appropriate eugenic 
solution to the problem is an interesting example of the difficulties 
the eugenists faced. This question has already arisen generally and 
in specific contexts but here it requires a more extended treatment. 
Two clarifications are necessary: firstly, in the types who were to 
be dealt with and secondly the methods which might be used. The 
eugenic theories of feeble-mindedness could produce a number of 
groups since while in principle behaviours were to be reduced to the 
hereditary level, in practice this was not always possible - not all 
criminals or prostitutes were feeble-minded for example. Thus there 
might be hereditary variation and behavioural variation producing 
the following situation:-
Behavioural Defects 
Present Absent 
Germ-plasm defects Present 1 2 
Absent 3 NORMALS 
Such criteria would certainly produce a ·favourite· group of 
defectives, characterised by behavioural abnormalities which could 
be assumed to be rooted in hereditary abnormalities. The case of the 
other two groups was slightly more complicated. Group 2 had morbid 
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heredities but were behaviourally normal. G 3 
roup would be those 
showing behavioural defects but with no apparent hereditary 
abnormalities. No problems attached to Gr8Up 1 but Group 2 had both 
a eugenic and a legislative difficulty. Stocks with bad heredities 
were likely, as we have seen, to drag down good stocks. On such 
grounds some eugenists wDuld like to have forbidden procreation. 
A.R. Douglas for example argued that they were the real problem and 
that "where imbeciles have appeared in sibship, marriage to be 
refused to all other members of that sibship" (1). Other eugenists 
were less rigid. The legislative problem with this group would be 
that they could not be recognised through a social problem grid. 
Even those with hereditary defects (as opposed to morbid heredity) 
would be very difficult to deal with on eugenic grounds alone, in 
the absence of any legally definable abnormalities. Lastly there is 
no direct reason why a eugenic argument should be interested in 
Group 3 at all since their behavioural abnormalities, however 
regrettable, had no hereditary basis and therefore no eugenic 
significance. 
The second necessary clarification lies in the appropriate methods 
and here a comparison of the logic with the reality may prove 
helpful. In any eugenic case there are clearly four methods of 
controlling the unfit, namely, removal of the organism; removal of 
the organism's reproductive capacity; prevention of the functioning 
of the organism1s reproductive capacity by (a) social means (b) 
individual means: removal of the organism's offspring. Clearly again 
logically in relation to the groups I have separated out above some 
of these methods might be more appropriate than others on eugenic 
grounds. So for example a person likely to produce abnormal 
offspring but otherwise capable of sustaining a normal existence 
would not usefully be segregated whereas a person incapable of 
operating a method of individual birth control might well be 
usefully sterilised. 
In practice of course the debates of the time bear very little 
resemblance to the network of logical choices I have outlined. Such 
debates did not take place in logic but in a definite universe of 
moral and legal discourse solidly anchored in a stable society. The 
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logic therefore had to give way at points to other elements. The 
eugenists were aware that they were located on extremely sensitive 
ideological terrain. The removal of the organism was clearly 
inconceivable on ideological grounds including notions of the 
sanctity of life and freedom of the citizen (2). Usually either of 
these can be invaded only on grounds of criminal behaviour with a 
built-in category of intent. Having bad hereditary qualities 
could not be brought within this set of categories. 
More practically however the other· logical possibilities all involved 
some consideration of reproduction and therefore sexuality and this 
alone made the eugenists vulnerable. Whatever their personal 
predilections the logic of their positions forced them to probe areas 
of behaviour which for years if not centuries, had been under the 
ban of repressive ideologies. Sir James Barr argued quite rightly 
that one of the obstacles facing eugenists was that "perhaps the 
majority of people were apt to taboo sexual matters" (3). And yet 
while the eugenists were in some ways in the vanguard such incidents 
as the following do not seem untypical of the times - "Galton agreed 
to he~p, but then withdrew his offer upon receiving a complaint 
from Miss Elderton who had attended a meeting chaired by Dr. 
Slaughter in which sexual problems were discussed. Matters became 
worse in March 1908 when Slaughter was convicted of indecent as~~t, 
a conviction that was however, quashed on appeal" (4). 
Certainly this atmosphere seems to have provided a total obstacle to 
any discussion of birth control as a means of securing eugenic ends 
(5). Undoubtedly many of the eugenists shared the c9yness and reserve 
of their times (6) which brought attacks from their more radical 
critics. Stella Browne, for example, complained that the Eugenics 
Society had, "persistently refused to give any help towards 
extending the knowledge of contraceptives to the exploited classes" 
(7). I am not happy with this as an explanation (8) but I can only 
report the fact that there is almost no discussion of birth control 
as a eugenic measure before the first world war. 
Given these various ideological constraints the options were reduced 
to two, in the jargon of the time, sterilisation or segregation. 
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Even this debate seems to have been a muted one carried on primarily 
in medical circles to which I now refer. There is no doubt that 
sterilisation proposals did arise both in medical and wider debate 
from time to time, perhaps their most notorious proponent being Dr. 
Rentoul, already referred to in chapter four. Although there was 
some discussion as to possible side-effects of the sterilisation 
operation the overwhelming objections as perceived by both doctors 
and laymen were moral and political. There were no doubts about its 
feasibility in practice (9). The proposals do not appear to have 
been taken seriously at any time by legislators though there is one 
reference in the literature to a debate at an LCC meeging on 
reception of its Asylums Committee report which appeared to have a 
consensus in favour of sterilisation (10). I think it is reasonable 
to conclude that the almost universal assumption behind such 
discussion is summarised by Flinders Petrie's comment, "Much more 
drastic treatment of the unfit has been advocated, as by Dr. Rentoul. 
In a future period of civilisation a logical course of treatment 
might have a chance of adoption, but in our age any serious change 
of the habits of thought and action will not be tolerated, unless 
brought about very gradually under small influences" (11). This 
certainly remained the position until after the first World War. In 
the period before the war this effectively left segregation as the 
only practicable option. 
The immediate background to the legislative battles of the period 
1910-1912 was of course the Royal Commission on the Care and Control 
of the Feeble-minded (12). The Commission laboured long and hard 
and its voluminous report and findings finally appeared in July 1908. 
Itself a summary of the state of the debate on the subject the 
Commission stimulated further argument which intensified in the 
period following the government's decision to take legislative action. 
The Commission's deliberations may be separated into three parts, 
namely, an analysis of the existing state of affairs and a report 
recommending various changes, an exhaustive survey of the state of 
opinion amongst those interested in the field of mental illness, and 
an attempt to arrive at reliable figures for the numbers of the 
mentally deficient in the country. 
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Although these questions had been discussed for many years the 
Commission's report appears to have given a considerable boost to 
demands for state action. According to K. Jones (13) by the end of 
1912 the Home Office had received 800 resolutions to that effect from 
public bodies. The government may also have felt pressured by the 
two private members bills introduced into the Commons in the 1912 
session. An analysis of the legislative campaign will give some 
idea of the degree to which the eugenics movement was constrained to 
make ideological concessions and the degree to which it exercised 
some influence on the legislation that finally appeared on the 
statute book. 
Over the period 1910-1912 the House of Commons dealt with three 
quite different bills on the general subject of feeble-mindedness 
(14). Only one of these was directly inspired by the Eugenics 
Education Society. An examination of this bill will provide a 
preliminary indication of the eugenists' legislative ambitions in 
relation to the feeble-minded. On the fifth of December 1911 Mr. W. 
Rea M.P. arranged a meeting for MPs with a joint delegation from 
the Eugenics Education Society and the National Association for the 
Welfare of the Feeble-minded, the major representatives for the 
eugenists being Tredgold and Langdon-Down. The meeting led shortly 
afterwards to the presentation in the Commons of a private member's 
bill by Mr. G. Stewart. What then did this measure, directly 
inspired by the eugenists, contain? 
In fact the bill had few, if any, dramatic proposals, Clause 8 
specified that a feeble-minded person could be placed in a registered 
home by order of a J.P. or a stipendiary magistrate provided (a) the 
feeble-minded person was in need of protection, (b) was a source of 
injury to himself and others, and (c) two medical practitioners 
would give such a diagnosis. This clause also allowed that 
relieving officers might apply for an order for persons "found 
wandering in that parish". Clause 10 laid down that detention of a 
feeble-minded person could not continue beyond eighteen months 
without the written consent of the Commissioners in Lunacy. Clause 
13 made it possible for those in charge of any feeble-minded 
institution to discharge any feeble-minded person providing the 
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Commissioners were notified. Clause 15 required regular annual 
inspection by the Commissioners or their agents of every detained 
feeble-minded person. Clause 18 guaranteed that representatives of 
the feeble-minded might retain supervision of them if they could 
convince the Commissioners they could provide adequate care, 
protection and control. 
It must be pointed out of course that while the bill contained no 
dramatic proposals it was regarded as a minimalist measure, "to 
secure control over those persons whose condition or surroundings 
are such that their liberty is a source of injury and misery to 
themselves or a menace to the welfare of the community" (15). At the 
meeting with the MPs "it was freely admitted that the bill was only 
the minimum demand and in no way pretended to deal with the problem 
completely, but sought to confer the necessary powers on existing 
authorities pending the adoption of the largermeasure" (16). And it 
is also the case that in his introductory speech Stewart frequently 
indulged in eugenic rhetoric of the cruder kind e.g. "In fact to put 
it briefly, the object of this bill is to regularise the lives, and, 
if possible, to prevent the increasing propagation of half-witted 
people" (17). Other supporters of the bill spoke in similar terms. 
Nevertheless it is worth emphasising that the bill restricted itself 
to an entirely social problem grid, that it was hedged about with 
the usual qualifications and that it allowed approved institutions to 
discharge their feeble-minded inmates. Indeed after the bill had 
gone through committee its somewhat limited provisions were even 
further restricted e.g. in Clause 10 the period of detention was 
reduced from eighteen months to one year and further instalments of 
detention were of one year only requiring the written consent of the 
Commissioners. 
If the Stewart bill was tactical then it had the desired effect 
insofar as just before its second reading the government introduced 
its own bill. This measure aroused a tremendous volume of discussion 
in which a central issue was the degree of influence of eugenics 
theories. As a preliminary it is necessary to single out those 
clauses in the government bill with a specifically eugenic interest 
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for it is these that aroused the greatest controversy. There were 
two clauses in the bill which by any standards, legal, historical or 
administrative, were quite startling (18). These particular clauses 
do not appear to have had anything other than a purely eugenic 
intention and they are certainly the clearest formulation of real 
eugenics practices to find expression in an English bill. The rest 
of the bill could be, and was, justified by reference to the 
statement that the defectives had to be behaviourally abnormal as 
well as being mentally abnormal. No such qualification was made in 
Clause 17 (le). And the intention of Clause 50 was plainly to 
prevent intermarriage and therefore legitimate procreation solely on 
the g~~ands of the defective nature of one of the partners. It is 
clear then that the government's bill had considerably more eugenic 
content than the eugenists themselves had asked for in their own 
bill (19). 
This did not prevent, then as now (20), the eugenists being credited 
with an enormous amount of influence in the controversy surrounding 
the bill. The controversy may be grouped under four headings. 
Firstly, questions of administration and finance; secondly questions 
of the liberty of the subject; thirdly the question of the 
appropriateness and adequacy of the categories proposed; and fourthly 
the degree to which the legislation embodied unproven theories; I will 
deal only with the last three of these. Critics of the bill 
regarded at least the last three groups of these issues as 
inextricably interconnected though in their public statements they 
tended to lead the criticism from the angle of the liberty of the 
subject. The government's case was not helped here by some sloppy 
drafting and the quite extraordinary Clause 17 (If) giving the Home 
Secretary very wide-ranging powers. This was a godsend to the 
opponents of the bill. As Wedgewood put it, "The Secretary of State 
may at any moment by a stroke of the pen invent a new crime which 
will deprive the individual of all his rights of citizenship and 
send him to prison for life" (21). 
There were many other civil liberties issues in the bill but two 
perhaps are worth highlighting. Clause 12 of the bill required 
" . f d f to " local authorities among other things to keep reg~sters 0 e ec lves • 
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This was condemned by Wedgewood as a 'black list' giving excessive 
powers to the authorities. liThe p f h dO 
rocess 0 an ~ng over to a county 
committee all these enorrn f 
ous powers 0 black-listing people is really 
the power of selecting from amongst those black-listed people the 
victims who are to be locked up ••• " (22). A second issue which 
many found disturbing was the potential class bias built into the 
bill. This argument tended to be a little hysterical at times (23) 
but there was a serious point to it. As Wedgewood put it, "All these 
bills are meant for the very poor. Clause 19 is the saving clause 
of the rich. The rich are always omitted from measures of this sort. 
Defectives liable to be dealt with under this Act may be 'placed under 
guardianship'. Where there is sufficient money guardianship is 
alright. It is only the people who have no relations to find the 
money that are to be sent to prison" (24). In fact as other 
commentators pointed out it was rather Clause 21 that was the saving 
grace of the rich i.e. "A petition under this act shall, if 
application is made for the purpose before the hearing of the petition 
by or on behalf of the person to whom the petition relates, in 
manner provided by rules of the Supreme Court, be removed to the 
High Court and heard and determined by that court in accordance with 
such rUles". The class bias then lay in the day-to-day workings of 
the legal system since lito make use of a safeguard of that 
description is beyond the financial resources of the ordinary 
working-man" (25). 
It was a point that the more radical critics of the bill constantly 
made and it clearly worried the bill's supporters who seem to have 
read it as an accusation that they argued that only the poor 
produced defective children. Miss Dendy for example replied to a 
series of articles by M.D. Eder (26) with a vigorous assertion that 
feeble-mindedness was equally distributed amongst rich and poor. 
But this was not really the point. A more sophisticated counter 
attack would have been along the lines that Clause 20 of the bill 
(which covered all the appropriate procedures) broadly speaking 
followed the procedures laid down in the Lunacy Act of l890.which 
had not been accused of class bias or at least making the accusation 
of class bias look less convincing. Nevertheless the contexts were 
somewhat different. Both the medical and lay public were much more 
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clear about whay they meant by lunacy than what they meant by 
feeble-mindedness. 
The issue of class bias drifted imperceptibly over onto a second set 
of issues namely, the definitions to be used and the power they gave 
to the relevant experts. It was widely argued that, in the words of 
one informed commentator, "It 1." S a matter f or the serious consideration 
of the public whether the government bill does not contain too much 
of the expert and too much of the bureaucratic to be acceptable" (27). 
The general point was well-expressed, if somewhat provocatively, by 
Wedgewood, "If a spec1."al1."st, d a octor or a eugenist said that so-
and-so is a danger to society and ought to be imprisoned, it is not 
possible for the ordinary layman to criticise the grounds on which 
he has based his dictum of imprisonment" (28). Another outspoken 
critic of the bill, M.D. Eder, put the same point in historical 
perspective; "Today the experts would send a poor man to prison for 
a lifetime because they don't like his family, just as, when Gall was 
in fashion, they would have done so (had they had the power) because 
they didn't like his bumps, or, when Lombroso. was the fashion, 
because they didn't like the shape of his face" (29). This power of 
the experts derived of course from the kinds of definitions of 
feeble-mindedness that were proposed. The critics regarded the 
excessive power of doctors and other relevant functionaries as an 
effect of excessively wide definitions. As Wedgewood put it, "If 
there is anyone who ought to be precluded under this act it ought to 
be the doctors, particularly those who have their own theories and 
fancies as to many of these matters" (30). 
Finally the attitudes of doctors linked up with the third element of 
the critics indictment of the bill, namely the argument that it was 
based on unfounded theories. The most determined opponents of the 
bill saw in its vagueness, its arbitrariness, and its excessive 
bureaucratic power the hand of eugenics, if not a eugenic conspiracy. 
t 1., n the House - "I submi t Wedgewood's more dramatic pronouncemen s 
our object in a democratic country is not first and foremost to 
breed the working classes asthough they were cattle" (31) - found 
d h " support from the Manchester Guardian which commente t at, very 
unfortunately the bill has become associated in people's minds with 
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the theories of the eugenics society, which however interesting, 
are as yet quite unworthy to be regarded as science. Human 
liberty is too precious a thing to be made a subject of experimental 
legislation on half-baked scientific theories" (32). And indeed it 
was a widely repeated criticism that the purpose of the bill was 
"to enable the eugenics society to make experiment in some of its 
pet theories" (33). 
It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that in its first bill the 
government had been under a clear and unequivocal eugenic influence. 
The most obvious objective index of this were that two clauses of 
the bill were quite without legal precedent and these two had the 
clearest pure eugenic intentions. However this bill never became 
law. The reactions of the bill's supporters, the changes that were 
made in committee and the contents of the second bill which was 
introduced in 1913, when assessed, provide a truer measure of the 
real extent of eugenic influence. 
It was clear from the beginning that those who were generally 
sympathetic to the bill, both inside and outside the House, had 
serious reservations about its precise form. This was especially 
the case with the definitions provided in Clause 17 of the bill, 
phrases that were so vague and open to such a wide degree of 
interpretation that even the friends of the bill could scarcely 
restrain their contempt and derision. As Mr. Hume Williams put it, 
I'The idea that you are to be treated as a defective because you are 
incapable of competing on equal terms with your normal fellows is 
purely comic" (34). Mr. A. Lyttelton (in general sympathetic to the 
bill), agreed that, "Anyone who looks at Clause 17, which is one of 
the central features of the bill, will see there an attempt to 
define what feeble-mindedness is, and everyone ••• must think it is 
contrary to the most ordinary common sense" (35). Such supporters 
of the bill made it very clear that they would seek major 
alterations in committee. The standing committee only managed to 
deal with seven clauses of the bill (36) but they were some of the 
most crucial. With reference to the Horne Secretary's powers these 
were circumscribed by the requirement on him to lay regulations 
before acting. In Clause 12 the government on its own initiative 
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deleted the register of defectives sub-clause and while this might 
seem unimportant given the other requirements on local authorities 
to "ascertain what persons within their area are defectives" it 
seems reasonable to suppose that this reduced the potential for 
black-lists that was contained in the first draft of the bill. 
In the all-important Clause 17 which took up the largest part of the 
committee's time the directly eugenic Clause 17 (e) disappeared 
completely though part of the idea was retained in a new clause i.e. 
a new group that were now subject to be dealt with were those "who 
are defectives and who are in receipt of poor relief at the time of 
giving birth to an illegitimate child or whcf\pregnant of such child ll • 
There were changes in the definition of feeble-mindedness to make it 
look less ridiculous. In the amended version it now read, II persons 
in whose case there exists from birth or from an early age mental 
defectiveness not amounting to imbecility, yet so pronounced that 
they require care, supervision and control for their own protection 
or for the protection of others; or, in the case of children, are 
incapable of receiving proper benefit from the instruction in 
ordinary schools". 
These concessions found their way into the draft of the second 
government bill introduced to Parliament in March 1913. Both front 
and back bench spokesmen for the bill were eager to absolve it from 
any association with eugenics and in large measure they were right. 
The Home Secretary referred to the issue in his opening speech. "We 
have also omitted any reference to what might be regarded as the 
eugenic idea which my honourable friend behind me believes underlies 
the whole promotion of this bill. I can assure him that as the 
measure now stands, it exists for the protection of individual 
sufferers" (37). McKenna was followed by others making the same 
point. Mr. Leslie Scott, a prominent supporter of the bill argued 
that, "The bill in its present form does not represent any experiment 
in eugenics. It contains no single proposition which is, in any 
sense, an experiment in the new discoveries of eugenic scientists" (38). 
On the civil liberties issues the opponents of the bill made some 
All attempts to give the Home Secretary residual further gains. 
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powers (either by order or by regulations) were dropped;. As 
McKenna explained, "No power was given either to the existing 
holder of the Home Office or any future holder of the office to 
extend the operations of the bill except by introducing a new Act of 
Parliament" (39). In addition no attempt was made to reintroduce in 
any direct form the register of defectives idea or what Wedgewood 
called the black-list. Wedgewood continued to argue that the 
definition proposed in the bill gave unreasonable power to doctors 
and were ultimately based on eugenic inspiration. He made strenuous 
efforts, without success, to remove the clause that allowed the 
inclusion of women in receipt of poor relief who had or were going 
to give birth to an illegitimate child. 
For the rest Wedgewood concentrated his fire on the definitions 
clause, particularly the phrase that they "require care, supervision 
and control for their own protection or the protection of others". 
The argument here was that, "merely under the words 'for the 
protection of others' you might bring in all the ideas of the 
Eugeni@ School"(40). Battle was joined when Wedgewood tried to 
introduce an amendment to clarify 'for the protection of others' and 
this battle does seem on the face of it to be evidence of continuing 
eugenic influence. Wedgewood pointed out that, "the ordinary way 
to interpret 'protection of others' is to say that it is protection 
against absolute physical violence" (41). Not only did McKenna 
entirely evade this point he refused to clarify exactly what the 
phrase in the bill meant. 
Nevertheless having failed in his second major frontal, assault on 
the bill Wedgewood fought a brilliant rearguard action inserting small 
amendments en route whose effect was to narrow the interpretation of 
the bill to the interests of defective persons rather than any wider 
social goals. In Clause 11 (3) of the bill for example Wedgewood 
moved to insert after the words 'in the interests of the defective' 
the word 'alone' with the intention of focussing the bill on the 
As he put 1· t, "I move these words, mentally deficient themselves. 
and hope they will be accepted by the honourable Member for St. 
Pancras, because I am sure the public understand that we are moving 
in the interest of the defective, and not in the interest of eugenics 
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the better it will be" (42). Though the word alone was later 
replaced by the word himself the effect appears to be the same. 
Similarly in the next section of this clause Wedgewood managed to 
insert after the phrase 'under guardianship' the phrase 'in his own 
interest' (43). 
In the Lords the roles of McKenna and Wedgewood were taken by Haldane 
and the Marquess of Salisbury but the issues were the same, even if 
dealt with in a more gentlemanly manner. On certain central struts 
of the bill Haldane, like McKenna, stood firm e.g. in the use of the 
words 'protection of others' already referred to (44). But Salisbury 
managed to force concessions on the issue of an independent medical 
review of any inmate of an institution for the mentally defective (45). 
Salisbury also secured the insertion of an entirely new clause in 
the bill (Clause 18) which gave rather clearer rights to relatives 
and guardians of defectives with reference to visiting them while 
they were in insbitutions. When the bill returned to the Commons 
Wedgewood quite rightly commented, "I gladly recognise that nearly all 
the amendments we are now considering which have been made in the 
House of Lords are advances towards individual liberty, and therefore 
safeguards which we owe to Lord Salisbury's amendments in the other 
place" (46). 
It has been shown that while the campaign for legislation on mental 
deficiency drew on certain eugenic theories; while the Eugenics 
Education Society played a prominent part in the agitation; and 
while the government's first bill contained unambi5uously eugenic 
clauses the Act that finally found its way onto the statute book 
contained little, if any, eugenic influence. How can these 
developments be explained? A full explanation would doubtless 
require further more specifically focussed research but the material 
examined in this chapter prompts the following reasonably plausible 
hypothesis. 
Shortly after the bill had finally been passed one of its most 
active supporters (and a member of the Royal Commission) made the 
"In V1· ew of the s ta temen ts which have been following comment: 
repeatedly made by opponents of the bill that the measure owes its 
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origin to a band of idealists whose sole object is to improve the 
breed of man, and who for this purpose care not what suffering they 
impose upon the living souls whose physical defects they hope to 
banish from the race, I thJ.·nk J.°t well t 0 d o remJ.n my readers that the 
movement on behalf of the feeble-minded originated with much more 
humble and much more practical persons" (47). This was indeed the 
case. The call for legislation derived its legitimacy from certain 
sections of the medical profession and from the demands of 
administrators, either public or voluntary, who were actively involved 
in the handling of the mentally deficient section of the population 
(via prisons, schools, privately funded 'colonies' etc.). 
Two organisations that may be regarded as representatives of these 
forces in the debate on legislation were the Medico-Psychological 
Association and the National Association for the Feeble-minded. Both 
appear to have been heavily involved in the legislative campaign, 
almost to the limits of their resources. The NAFM report for 1912 
records that the parliamentary campaign "entailed unremitting effort 
both on the part of the committees concerned and of the staff" and 
that, "many thousands of letters and circulars were despatched, 
appealing to MPs and to persons interested, to use their influence 
in order to place the measure before the country" (48). The National 
Association closely coordinated its effort with that of the Medico-
Psychological Association which discussed the bills frequently at its 
meetings and reported developments in its Journal of Mental Science. 
It is not being suggested here that these organisations did not 
include people who were sympathetic to the eugenic cause. Such is 
clearly the case. What will be argued here is that the primary 
objective of these organisations was to extend the boundaries of the 
Welfare State and more particularly their own power within it. While 
they were not averse to drawing on eugenic propaganda to support their 
case they certainly had no wish to jeopardise their primary project 
should such association prove to be counter productive. 
The leading member of the Medico-Psychological Association most 
closely associated with helping the bill was Dr. Theo B. Hyslop who 
in an address to the Association argued that, "It seems almost 
unnecessary for us to endorse the findings of the Royal Commission, 
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and yet it would appear advisable to add our testimony to it in 
order to help various sections of the community to appreciate the 
existence of evils which are real and not merely a fanciful 
necessity based upon theories emanating from any school of eugenics. 
I venture to submit therefore that we are agreed as to the need for 
irmnediate legislation for the mentally defective" (49). This remark 
reflected the consensus of the relevant section of the medical 
profession. Undoubtedly many of these were sympathetic to eugenic 
goals. Hyslop himself was on record as favouring the idea that 
marriages should be contracted partially on grounds of biological 
fitness and in the speech already referred to he described Clause 17 
(e) of the first government bill in the following terms: "I, for my 
part, believe that it is one of the most important and farthest 
reaching of the benefits proposed and this sub-clause alone raises 
the principle of the bill to a higher plane than does any other item 
in it" (50). 
Nevertheless in the Association~s detailed deliberations on the bill 
can be found a more accurate picture of its priorities. The 
Association's special committee (set up to examine the bill) 
commented in its first report that while agreeing in principle with 
Clauses I and 2, "your committee feel that the sub-clauses are too 
vaguely worded, and that further definitions are needed, particularly 
in regard to section 1 (e) dealing with those who are to be deprived 
of the opportunity of procreating children" (51). This point was 
elaborated by Dr. Corner, a member of the Association's Parliamentary 
Committee and a consulting Physician to the National Association for 
Feeble-minded: "His sympathy was with the government in their effort 
to prevent the propagation of the unfit, but this clause (17(e» 
seemed to him to be one which would arouse considerable opposition, 
and, as stated by the National Association for the Feeble-minded, 
and also by the MPA's Special Committee it was too vague for an Act 
of Parliament, and would probably lead to much litigation" (52). 
The Association also expressed its reluctance about the black-list 
clause in the bill. It was argued that this implied an unnecessary 
social stigma. As Dr. Shuttleworth put it, "It would be iniquitous 
if by too stringent an application of the notification provisions 
of the bill useful careers should be ren("',~~\impossible" (53). 
4., ,5&, 
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By September 1912 the committee had made up its mind that Clause 17 
(Ie) should be left out entirely though they did conclude that, "it 
is felt that if the Act is thoroughly administered, the feeble-
minded who are capable of procreating children will before long be 
in safe keeping" (54). In a later report to readers of the 
Association's Journal Dr. Hayes Newington returned to the black-
listing Clause 12. He wished to see this clause deleted and 
commented, "Perhaps such a limitation would not satisfy the eugenists, 
who would probably wish that for their purposes the registration of 
the second class of defectives should be noted as well. It is much 
to be hoped for that the excellent principles of the eugenic body 
should not be imperilled by general mistrust arising from too 
vigorous application of detail" (55). 
The views of the National Association for the Feeble-minded and its 
proposed changes in the bill were very similar. In its reports and 
in a memorandum sent to the MFA and published by them the NAFM 
expressed its opposition to the keeping of registers of defectives; 
it wanted Clause l7(le) removed (but replaced by "who are in need of 
further care and control, and are a source of injury and mischief to 
themselves or others" (56» and it wanted the wide powers granted to 
the Home Secretary (in the first bill) to be restricted by the 
advice of the new Commissioners to be appointed under the Act. 
Finally the Association favoured a new clause strengthening parental 
powers to some degree: "A new clause suggested providing that no 
parent, guardian or relative (above the age of 21 years) of any 
feeble-minded person shall be deprived of the control and protection 
of such person, upon proof to the Commissioners that such care and 
control would be adequate" (57). 
I think it is reasonable to conclude from the above that the 
evidence as to eugenic influence on the making of the Mental 
Deficiency Act of 1913 is at least contradictory and needs to be 
placed in the context of other pressures for legislation on this 
submect (58). This context is perhaps one to which we have only 
recently become more sensitive both in terms of current practices and 
informs of historical explanation. We have (59) become more 
sceptical of those who claim to care for others after repeated 
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demonstrations that the caring inevitably benefits the care!~ more 
than the cared for. A more detailed assessment of the eugenics 
influence on the 1913 Act may open up more promising avenues of 
enquiry which will contribute to this reassessment of our past and 
therefore our present. 
. .... _.. ..-
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.' PART II. 
{, ' METHOD oF DEALING WITH MENTALLY DEFECTIVE PERSONS. 
If.···. 
, Persons su6jeci to be dealt Ujitn# 
, , 
PERSONS SUBJECT TO BE DEALT ,Wll'R AS BEING DEFECTIVE. 
" 1~.-(1) Save as expressly provided :by this Act, the 
fo~lowlDg per~ons, and IlO others, shall be subject to be dealt 
WIth under thLS Act, that is to say, persQns who are defectives 
and-
y 
(a) who are found wandering about., neglected, or cruelly 
treated' .. . , , 
, (b) who are charged with the commission of any offence, 
or are undergoing imprisonment or penal servitude' 
or detention in a place of detention, ora reforma-
• tory, or industrial school, or any inebriate reforma-
tory; .' . 
(c) who are habitual drunkards within'the meaning of the 
Inebriates Acts 1879 to 1000' ,",', .' . 
.'. . " , . ',.. '. , 
: • {(d) in wboae case, being children discharged on attaining 
, the age of sixteen from a flpecial school or class 
:' !, established under the Elementary Education (De-
.'. ._'._ fectiye and Epileptic Childre~) Act, 1899 [62 & 63 
'.~,::! .:'i:"'·~· 'Viet. c,'52], 8uch ~o~ic~ has been given by the 
. ","" ," '. local edu~ation. authority ,as is ,h~rein-e.fter men-
:~; .. ;;, {~T·! "l·oned' '".""'./ ,.,. , .,~~ .~ .. ,. ' 
.- :tI, ,J _ .~."' •••. • '\_ ~ .. ~,: .$J..\. I. ~ .. , '. 
'r. (e) in .. hose caSe' 'it is 'd~rable in "tlie :in\ie~est8 of the 
, .' A). <!;;,;;,::". _~i.~;i~~~ ·co~~wPty .,~~tQley §h.o~d be;: ,lepriyad f:;qf~·~fh? 
,.: ' '. ~~~r(f':!"i~,:j ,?ppo~J1p.Jtl(.ofJ>~rea.~~;~~ild~~ .. i:l·;~· ;;'~'i' ~r<·,,~,·:1 , 
/.",~,.:~-\+;:~·inwhOse'-ease· $UCh;4)t.her:~u.mst.'lloetl..eJisbi'~:·Ig1ay 
" ,.' ... )~f.;.~ ,:'''?'I ~;.~ ~:"," be specified In ·.,ny:'order J:\'.lade ,by ,the.~aq:of 
,;~ "":,!; t ~ i _ 'l</f~ .":,.State; ;3S' be~ng ~~~stance8 w14ch make-it ~r--' 
.~::~,.. -~~t,","'~'.~I.l,-.":~ _;_~' _.,,,,, .. _, __ •. ~_ •. _ .~.4. OJ' ;. "., " • t· t'. "',,I.!~\, 
, . / 
!" / . ·able that they should be' subject to be dealt' with!' 
II under this Act. " . ". ~ . .-
/ (2) The following classes of persons shall be deemed to 
be defectives within the meaning of this Act:-
.(a) Idiots; that is to say, persons so de~ply defective ill 
mind from birth or from an early age as to be 
unable to guard themselves against common physi. 
cal dangers; . 
( h ) Imbeciles; that is to say, 1>61'$OD8 who are capable of 
guarding themselves against common physi~l 
dangers, b.ut who are incapable of ~. theIr 
own Jiving by reasc..n of me.ntal defect exl8tlDg from, 
birth or from an early age; _ 
(c) Feeble-minded persons; that is to say, persons who 
may be capable of e~rniDg their livi~g under 
favourable, circumst~nces, but are mcapable, 
througb mental defect es.isting from birth or from 
an earlyage,-
. . (i) of competing on equal terms with their 
normal fellows; or 
(ii) of ,ma.naging· themselves and their affairs 
with ordine.ry prudence; , . 
(d) Moral imbeciles; that is to :say, persons who from 
an ea.rly age display some mental defect ~up!ed 
with 'strong vicious or criminal prOpen8ltle8 on 
. which punishment qas little Qr,.no deterrent effect; 
: :' (e)1dentally infirm persons.1 that is 'to ~.Y / penona who 
• ;'~hrough mental· infirn:rity ~ from age or the 
'decay of·lheir facu1t~es aK:~ meapab1e of manag-. -
ing ,hemsel\'e8 or :t~elr affall'8 .. 
I 
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Clause 50 
If any person intermarries with or attempts to intermarry with 
any person whom he knows to be a defective within the meaning of 
this Act,or if any person solemnizes or procures or connives at 
any marriage knowing that one of the parties thereto is a defective 
he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour. 
-~UA .. . . -.. ~- .... 
(213) 
CO'Delusion 
"The problem for each individual ir to discover the attitude 
or explenation that suits his te perament.Difficulties arise 
less from disagreement than from, 1 t k eop e no nowing the~selveB, 
from their takinG themselves too seriously,and from their 
thinking they know the whole truth" 
T. Zeldin - Poli ti cs and ;~n£er 
The conld.ueion to this research offers the opportunity to 
highlight some of its main points and to make Borne more 
gen$ral remarks on the wider significance of some of the 
issues discuBsed.:'1y first chapter is 'theoretical' and it ~ay 
be desirable to make some comment as to its ~urpo8e and 
presupposi tions. To boCin wi th I should fran!·~ly sny thnt in my 
view it 1s impossible to establish some definitive way of 
wr1 tin~. title history of ideas whose superiori ty over ito 
rivnls can be cler-'rly demonstrated.Indeed the full 1=:,plic2t~ons 
of this ar£ument must be eccept0d-the notion that the humanities 
can follow a rational progression which will le~d to 
accumulated piles of knowledge is a. chimera and an illusion. 
Rather they exist in the for of disput~B . and disagreements. 
Thus there will always be reductionist historiana,theT!latic 
histor1ans,even Foucauvia~ historians and nothing anyone can 
say will make them go aw<' y. 
\!Jithin this lim1tatf.on my fiEst chppter restricted itself to 
a (doubtless partial)exploration of what the prevailing 
methods are and why t:ey miLht be unsatisfectory.l'o ar~ue that 
something is unsp,tisfactory is not to sul ject it to a 'cri tiquc' , 
not to indict it as an infr1ngeent of the ele:nentary r",les 
of reasoning,not to prove that it is 'unEcientific','met~phYGical, 
or even 'incoherent'-1t is not indeed to indulrc i[:: any of tho 
sterile denunciations so favoured by the acce~ted modes of 
academic communication.Hather it is to state a reasoned 
prefer'.:.nce for doin£; something else.! hpve tried to make this 
point wi th the ex,'"'r:'ple drawn from the history of l:iolocy,nar'wly 
animal selLantics.An obscure eXMple perh'"'ps,of which I have no 
special knowleciLe, but one in which the different types of 
rar-aonine are cler'rly apparent. c~he v~.lue of this eX'"'Jlnle for 
me is not that Foucault demonf7trated t~1.t tLe positivists were 
wrone:(or ~ctnphysical,incohereut etc.etc.) .Thif" i~: . urely 
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impossible.If Aldrov~nc~i et.al. cannot be taken as incredulous 
fools or irratinc1 beings nor equally c~~ J.von ~~chs et.al. 
What Ioucault did pr,)vide in t~at context ,,:~; r: reasone,-1 
alternative to their kind of activity and ~ome sUG!~ested £Uideline~ 
towardE another kind,in a way which I found convincing.To say 
any thine more dE;finite than this ~pDg~r[' to ':1e to be i.~r.osBible. 
In 'Jly eX~:Llination of the po~.sible alteratives I drew 
exclusively on ~oucault and ,\1 thuBser, a selection which no 
doubt could be added to.At its sil~')lest I would arLlle that 
these two h~ve ~, common concern wi th the structurati.n of 
ide~~.What are the bou~daries of a particular discourse? ~h~t 
sort of glue is it that binds the elements toeether? 'r:hat :1lakee 
biology bioloLY or ~Jarxif;} marxism? Their own researcher' h~ve 
led to dra .. ,atic resrawinl.s of our picture of very familiC1r 
ide~8 as I discusoed wi threferencc to theories of evolution 
for eXPL:ple.I di( not intend to st<~Lest t;.:lt t'lese werr 
entirely new problems nor that they had provided co~plete 
solutions to them,nor yet thac I had applied their solutions 
in any ri[,orou8 or consistent wny. ~3ut I di(l seek to rU~tef~t 
th9t they had thought through SO~R of the centrel issues in 
an exemplary way,and only iL this senae did I try to 'follow' 
them. This is surely accept2ble.lt i r plainly inposEible to 
'follow' or 'apply' in any convel tional rence,a writer like 
Foucf,ult,who has instclled idiosyncrasy and e.:oteric,almost 
poetic,modes of expression at the very he~rt of his ~iscourse(l). 
Thus thinkin~ through the kindr of conr-idcr2ticI:r- r~iBod by 
AJ thu8ser and I ouccli.l t formed the background to what r'eC::loc 
to me two i-rers that hf'd to be dealt with.Firrtly to describe 
as accurately as possible the theoreticc:l structure of L.oULeliic8 
F.nd hnvin£ ~€,Bcibed it, to acc()u~.t for all the v"r arlt texts 
produced in i te name b~· reference to tr.is str~Jct\lre.' he second 
area w: e to explf:'in \.;!~y LuCeni r'te sc.ur.ded like Dr- rrir.ians 
1I-sof8r as thcj deployed bioloLical conceptr. and yet that 
1 · t d . thO .. r" thor ,':f!"€rent fro'~ deployment CU.llnp- e 1l... SO;jC 1:.:> 
Dnr' .. iniem loth in i ts c~)~:cepts and its r' ~ul ts. 
The ref.ul ts of these two ir.veFti ___ c.tioLs were f: rstl~r tll.-,t 
h t ised b",; certain eu[enics os ~ discourse was seen to lc c 2r~c ar . 
basic ~rnbiLiji tes or difficultier:.,the var:',lur r-ttc:-_"'ted 
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resolutions of which expl8ined the cuperficial ~1ver~:ty of 
eUGe;lic statements.!tnd secondly thp.t thef:e chpr~cteristj,.,ca 
were not the reuult of 'ideolo[Y',stl1l lepp the ~n~crh~nd 
theft by ill-intentioned ~en of pure sc~ence ~ut werr ro ted 
in certpin problems chnrpcterlstic of the very doctrine fro~ 
which they sought to borrow.But then,of course,nad th~t not 
been the C~ se, they would not have been in te rr f- ted in 
borrowin,.:;, it. 
In en~lcsB cont'-~plntion of these 
r8ther dry procedural matters one may lose 8i[ht of the object 
of inter.st,hugenics.ln one sense of course the m2terial 
expmined here is of purely historical interest-or,put less 
polltely,dead.lt has been a matter of filline In so~e £nns in 
the historical record.Yet there are perhaps 80me bro~d0r 
issues to be consider· d which sive the writings of the old 
~"ugenists a Ii ttle more th~n purely antiquarian interert. 
Plainly the questions raised by these old controversies are 
not yet dead.The interest in Darwin and D~'rwinism har- not died 
down but has rf-'ther intensified to t~lC point where there Is 
a veri ta,le l)8rwin industrY.!'iot only is a vast amount being 
done to fill in the details o~ D~rwin's life nn~ work tut 
the structure of his theory and its implicptiona are still 
being actively discuseed(2).Complementary with this hae been 
a renewed interect in the biolo6ical side of human nature and 
its implications for I1lankind('3).It is cornman knowled£e that 
for many years bioloEically based explanations were frowned 
on in the social sciences. Yet the question of rioloLY'S place 
in these sciences is a highly charged topic not ~erely within 
academia but emonsst a wider audience-oLe need only think of 
the controversies over intelligence for ex~mple.lt seems 
re~soneble to assume that. these if~sues will Lot eo aw~y. 
Looked at from this perspective the old ~.U[er.:ist8 j'lr'serve 80'11e 
credit.Jor all their errors and prejudices(a,.lpl~l r,~corr1ed here) 
they insisted that the i::1nlications of 7Jodern b101oL y be 
consider..:;d,and,where appropr1ate,acted on. 
Indeed even in a literal 
sense onE: may exagge~ate the deCree to which thf> i rf,t~cS are 
dead.One is often struck by how .':any of the p:-'o'le':'1s the old 
eUt::.e11sts t,rappled witl: re:n::in open querti(:Ls ••• or. alcoholi~":'l 
for exemple some of the old ideas c~nnot 8i~ply be di~missed 
gut of h~nd(4);the vexed questitD of genius rnd ~3dnce~ 
(216) 
remains( 5); the nature-l!urtt're controverD~l, rhetorically re8 t)lved 
by some vaLue eesture tow2r~s 'inter~ction',is still a live 
question(6).vJe CCIlf!ot,it would seem,cl'"'i'1 to have laid all the 
ehor:ts to rest and look b2ck on the eu[p,; tats fro:] a fir:! 
base of clear ~rd unas~ail~hle certainties. 
If these ro: ewhat speculative 
propositions be [ranted what linkc dare one drRw between 
historical study and current concerns? Firstly that,in this 
area at least, science/ideology distinctions of the f~~iliar 
kind are very difficult to Bustain.'.i.'his is a position which 
must be pressed even against the present study. Chapter two 
undoubtedly Buffer8 from the consider2ble limitation that 
Darwinism is taken as a unified enti ty.'~'his entity must 
surely be dissolved into D~rvinism as doctrinal statement, 
Darwinism as scientific prrctice and so on.In other words 
it should be treated as a tJuch more dislocated ~.nd ':ml ti-
levelled phenomenon than it conventionally is.A second feeling 
towL;rdc which this study tends is to avoid the ~l,stract 
polarisation of internalis~ and externalism.The acceptable 
element in internalism is cle"rly the thorough analysis of 
ideas and doctrines wi t:-jout the all too eflf'·Y recourse to 
reflection,psycholo[ies of motives rnd so on.Equally the 
materialist separation of ide~s and the reet of the world 
lacks conviction.Discouraes are not fenced off from the rest 
of human netivi ty yet nei ther are thc:-l simply paseive 
vesels for the expression of 'interests' or 'motives' 
consti t~ .. ted elsewhere.Finally,wi th reference to a question 
already alluded to,may one hope that an eX":ination of 
past efforts cannot impede,and,if only by indic~.tin£ previous 
pitfalls,may assist,in the halting progress tow~rds that 
'interaction' of Man'c biolo[;ical end social char~cteristics 
that has lone been sought and not yet found? 
(217) 
Conclusion - FOOTNOT~0 
1) See the intereetint; discussion of Foucaul t by H0 7cen 'I/hi te 
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